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Preface
‘Reduce the digital divide’1
‘Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger’
‘In  cooperation  with  the  private  sector,  make  available  benefits  of  new  technologies,  
especially information and communications’212
James  Grant  (cited  in  UNICEF 2008),  a  former  Executive  Director  (1980-1995)  of  the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), complained, in 1993 that, “[t]he problem is not that we 
have tried to  eradicate  global  poverty and failed,  the problem is  that  no serious  and concerted 
attempt  has  ever  been  made”.3  It  is  perhaps  against  this  backdrop  that  the  above  goals  of 
development  should  be  considered  especially  since  they  are  held  by  many  countries  and 
international development organisations.4  
1 In  addition  to  many  countries  and  other  organisations,  this  is  a  goal  envisioned  by  the  International 
Telecommunications Union (2006).  
2 The second and third of these slogans are official targets of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) to end hunger and develop a global partnership for development respectively.  The other MDGs pertain to 
universal education, gender equality, child health, maternal health, HIV/AIDS and environmental sustainability.  For 
more, see United Nations (2008).  
3 Ann Veneman (cited in UNICEF 2008), the current Executive Director of UNICEF has responded to this comment by 
saying, “Regrettably, that observation remains as valid now as it was in 1993”.
4 There are at least 20 organisations and programmes which are in partnership with the United Nations in support of 
these, and other, Millennium Development Goals.  These organisations and programmes include the World Bank, World 
Health Organisation, International Telecommunications Union and World Food Programme.  For a complete list, see 
United Nations (2008).  The countries which support the MDGs are, generally, those which are the members of these 
organisations and programmes.
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The argument is that if the digital divide5 is reduced by any measure (as envisioned by the 
International  Telecommunications  Union,  which  also  supports  the  MDGs),  if  world  hunger  is 
halved by 2015 and if the benefits of new technologies are made available to all, development will 
occur.  If a goal is to represent a vision, then it can be said, with respect to the Preface’s opening 
slogans, that conceptualising the idea to reduce and not close, to halve and not eliminate, to make 
available and not promote the productive utility is to suggest, by implication, that the processes – or 
tools – in meeting these goals are equally limiting.6  It is argued that from these (mis)conceptions of 
goals  and tools,  in their  various  forms,  emerge inconsistencies,  contradictions  and implemental 
shortcomings  of  policy.   While  vehement  attention  to  these  goals  may  ensure  their  statistical 
achievement,  this  could  detract  attention  from  the  inconsistencies  and  imbalances  of  that 
achievement.  An example of such a shortcoming is the global reduction of poverty from 28 percent 
to 21 percent over the 1990-2001 period.  Presumably, this is suggestive of progress towards the 
above MDGs.  However, this shadows the increase in poverty in sub-Saharan Africa over the same 
period from 44.62 percent to 46.54 percent (Gambari 2004).
This thesis investigates the reality of such concerns more closely in the ‘digital’ political 
economy of Africa.  Nestled, more specifically, in the South African ‘digital’ political economy, the 
research engages itself on a route of study of such processes within high-technology capitalism.  It 
would seem that the prevalence of such shortcomings, as those noted above, is possibly suggestive 
of more complex webs of confusion and concerns with implemental realities.  These are explored in 
the rural case studies of the Ndumu and Sicabazini villages in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.
5 In its simplified form, the ‘digital divide’ refers to distinctions between countries based on them being technologically 
‘rich’ and technologically ‘poor’.  Although not always the case, this generally follows the well-known classifications of 
countries in the global ‘north’ and the global ‘south’.  The term is also expanded to refer to those differences between 
regions, cities and suburbs.  This term is described further in section 2.5.2 below.
6 To the contrary, when declaring the MDGs in 2000, the international community, ironically, pledged to “spare no 
effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanising conditions of extreme poverty” 




The globe shrinks for those who own it; for the displaced or the dispossessed, the migrant or  
refugee, no distance is more awesome than the few feet across borders or frontiers. 
(Bhabha 1992: 88)
‘The  Information  Economy’.   ‘The  Network  Society’.   ‘The  Digital  Age’.   In  historical 
perspective, the technological revolution of present is transforming the social topography of our 
very existence.  This is, largely, facilitated by information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
which have the ability to store, transfer, process and disseminate data.  These technologies include 
(but are not limited to) radios, televisions, computers, the Internet, landline and mobile telephones. 
From  politics  to  ideology,  from  production  to  management,  and  from  basic  literacy  to 
entertainment, leisure and travel, global and personal relations are becoming increasingly dependent 
on ICTs.
The marriage of these technologies and capitalism into ‘high-technology capitalism’, as it 
has  come to  be  known,  has  facilitated  the  economic  interdependence  of  international  financial 
markets.  This has put a face to globalisation and provided a value to the high-skilled worker in 
forms which have never before been witnessed (Castells 1996: 201-326; Burnett and Marshal 2003: 
128).1  Precisely because of these associated influences,  it  has been argued,  we have witnessed 
changes  in  socio-economic  relations  and  geopolitical  realities  (Castells  1996;  Dyer-Witheford 
1999).  
These changes have been witnessed in various forms: the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 
which facsimile machines, computers and video cassette recorders were critical (Teharanian 1999: 
4);2 following the Cold War, the rise of South and East Asia has largely been credited to their roles 
as  e-commerce  hubs  and  high-technology  manufacturers  (Coe  and  Wai-chung  2004);  and  the 
“golden age” of transnational capital in the ‘western’ world (Kofi Annan cited in Kovel 2002: 49) 
was  marked  most  characteristically  in  the  last  decade  with  the  DotCom  ‘bubble’ (Ofek  and 
Richardson 2003).3  
1 To the contrary, Rifkin (cited in Tehranian  1999: 66) describes the information economy as leading to the ‘end of 
work’.  
2 Teharanian (1999: 4) makes this point because “technology can empower the social forces already pressing for social 
change”.  The role of the ICTs noted in-text, arguably contributed to the  new face  of former-Soviet Union market 
arrangements to heeding the embrace of neo-liberalism (Job 2001).  Job (2001) goes on to suggest that the accumulating 
debt of all the ‘developed’ world is linked to a process which he terms the ‘Russification of the West’.
3 The DotCom or Internet ‘bubble’ refers specifically to the period from January 1998 to February 2000.  During this 
Alongside such changes, and perhaps even as a result, the irony of global integration and 
global  interdependence has  been  its unevenness  (Table  1.1  and Figures  1.1  and 1.2). 
Despite the claim that “[b]y connecting the world and fulfilling everyone’s fundamental 
right to communicate, we strive to make the world a better and safer place”, statistical 
evidence  of  the  trend  to  meet  such  an  obligation  seems  to  suggest  otherwise 
(International Telecommunications Union 2008, emphasis added).  Illustrated graphically, 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show that although the proportions of Internet users and cellphone 
subscribers  have  increased  in  the  developing  world  over  the  1990-2002  period,  the 
balance  (particularly  with  respect  to  the  Internet)  largely  remains  in  favour  of  the 
developed  world.   Statistically, Table  1.1  shows  how  disproportionate  these  are, 
especially  when  comparing  Africa  with  North  America.   On  the  basis  of  these 
comparisons, it may be justifiable to question the actual global nature of the international 
information  economy as one envisioned as anything different to that of Marxists who 
point  to  the  transnational exploitation  of  labour.4 Alongside  such  disparities,  an 
international  policy has emerged whereby ICTs,  and their  possibilities,  are  offered to 
developing regions as promoters of development.5  In the global arena,  this has been 
publicised by both international organisations and developing countries.  From the United 
Nations, World Trade Organisation and World Bank to the G8; from the United States, to 
Britain  and Australia,  the connotations of ICTs are cast  in view of replication of the 
economic statuses of the developed world (Ya’u 2004).6
time, Internet sector stocks earned in excess of 1000 percent returns on public equity, largely unparalleled 
in any other sector (Ofek and Richardson 2003).
4 In  Karl  Marx’s  (1859)  Critique  of  Political  Economy,  he  saw in  capital  the  ability  to  influence  all 
participants in the global economy.  However, behind this supposed ‘free access’ to the capital market are 
disguised power relations, of – contrary to the liberal beliefs of John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo – 
exploitative power.
5 A definition of ‘development’ as well as an explanation for its use in inverted commas throughout this 
thesis are provided in section 2.5.1 below.  
6 There are, of course, uses for ICTs which do not universally fit this pattern of one-directional flow from 
‘developed’ to ‘developing’ countries.  In fact, Breckenridge (2005: 267, emphasis added) shows that quite 
the opposite is true with respect to biometric identification: “For the countries considering a move from the 
decentralised order of paper-based identification to the new world of digital biometrics, there is much to be  
learned from a close study of contemporary South Africa”.
2
Figure 1.1  Global comparison of Internet users, 1990-2002
Source: Worldmapper (2008)




Table 1.1 Total numbers of Internet and cellphone users by continent (2007)  
Total  No.  of  Internet 
Users (2007)
No.  of  Internet  Users 
per  100  inhabitants 
(2007)
Total  No.  of 
Cellphone Subscribers 
(2007)
No.  of  Cellphone 
Subscribers  per  100 
inhabitants (2007)
Africa 50 858.9                             5.3.. 270 585.7 28.1
North America 245 000.0                           74.4.. 275 673.0 72.6
South America 129 415.6                           26.9.. 378 980.9 69.7
Europe 331 610.4 41.27 882 648.1 109.5
Asia 569 798.0 14.3.. 1 475 121.5 37.1
Oceania 15 070.6 44.9.. 26 912.2 78.9
Source: ITU (2007a)
These  trends  are  certainly  emphasising  existing,  and  giving  birth  to  new,  faces  of 
international relations through their abilities to both undermine and enhance development.  On the 
one hand, ICTs appear to facilitate hegemonic popular culturalisations (Tehranian 1999: 61).  This 
is through an adoption of high-technology in the developing world on the, largely,  informal basis 
whereby “consumers have rights which non consumers do not share”, as John Pilger (1998: 68) 
describes in Hidden Agendas.   On the other hand, ICTs are facilitating the transfer of technologies 
and ideas from developed to developing countries in the spread of a new world information order 
(Dyer-Witheford 1999; Sklair 1995: 159-162).  This is promoted, formally, by politicians and other 
policymakers (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 1998).  In Africa, evidence of this ranges from the 
north with Egyptian President Mubarak’s (1999) prescription that, “[t]o invest in the technological 
industry is to invest without the least hesitation in Egypt’s future” to the south with former-South 
African President Mbeki’s (2001) proclamation that, “[w]e are determined to ensure that [South 
Africa] moves as speedily as possible onto…the information super-highway”.8 However, in the view 
of Joseph Stiglitz (1998a), technology transfer is insufficient to bring about development in the 
developing regions where it is needed most, primarily because of the widespread socio-economic 
and political realities facing such countries (Duffield 2002).  
The rapidity and extent of this embrace beg the question of why exactly it is that historically 
‘western’ technologies have come to be so dominant in the political agenda of the developing world, 
most notably in Africa.  Explanations pertaining to cultural identity have long been overlooked. 
7 This average is possibly lower than some would expect.  This is largely because 14 countries in Eastern Europe have 
averages  below 41.2 percent.   Those  with  the  lowest  are  Albania  and  Serbia  with  15.0  percent  and  15.2  percent 
respectively.  For a global and country-specific analysis of Internet and cellphone indicators, see ITU (2007a).  
8 David Moore has recently suggested that political ‘publicisers’, such as these Egyptian and South African leaders, 
represent the ‘organic intellectuals’ of society.  This is a Gramscian concept, by which Gramsci (1971: 97) means “not 
those strata commonly described by this term, but in general the entire social stratum which exercises an organisational 
function  in  the  wide  sense  –  whether  in  the  field  of  production,  or  in  that  of  culture,  or  in  that  of  political 
administration”.  For a useful intepretation of organic intellectuals, see Moore (1988).
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This  is  especially  because  such a  suggestion  has  not  been  granted  much attention  by political 
economists since the discourse of an ‘African socialism’ was, by and large, dismissed in the 1970s 
(Powell  2001: 242).  As a result,  this  thesis  is concerned with asking: why and when did ICT 
initiatives take priority in the minds of African policymakers?  At what point do these technologies 
replace  or  become  complimentary  to  the  implementation  of  developing  countries’ government 
policies?  How were,  and are,  these policies  appropriated at  grassroots  level  and how do they 
influence development in this context?
When embracing ICTs for development – whether this includes such aspects as promoting 
economic  growth,  reducing  poverty,  creating  employment  or  improving  health  care  –  the 
improvement  of  access  to  and creation  of  information  are  often  emphasised  as  the  pioneering 
benefits of this technology (Ayanwale and Adekunle 2006: 17; Hudson 2006: 20; Sen 1999a: 162).  
While these benefits are important, sometimes when facilitated by globalisation, they can 
also side-line the importance of local resources, skills and training (Habib and Padayachee 2000: 
259; Moyo 2001: 314-317).  To take this further, it also questions, in the minds of authors such as 
Hedley (1998) and Main (2001), the appropriateness of investing in digital technologies given the 
countless challenges faced in the developing world.   
NEPAD’s embrace, therefore, of free-market policies leaves questionable, on some level, the 
impacts  of  many  of  its  development  policies.   This  is  because  “political  democratisation  and 
economic liberalisation march together” (Moore 2001: 911).  These are two criteria are sometimes 
cited as necessities for the ‘openness’ allowed by the possibilities of cyberspace in the 21st century 
(Ayanwale and Adekunle 2006: 17; Habib and Padayachee 2000: 245).  The market arrangement 
which allows this, of course, fulfils the goal of many ICT policies seeking to increase the usage and 
accessibility to telecommunication devices (Hudson 2006: 1-15). 
The  thesis  postulates  that  the  ‘digital’  economy  is  a  complex  one  requiring  greater 
understanding by ICT policymakers and implementers.   Arguably subscribing to  views such as 
Bhabha’s (1992: 88), which opened this chapter, it can be suggested that perceptions towards, and 
expectations of, this economy, are underpinned by an assumed technological determinism which is 
not always appropriate for socio-economic development (Hedley 1998; Main 2001).  
It would seem that lack of clarity between ICTs as goals of development and ICTs as tools 
of  development  is  the  source  of  much  failure  of  the  development  potential  of  policy 
implementation.  Is the confusion between ‘goals’ and ‘tools’ due to technological determinism on 
7
the  part  of  politicians  whether  this  be  in  the  arenas  of  national,  regional  or  continental  socio-
economic legislation,  policy and rhetoric?   Is  it  simultaneously due to  the unbridled impact  of 
modernisation at grassroots level – even in the most rural settings –  which instils a ‘commodity 
fetishism’9 in the end-user?  
While there is evidence of the communal sharing of cellphones so that groups can maximise 
their  potential  as communicative devices (such as in rural  India;  Konkka 2003) there is  also a 
growing body of literature which shows how ownership has become a focal point of public fashion 
and how private ownership promotes individual self-worth (Cohen and Wakeford 2003; Katz et al. 
2003; Katz and Sugiyama 2005).  As Fortunati (2002) and Fortunati et  al.  (2003) show, this is 
sometimes taken to  the extent  that  possession  is  fashioned as  part  of  everyday clothing.   This 
arguably creates perceptions in the consumer that “...having the appropriate device is not enough; it 
must also be personalised because ultimately, it is an expression of personal style and way of life” 
(Oksman and Rautiainen cited in Castells et al. 2007: 160).  Evidence of such trends (Fortunati 
2002; Ling 2003; 2004), particularly for purposes of social status, is also emerging in Africa.  This 
raises much controversy over its inclusion amidst other concerns such as widespread hunger and 
poverty (Donner 2005; Hedley 1998; Main 2001).  The manifestation  of this is explored in the 
thesis to identify if such culturalisations exist in rural northern KwaZulu-Natal, and if so, how they 
are framed alongside national ICT policy.
With this in mind, the chapters are divided as follows:  To commence with the investigation, 
Chapter Two outlines selected development theories from the post-World War II era.  This provides 
a general introduction to how ICTs have entered and influence current theoretical discourse and to 
determine the most useful theory in explanation of African ‘digital’ political economy.  In addition, 
the chapter provides definitions and analyses of the culture-ideology of consumerism, development 
and the digital divide.
Chapter  Three  traces  the  appropriation  of  rhetoric  by  regional  African  Economic 
Communities.  It also explores their ICT-related policies and questions the extent to which these 
policies  create  an  environment  particularly  for  the  profits  of  the  transnational  private  sector. 
Against the backdrop of ICT prescription for development, and the adoption of these technologies 
in Africa, the continent remains largely burdened by poverty.  This potentially sheds light on the 
actual beneficiaries of ICT introduction.  
9 Karl Marx (cited in Miklitsch 1996: 6) notes, “[t]he commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily 
understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing”.  He argues this, primarily because of the value 
attached to certain commodities based on ‘sign-value’ as an indicator of their worth, rather than on use-value.  For a 
detailed study on commodity fetishism, see Miklitsch (1996).
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Chapter Four traces the politics of the South African ‘Information Society’ since political 
democracy in 1994.  It does this in order to pay systematic attention to potential contradictions in 
government ICT-related policy.  The chapter argues that ineffective policy implementation possibly 
originates from these contradictions.
  
Chapter Five continues this analysis in the case studies of two villages in KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa: Ndumu and Sicabazini.  It does this by paying specific attention to the ‘telecentre’ 
concept.  In the absence of effective government policy,  the topography of local ICT-politics is 
largely determined by the role of independent organisations and the private sector intervene which 
intervene in the name of development.
Chapter Six is a brief chapter which draws together the various conclusions of the preceding 
chapters.  It also makes informed suggestions of the ways in which the ICTs of the Internet and 
cellphones can productively be used to bring about development.
1.2  Why is the topic important?
Castells  (1996:  4,  emphasis  added)  argues  that  in  the  digital  economy,  “[p]rophets  of 
technology  preach  the  new  age,  extrapolating  to  social  trends  and  organisation  the  barely  
understood logic of computers…”.  Partially in response to such a claim, it is believed that the more 
attention which is  granted to  academic studies on this  topic,  and the improvement  of  dialogue 
between academics and government policymakers, the better.  
Because the focus of this thesis is the complexities of cyberspace, through cellphones and 
the Internet,  it  addresses the ways in  which these technologies  are  seen to offer paths  towards 
development in countries of the global south.  At the levels of inter-governmental organisations and 
certain  national  governments,  the  attractiveness  of  digital  technologies  has  manifested  in  an 
appreciation that living in the ‘information era’, aptly, requires the augmentation of existing, and 
new, development strategies with ICTs.  Potentially couched in technological determinism, a study 
is required to identify the accuracy of this view. 
Perhaps  the  ‘barely  understood  logic’  which  Castells  describes,  stretches  beyond  his 
limitation to  computers.   With a  possibly limited understanding of cellphones  and the internet, 
different, yet associated concerns emerge in academic literature.  In fact, there is an ominous global 
consistency in the creation, preservation and cognitive processing of information, which ironically, 
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meets the deterministic standards sometimes preached against by the very people who indirectly 
promote that ominousness (Goodenow 1996: 197; Hudson 2006; Odendaal  2006).   Studies,  for 
example, on the ‘digital’ economy in Africa (Donner 2005; Powell 2001; Thioune 2003) should not 
lose sight, as they sometimes tend to, of the fact that “we need to take very seriously the legacy of 
past  structures and mentality while appreciating that  identities and economic forms can change 
radically and rapidly” (Marks cited in Freund 2001: 546).  It is precisely because of this that an 
investigation is needed, not necessarily into historical origins of any sort, as Marks (cited in Freund 
2001: 546) suggests, but certainly towards looking more critically and in-depth at realities.  This 
may reveal the extent to which the digital economy does not directly benefit those marginalised 
communities it is seemingly intended for when interpreted as a tool in development studies.  
1.3  Methodology
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between ICT policy at national level 
and the effects of government implementation at grassroots level, in rural KwaZulu-Natal, South 
Africa.  The conclusions, however tentative, are based on consideration of the body of existing ICT 
literature.  A perusal of the bibliography will reveal the relative absence of literature on the political 
economy of ICTs.  Despite the fact that literature on ICTs is very limited – either in English or 
translated into English – in academic discourses, its inter-disciplinary nature demands a respective 
range of sources.  As a result, this thesis is based on a fusion of literature which ranges from the 
disciplines of political science, sociology and philosophy to information studies, internet studies, 
economics and management studies.  It is the hope that the mix of comparative knowledge across 
these disciplines will contribute to greater interest in, and far more comprehensive studies than the 
present one on, the political economy of cyberspace.  Further, it is hoped that this methodology will 
offer a useful analysis and will contribute to the promotion of more thorough investigations into 
‘digital’ political economy.
This thesis makes use of primary and secondary literature.  For Chapters 2, 3  and 4 the 
primary  sources  are  various.   They include publications  and  speeches  of  African  governments 
dealing particularly with information and communication.  In addition to this, the thesis makes use 
of  publications  and speeches from the African Economic Community.   These include the New 
Economic  Partnership  for  Africa’s  Development  (NEPAD),  the  Southern  African  Development 
Community  (SADC),  the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS)  and  the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).  
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The thesis also draws on secondary literature and theories of development, particularly since 
the end of World War Two to the present.  These sources allow for the required engagement with 
discourses since 1945 as well as with more recent studies of the digital economy.  This fusion 
provides  a  basis  for  a  unique  analysis  of  political  economy,  in  what  is  referred  to  as  ‘digital’ 
political economy.    
1.4  Goals and tools
Cowen and Shenton (1996) argue that when the intention to ‘develop’ is a response to the 
question ‘What is development?’, the actions of that intention are substantiated.  On the other hand, 
“When the question, ‘What is intended by development’ is  confused with the question ‘What is 
development?’,  an  intention  to  develop  is  routinely  confused  with  an  immanent  process  of 
development”  (Cowen  and  Shenton  1996:  viii).10   In  other  words,  actions  in  the  name  of 
development are not necessarily reflective of an actual occurrence of development even though it 
may be believed that this will occur.  
A similar methodology is used in this thesis in terms of problematising development.  It is 
argued  that the intentions – or tools – thereof can be routinely confused with, in a broad sense, 
definitions – or goals – of development.  When the fulfilment of tools of development are viewed as 
the completion in a process of development it  is not necessarily the case that development has 
occurred.  Possibly in recognition of this, the WSIS (2004: 2, emphasis added) has expressed,
We are  aware  that  ICTs should be  regarded  as  tools and  not  as  an  end in  themselves.  Under 
favourable conditions, these technologies can be a powerful instrument, increasing productivity, 
generating economic growth, job creation and employability and improving the quality of life of 
all. They can also promote dialogue among people, nations and civilisations.
The descriptions, as interpreted by the WSIS, of what ICTs can be and can promote are indirect 
references to the definitive goals of development.  
The understanding of ‘goals’ and ‘tools’ is developed in this thesis on two vertices.  The first 
is horizontal in which the yardstick of analysis is that tools are associated strategies and processes 
which are implemented by states to achieve specified goals.  The assumption is that ‘goals’ are 
those aspects of government policy which seek to be achieved because they serve the interests of 
the public at large or the interests of a specific targeted group of people.  ‘Tools’ are assumed to be 
the facilitatory policies and processes employed to achieve the respective ‘goals’ they are targeted 
at. 
10 Cowen and Shenton apply this to expressions of state policy.  It is the attachment of ‘development’ to the agency of 
the state which gives definition to doctrines of development.  This is, incidentally, the title of their book.    
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The second is vertical in which internal processes of the first vertex are bureaucratised with 
a  devolution  of  tasks.   For  this,  goals  and  tools,  on  a  less  ‘macro’ level,  overlap  and  are 
substitutable.  To illustrate the vertical vertex, a key policy of the state could be to achieve adult 
literacy rates of 100 percent for those between the ages of 16 and 65.  This would be a ‘macro’ goal 
of the state.  The tools to achieve this, as developed in national policy, could include better teacher 
training in primary and secondary schools, the subsidisation of enrolment to such institutions for 
those  who cannot  afford it,  and  perhaps,  nationwide  e-learning  programmes  to  reach  the  most 
marginalised  communities.   The  goal  and  its  associated  tools  operate,  metaphorically,  on  a 
horizontal  vertex.   On  the  vertical  vertex,  the  national  Department  of  Education  may  appoint 
various task teams to implement the above tools.  From the perspective of these task teams, the 
fulfilment of these tools becomes their goal even though it differs from the national goal.  If the task 
team appointed to developing e-learning courses and their infrastructure establishes access points in 
rural areas (such as Internet cafés and telecentres), it  becomes the goal of local management to 
ensure the sustainability of the centre and that it operates in a manner which is conducive to the e-
learning initiative.  The goal of the person who attends these courses is to become literate.  The tool 
for achieving this literacy is the e-learning course.
1.5  Limitations of study
The shortcoming of many studies on the implementation of ICTs is that they are based on a 
hypothesis about the causation of  development rather than on a general framework for analysing 
development.  As a result, literature on ICTs has a tendency to explain, in a narrative sense, what 
they can do, but it falls short in actually defining them, in an empirical sense, in terms of what they 
are.  This is a shortcoming which is sometimes overlooked in both applied and social sciences.  For 
example, mainstream narrative investigations of ICTs in anthropology, sociology, information and 
media studies, broadly speaking, contain analyses of ICT content.  These include studies on (but are 
not  limited  to)  cyberactivism (Croteau  2004),  cyberculture  (Stone  1996),  cyberidentity  (Turkle 
1995) and surveillance (Lyon 2007).  For illustrative purposes, studies encompassing these themes 
are directed at: the Zapatista movement in Mexico which used the Internet for gathering support for 
social and political justice (Cleaver 1998; Walch 1999); the role of SMS and the Internet in the 
ousting of President Estrada from office in the Philippines in 2001 (Bagalawis 2001; Salterio 2001); 
the role of cellphones in mobilising young voters which helped bring President Moo-Hyun to power 
in Korea in 2002 (Hachigian and Wu 2003); the role of the Internet and wireless communication in 
the political  defeat of the Partido Popular  in  Spain in 2004 (Rodriguez and de Ugarte  cited in 
Castells  et  al.  2007: 198-202); and most recently,  the role of the cellphone in Barack Obama’s 
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(successful) campaign for gathering support amongst young voters in the United States’ presidential 
elections (Smith 2007).11
These analyses into the content potential of ICTs are important to the fields of ICT-based 
academic literature, but are necessarily separated from the present study.   This is because they are 
distinctly  different  to,  as  this  thesis  shows,  technical  accounts  of  how  ICTs  are  conceived  as 
technologies of government policy and shaped by broader political economy.  It is the belief, as a 
point of entry, that only once attention is invested from this perspective, in terms of what ICTs are, 
that their content potential, as a function of what they can do, should be explored. 
To proceed,  attention is  granted specifically to the new information and communication 
technologies (NICTs) of the Internet and the cellphone.  This is performed, firstly, for the obvious 
reason of limiting the scope of analysis  since the intention is analytical  and not encyclopaedic. 
Secondly, even though the evolution of these technologies is rooted in decades past (Farley 2005; 
van Thanh and Jørstad 2005), with their  own individual histories,  this thesis is  limited to their 
existence in their present forms.  It is these forms which are most characteristic of the present digital 
economy.   This is  evident,  as  shown throughout this  thesis,  in the rhetoric of political  leaders, 
international organisations and the global corporate sector, as well as in the culturalisations of the 
public in the global information society.  Thirdly, in industrialised countries, the telephone proved to 
be a central factor in the reshaping of urban spaces, the workplace and the home (Castells 1996; 
Saunders et al. 1994).  While the cellphone and the Internet are increasingly looked at as means of 
hastening such changes in the 21st Century (Ling and Yttri 2002; Townsend 2000; Wellman 2002), 
they are, in many rural areas, the first kinds of NICTs (Castells et al. 2007).  As a result, it seems 
that they bring with them new social complexities, culturalisations and economic possibilities.  It is 
the landmark potential of NICTs in rural areas which is the final objective of the study.
The  preferred  approach  to  this  thesis  would  have  been  to  formulate  a  mix  between 
government ICT policies, political speeches and legislation, as primary sources, and studies in the 
confines  of  academic  research,  as  secondary  sources.   However,  the  global  escalation  in  the 
appropriation of ICTs – particularly in the developing world – is far quicker than the processes 
involved in performing academic fieldwork, the formal writing of studies based on this, and lastly, 
publication.  While every effort has been made to limit the literature used for this study to the 
standards of academic rigour,  the scarcity of such literature has been limiting.   As a result,  the 
11 As the election race heated up, particularly in October 2008, Obama’s camp introduced.  ‘The Official Application’ 
for iPhone and iPod touch.  This improved public interaction with the campaigners and made updated information about 
Barack Obama and Joe Biden quickly available.
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bibliography has been extended to include information from media reports, private consulting firms, 
international organisations and a range of credible online authors.   
Furthermore, in Chapter 3, which examines ICT policy in Africa, a key limitation is the 
availability  of  information.   Data  and  information  gathering  from  national  websites  proved 
particularly  challenging  as  some  countries  do  not  even  have  an  official  (government)  online 
presence  (such  as  Eritrea  and  Mali).   A translator  was  employed  to  translate  the  websites  of 
Francophone countries and regional economic communities.  However, it was determined that no 
government documentation was available from such sources.  As a result of this ‘dead end’, it is 
assumed  to  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study to  delve  into  French-written  academic  studies. 
Because  of  this,  the  chapter  is  limited  to  the  regional  economic  communities  of  the  Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).  Less substantial, but interesting, information on the role of the private sector in the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has also been included.
For Chapter 5, it was promised, by an interviewee (government representative), that data 
serving to confirm various claims by local people in Ndumu would be e-mailed.  This data remains 
necessary to this study.  Following the interview, the interviewee was reminded of this via both 
telephone and SMS.  Over the period August-October 2008, six phone calls were made but none 
were answered.   Of these six calls,  voice messages were recorded for three.  During this  same 
period, 16 SMSes were sent serving as reminders of the promised information.  However, none of 
these were responded to.  
1. 6  Case studies
1.6.1 Ndumu and Sicabazini
This  section offers an introduction to the chosen case studies of Ndumu and Sicabazini 
which  are  the  two  case  studies  in  this  thesis.   The  village  of  Ndumu  is  situated  in  northern 
KwaZulu-Natal and is part of ward 16 in the Jozini Municipality.  The village of Sicabazini lies 
approximately 35 kilometres,  by road,  east  of  Ndumu.   It  is  Ward 8 of  the  uMhlabuyalingana 
Municipality.  In 2001, the Jozini Municipality had a population of 184 052, which increased to 207 
250 in 2007 (Statistics South Africa 2007).  Comparatively, the population of the uMhlabuyalingana 
Municipality increased from 140 958 to 163 694 over the same period of time (Statistics South 
Africa 2007).  Both villages were once agriculturally self-sufficient.  However, drought, politics and 
socio-economic influences have greatly affected the living conditions of local people.  Evidence of 
this exists in the excessively low levels of access to water and electricity as well as the prevalence 
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of poor sanitation and healthcare.  
Until the mid-to-late 1990s, these regions remained largely unknown to people not in direct 
or indirect contact with locals.  With few landline telephones and no interest from South Africa’s 
mobile telecommunication providers, this part of KwaZulu-Natal remained largely neglected.  It 
was arguably various individuals  and P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation,12 a  non-profit  organisation,  which 
continue  to  play  central  roles  in  facilitating  local  development  processes  and  in  the  process, 
highlighting government shortcomings and failures.
Figure 1.3  Geographical map showing Ndumu P.E.A.C.E. Community Centre and Sicabazini Community Centre 
Source: Europa Technologies et al. (2008) 
      
12 This acronym stands for  Planning, Education, Agriculture, Community and Environment.  These are the pillars on 
which the Foundation’s actions and activities are based.  
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Figure 1.4 Ndumu P.E.A.C.E Community Centre, 2 July 2008     Figure 1.5 Sicabazini Community Centre, 2 July 2008 
                              Source: Own Image                                                                  Source: Own Image
Because available  data  from Statistics  South Africa’s  (2007)  Community  Survey  provide 
information for Municipalities, but excludes analyses of particular Wards, a range of statistics has 
been compiled for this study to provide a more recent assessment of living standards in Ndumu and 
Sicabazini.  To do this, a random selection of households was used for the analysis to provide a 
representative profile of the respective communities.1 3   For the study, 20 people, each from Ndumu 
and Sicabazini,  voluntarily agreed  to  participate.   These  comprised 14 males  and 6 females  in 
Ndumu, and 11 males and 9 females in Sicabazini.  According to the United Nations Development 
Programme  (UNDP 2008),  ‘poverty’ includes  “not  only  a  lack  of  income,  but  also  ill-health, 
illiteracy, lack of access to basic social services, and little opportunity to participate in the processes 
that influence people’s lives”.  Informed by this, but less specific for the direct purposes of this 
thesis, income and illiteracy (education) were chosen as the focus amongst inhabitants older than 16 
years of age.  The following data was compiled and the results are applied to the remainder of the 
chapter.
Sadly, municipal officers in Jozini and uMhlabuyalingana (the Municipalities within which 
Ndumu and Sicabazini are, respectively, located) were not helpful in granting interviews for this 
study.  In fact, many scheduled interviews were cancelled upon arrival at the Municipal Offices and 
promises of official data were not kept.  As a result, questionnaires were used for a random sample 
of the respective local populations.  To avoid the impression that the interviewer or the research was 
judging local people, the questionnaires were offered on a voluntary and anonymous basis.  Further, 
people were only approached by the interviewer if they were in groups.   Those who completed the 
forms were asked to give them to any individual and then to the interviewer.  This was done to 
eliminate any perception that the interviewer was concerned with the identity of the respondents. 
13 The purpose of the study was explained to participants in isiZulu.  They were only allowed to participate in the data 
survey after it was emphasised that this was voluntary and anonymous.  
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Particularly because of the need to determine the affordability of computer literacy courses for local 
people,  limited  financial  information  was also  gathered  from the  respondents.   Because  of  the 
sensitivity of such data, great care was taken in its collection.  Thus, an emphasis was placed on 
voluntarism, clarity – in isiZulu – regarding the aims of the study and the protection of identities, 
even from the interviewer.
In the absence of academic analyses of ICTs in Ndumu and Sicabazini,  the research for 
Chapter 5 is  mostly reliant on primary interviews and questionnaires.   In addition,  this chapter 
requires  official  documentation  of,  and  interviews  with  members  from,  the  South  African 
government, the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation and Vuvuzela Communications.14  Limitations to Chapter 5 
include  the  representation  of  Ndumu  and  Sicabazini  citizens.   This  is  because  the  analysis  is 
restricted, for practical purposes, to 40 people.  The results of the study are not intended to, in the 
absence of additional research based on greater local representation, bear any significance on those 
local people beyond the limits of this study.  Rather, it is hoped to prompt further investigation into 
these  marginalised  rural  areas.   Finally,  because  the  focus  of  this  case  study chapter  is  not  to 
intentionally  incriminate  any of  the  local  inhabitants  or  those  involved  in  the  development  of 
Ndumu or Sicabazini, pseudonyms have been used in certain cases.
The thesis also draws on secondary literature and theories of ‘development’, particularly 
since the end of World War Two to the present.  These sources allow for the required engagement 
with discourses over this period as well as with more recent studies of the digital economy.  This is 
necessary in the attempt to assess the accuracy of development theories in accounting for the socio-
economic and political dynamics of ICTs in the villages of Ndumu and Sicabazini in KwaZulu-
Natal.
1.6.2  The  P.E.A.C.E. Foundation
The P.E.A.C.E. Foundation is an organisation which is involved in the ‘development’ of 
both Ndumu and Sicabazini.  It was established in 1993 as a non-profit organisation (NPO) and was 
originally based at  the then-University of  Natal  (now the University of  KwaZulu-Natal).   It  is 
headed by Dorothy who has held the position of Executive Director since its formation.  With a 
central focus on poverty alleviation in rural communities, the organisation focussed originally on 
such communities in KwaZulu-Natal and the former Northern Province (now Limpopo) but soon 
expanded its operations to also include Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape.  The main feature of 
P.E.A.C.E.  ‘development’ initiatives  is  the  establishment  of  P.E.A.C.E.  Development  Centres 
14 The P.E.A.C.E. Foundation and Vuvuzela Communications are, respectively, the non-profit organisation and private 
company, which are involved in ICT-relate ‘development’ in Ndumu and Sicabazini.  
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(PDCs).   These  Centres  are  multi-functional  hubs  which  are  concerned  with  such  aspects  as 
promoting local economic growth and micro-enterprise, improving municipal service delivery and 
improving  the  interaction  between  the  community  and  local  political  leaders  (P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation 2006: 10-23; P.E.A.C.E. Foundation 2007a: 2).  All of these are included, holistically, in 
the five elements which are defined in the P.E.A.C.E. acronym: Planning, Education, Agriculture, 
Community and Environment.   These are  believed to  contribute  integrally to  the alleviation of 
poverty  in  rural  communities  because  they  are  “built  around  the  needs  and  structures  of  the 
particular community in which they are developed” (P.E.A.C.E. Foundation 2007a: 2).  While doing 
so, they are seen to improve access to information which educates local people about how to use 
resources (more) productively.  The organisation’s efforts towards sustainable regional development 
have  been continuous.   This  has  been carried  out  in  different  parts  of  the country,  through its 
Community Development Centres which have established crèches, information hubs and, amongst 
other  features,  set  up  infrastructure  for  bakeries,  bottled  peanut  butter,  juice-making,  sewing, 
welding facilities and telecentres.
Chapter 2: The Meaning of Development: Theory,15 Concepts and Definitions
2.1  Introduction
…without new information technology global capitalism would have been a much- limited  
reality… (Castells 1996: 19)
This chapter traces the rise and fall of selected theories of development since the end of 
World War II.  It is most characteristically since then that development, with its vested interests – 
most clearly connoted with American hegemony – has come to define the relations between the 
global north and the global south.16  Against this backdrop, the evolution of capitalism has come to 
be intricately associated with technology.  It is precisely this relationship which creates a paradigm 
for  new ICTs  to  be  analysed  in  the  social  sciences.   The  association  of  this  relationship  with 
development aid implies a marriage with ‘digital’ political economy as a field of academic analysis. 
It is arguably from this marriage that stems a digital divide.  This seemingly propels traditional (and 
gives birth to new) conceptions of the geopolitics of socio-economic disparities into the digital 
world.  To develop a point of entry into the remainder of this thesis, useful definitions are also 
provided in this chapter.  
2.2 Truman’s (in)famous ‘point four’
Following  World  War  Two,  the  balance  of  European  global  power  was  clearly  shifting 
towards the United States and the Soviet  Union.   Having been plagued with Nazism, and also 
devastated by war, Western Europe arguably had little choice but to heel to the new powers.17  Its 
reconstruction commenced, based largely on the theories of the economist,  John Maynard Keynes 
(Leys 1996: 8).18  In 1947, this  reconstruction was stimulated financially through the American 
15 It is argued by Leys (1996: 4) that Hegel and Marx were the “true originators of development theory”.  The former 
saw the unfolding of history as a process of ‘development’ and a “progression to the better” (Hegel 1953: 11).  The 
latter saw ‘development’ as the succession of modes of production (primitive communalism, feudalism, capitalism and 
socialism, respectively).
16 This dichotomy was popularised by the 1980 Brandt Report.  The ‘north’ refers to the world’s richest and high-
income countries.  It is also these countries which dominate international financial systems.  The ‘south’ comprises the 
world’s poorest, middle-income and capital-surplus oil-exporting countries.  The Brandt Report was compiled by the 
Independent Commission on International Development and was chaired by Willy Brandt (a former Chancellor of West 
Germany).  At the time, it was considered as one of the most comprehensive analyses of international development 
issues.  For a critical introduction to the Brandt Report, see Williams (1980).
17 The United Nations (UN) which succeeded the League of Nations, came into existence in October 1945.  The United 
States was granted the authority to veto any decision taken by the UN .  This contributed to the shift in western power 
from Europe to the United States.  
18 In 1944,  the Bretton Woods conference took place.  This was mostly to discuss ways in which to reconstruct the 
international financial system which had been devastated by war.  At this conference, it  was the views of two key 
economists  which  dominated:  the  American  Harry Dexter  White  and  the  British  John Maynard  Keynes.   Keynes 
proposed the introduction of standard world unit of currency called the Bancor.  He also proposed the creation of two 
new institutions to manage international trade.  These institutions would comprise of a world central bank and the 
International Clearing Union.  However, with the growth in American political strength, the outcome of the Bretton 
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Marshall  Plan.   By 1948, with the Soviet  blockade of Berlin,  it  became clear  that  the primary 
politico-economic  interests  of  the  global  powers  was  Europe.   It  is  in  the  “hardly propitious” 
context, following World War II, and against the backdrop of the looming Cold War, that the notion 
of  developing the ‘underdeveloped’19 –  as  a  concept  of  global  relations  – entered  international 
rhetoric (Rist 1999: 70).20 
On 20 January 1949, newly-elected President Harry Truman delivered his inaugural speech. 
Given the challenges in global politics, it was clear that this speech would need to address foreign 
policy very closely.  The speech can be broken up into four main points.  The first three dealt with 
the Marshall Plan, the United Nations and NATO.  However, instead of being remembered for its 
first  three  points  –  which  showed  support  for  the  newly-formed  United  Nations  Organisation 
(UNO), a commitment to European reconstruction and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) in response to Soviet threats – it has been remembered for point four.  This 
point is labelled by Rist (1999: 70) as a  “public relations gimmick” and based on “opportunist 
deception”  (Rist  1999:  70).   This  point  was  mostly  in  reference  to  the  need  to  assist  the 
'underdeveloped'  world and marked a watershed in broader global socio-economic and political 
relations.   This  was  not  because the  implications  of  the  term  ‘underdeveloped’  portrayed 
characteristic countries as being antithetical to those of the developed world.  Rather, it was because 
of its implications of them being able to achieve similar development to the developed world by 
subscribing to specific policies.  In other words, ‘underdeveloped’ did not simply point to a state of 
being, but to something which could be overcome through a process of foreign assistance. 
In a broader context, it is important to keep two factors in mind: firstly, against the backdrop 
of the Cold War, it was strategically useful to offer the benefits which Truman outlined, only to 
“peace-loving peoples”, “free-peoples” and those willing to embrace “democracy” (Truman 1949). 
Partly for this reason, Rist (1999: 80) argues that the Cold War constituted the ‘Third World’ as “an 
ideological battleground of the major powers”.  Secondly, with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Woods Conference was in favour of White.  His proposed creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (now the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund began operations in 1945.
19 The definition of this term varies in academic literature.  In fact, as Foster-Carter argues, the variance even sparks a 
“controversy”.  Some Marxists, such as Warren (1973) question the very relevance of the term as it detracts attention 
from  the  early  stage  of  industrialisation  which  he  argues  ‘developing’  countries  are  at.   Others  believe  that 
‘underdevelopment’ signifies a ‘blocked transition’ in that ‘developing’ countries are caught in an orientation based on 
export  production  and  import  consumption  (Amin  1974).   To  Frank  (1969),  capitalist  development  in  the  ‘core’ 
(‘developed’ world) can only take place with the development of ‘underdevelopment’ in the ‘periphery’ (‘developing’ 
world).
20 This is not to say that this concept was invented at this time.  Cowen and Shenton (1996: 7) show that it was used by 
Bourdillon, the governor of Nigeria in an address to the Royal Empire Society in 1937.  In fact, even 32 years before, 
British  Prime  Minister  Bannerman  (cited  in  Cowen  and  Shenton  1996:  7)  said  that  “We  desire  to  develop  our 
undeveloped estates in this country; to colonise our own country”.
1919
Rights signed two years earlier, it was also important to dispel, in global politics, the association of 
subordination  with  colonial  relations.   As a  result,  Truman’s  point  four  made reference  to  the 
“human family”, and expressed the importance of relieving the “suffering” and “burdens” of such 
people (Truman 1949).  This was in stark contrast to the traditional conception of ‘coloniser’ and 
‘colonised’.  Whereas that conception often led to  traditional liberation struggles of class formation 
and conflict, Truman’s idea of the human family clearly challenged this.  
Even though President Truman’s speech was made 60 years ago, it is still very relevant to 
the present.  This is because it marked an “opening act of a new era” in which the paradigm of 
development shifted (Rist 1999: 78).  Indeed, as a result of this new paradigm of development being 
stretched universally,  it  is  argued that  foreign intervention  gained  some ground in  terms of  its 
legitimacy.   In  reality,  the  paradigmatic  shift  of  this  intervention  was  simply  from  European 
colonialism  to  American  hegemony  with  comparable  influences  and  consequences  over  the 
‘underdeveloped’ world.  Indicative of this, for example, is Truman’s mention in the fourth point of 
his  speech of “knowledge and skill” and “modern scientific and technical knowledge” as being 
needed  in  ‘underdeveloped’ countries  (Truman  1949).   He  argued  this  because  of  the  direct 
association of these resources with greater production and improvements in standards of living.  In 
fact, that association from the political level it was publicised is mirrored in current perceptions of 
technology.  This is shown through the support which NICTs, in particular, are given by politicians, 
development institutions and ICT implementers (see Chapters 1, 3 and 4).
2.3  A selected history of approaches to development theory (post World War II)
Development  theory,  as a  term of Western development theorists,  emerged in the 1950s 
(Leys 1996: 5-6).  This was particularly in response to transforming and improving the productivity 
and  domestic  economic  growth  of  colonial  economies  (mostly  of  European  powers)  as 
decolonisation approached.  However, with much failure in India and parts of Latin America, the 
initial optimism which had been attached to development theory became increasingly diluted.  A 
response to these failures was heeded by the American Modernisation School.  
Some modernisation scholars have expressed, vehemently, belief in the idea that the role of 
ICTs (such as the radio) was to “implant and extend the idea of change, to raise the aspirations 
of...people so that they will want a larger economy and a modernised society” (Schramm 1967: 18). 
This  idea  formed  the  basis  for  the  dominance  of  the  modernisation  paradigm  in  studies  of 
development  which  drew on  the  use  of  technology.   Broadly speaking,  the  polarised  ideas  of 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ in modernisation theory fuelled impetus in many ideas.  The clearest was 
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that for ‘Third’ and ‘Second’ Worlds to develop, they needed to follow the politico-economic and 
value  systems  of  the  ‘free’ ‘First’ World.   Critical  to  this  was  the  transfer  of  education  and 
technology to facilitate the diffusion of western grounded knowledge and ideas (Lerner 1967; Leys 
1996).21  The vision of transforming less developed nations into more ‘constructive’, ‘creative’ and 
‘functional’ nations (Lerner 1967, Myrdal 1968, Leys 1996) is presently continued, as argued by 
Schech  (2002)  and  Standing  (2000)  with  focus  on  the  World  Bank.   By  positing  itself  as  a 
“knowledge bank”,22 it not only defines those parts of the world which lack ‘knowledge’ (by its own 
quantitative measures), but it encourages the view of itself as the provider of knowledge (World 
Bank 2008).
In the 1960s and 1970s, Rostow’s (1960) linear growth model and, Lewis’ (1954, 1955) 
structuralist  model  provided  the  most  dominant  economic  growth  theories  with  emphasis  on 
‘economic growth’ and ‘expansive productive capacities’.  The former followed a 5-stage model 
and the latter prescribed the emulation of the global north.  However, the links between ‘economic 
growth’ and ‘production’ on the one hand with ‘democracy’ and ‘development’ on the other hand 
were questioned throughout this time for two main reasons.  
Firstly,  economic  growth,  by  and  large,  failed  to  have  a  ‘trickle  down’ effect  to  the 
‘intended’ communities and nations (Hunt 1989: 71); secondly,  the 1970s brought instability to 
global economic markets following successive oil crises.  Furthermore, countries in Latin America 
had still  not been rewarded with the benefits of development which were attached to American 
development plans, despite ironically being formally independent for more than 100 years.  
Against this backdrop, support for dependency theory – made popular by Andre Gunder 
Frank – grew in intellectual circles.   Its  central  idea is that  countries of the global north (core 
countries) “actively underdevelop” countries of the global south (peripheral countries) (Graaff and 
Venter 2001: 77).  According to this view, ICT imports from the ‘core’ to the ‘periphery’ will lead to 
further  underdevelopment  in  the  latter.   This  is  because  ICTs  will,  accordingly,  facilitate  an 
improvement in communication between the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ and, in this way, strengthen the 
relations of dependence.  However, this theoretical relationship seems too deterministic as it would 
need to argue that the emerging technological paradigm marked by rapid inventions and upgrades, 
was a response to the internal contradictions of capitalism at the time.  This is a link which Castells 
21 Beck (cited in Duffield 2002: 1055) suggests that the ‘new wars’ in many ‘developing’ countries have arguably been 
the consequence of attempts at the local refashioning and transformation of neo-liberal globalisation to benefit from its 
associated ‘opportunities’.  He terms this, ‘reflexive modernisation’.
22 Former  President  of  the  World  Bank,  James  Wolfensohn,  first  used this  term in  1996 in  the  effort  to  promote 
“mainstream knowledge sharing learning” (World Bank 2008).
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(1996: 51) argues does not exist.  Further contradictory is that while the problem in Dependency is 
(under)development  by  a  reliance  on  inclusion in  the  system  it  describes,  the  deficiency  of 
development in the ‘network society’ is based on exclusion (Schech 2002).
Nonetheless, the scale of dependency theory’s popularity during the 1970s was emphasised 
with the international development community responding positively to some of its perspectives. 
This mainly took the form of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Bank 
adopting ideas pertaining to the redistribution of growth and basic needs respectively (Leys 1996: 
11-12; McNamara 1973: 10-11).  At the time, literature which showed the reciprocal relationship 
between economic growth and economic inequality in countries of the global south became more 
abundant  (Adelman  and  Morris  1973;  Ahluwalia  1976;  Paukert  1973;).   Seers  (1972:  124) 
comments:  
The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: what has been happening to 
poverty?  What has been happening to unemployment?  What has been happening to inequality?  If 
all three of these have declined from high levels,  then beyond doubt this has been a period of 
development for the country concerned.  If one or two of these central problems have been growing 
worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result ‘development’, even if per 
capita income doubled.  
According to Hunt (1989: 267):  
the purpose of development is to provide everyone with the opportunity for a full life, and that 
meeting basic needs is an essential prerequisite for this...there is also broad consensus that certain 
basic  physical,  intellectual  and  psychological  needs  are  common to  all  people,  and  that  their 
fulfilment constitutes an essential precondition for a full life.  The most important of these needs 
are  for  adequate  nutrition,  shelter,  fuel,  clothing,  clean  water,  sanitation,  health  care,  basic 
education,  productive  employment...and  popular  participation  in  decisions  concerning  the 
provision of these needs.
With views of development such as these, widespread interest  has emerged in investigating the 
relationship  between  ICTs  and  basic  needs  (Ayanwale  and  Adekunle  2006;  Arokoyo  2005; 
Kalusopa 2005).  
With  the  oil  crises  of  1973-4,  and  1976-9,  together  with  an  emerging  debt  crisis  from 
excessive lending (marked most emphatically with Mexico defaulting in 1982), the economies of 
many developing  countries  were  in  disarray.   Simultaneously,  many  developed  countries  were 
experiencing economic instability, prompted mostly by the economic crisis in the United States’ 
economy (and not directly as a result of the oil crises).  As a result, while basic needs continued to 
grow in popularity, dependency received a counter-revolution from neo-classical economics which 
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provided a top-down trajectory of development (Moore 2004).  
During these years, many technological developments were sprouting either as a result of 
new inventions or upgrades.  These ranged from the inventions of the microprocessor  (1971) and 
microcomputer  (1975)  to  commercially-available  VCR machines  (1977)  to  various  upgrades  in 
operating  system software  throughout  the  decade.   One  must  not  assume,  as  it  is  sometimes 
misconceived,  that  the  technological  revolution  of  the  1970s  was  a  response  to  the  internal 
contradictions  of  capitalism.23 He  makes  it  clear  that  such  technological  advances  were 
“technologically  induced  rather  than  socially  determined”  (Castells  1996:  52).   He goes  on  to 
emphasise  that  within  the  context  of  neo-classicism,  specifically  of  the  1980s,  technologies’ 
“development and applications, and ultimately its content, were decisively shaped by the historical  
context where it expanded” (Castells 1996: 52, original emphasis).  This context praised the free-
market  (as  opposed  to  state  assistance),  the  ‘invisible  hand’,  privatisation  and  foreign  direct 
investments  (FDI)  (Toye  2003:  71;  Moore  2004:  88).   At  its  core,  the  neo-classical  ‘counter-
revolution’ was based on high fiscal discipline and the free movement of national and international 
capital (Leys 1996: 7).  
The ensuing pessimistic economic environment allowed the IMF and the World Bank to 
base development assistance, in what became known as structural adjustment24 conditionality, to 
countries of the global south.  This assistance was based on them accepting the fiscal disciplines 
mentioned above.  Implicit in the free trade, which was a promised benefit of economic policies of 
liberalisation, was an integration into a global economy with ICTs at its core.  
Symptomatic of adopting these economic reforms (in an environment commonly described 
by many political  economists  as neo-liberal  globalisation) was the international restructuring of 
telecommunications sectors, mostly through their growth and reorganisation.  For example, the call 
for liberalisation as one of the conditions for aid to countries of the ‘south’ was contingent on some 
reforms  such  as  the  privatisation  of  telecommunications  sectors.   This  was  rudimentary  in 
23 Another popular misconception is that  the creation of the United States Defence Department’s Advanced Research 
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) in 1969 was a measure to prevent a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. 
Abbate (2001: 150) dismisses this outright: “This was never the case. The ARPANET was a research network, not a 
military command and control system; there is no evidence that it was ever regarded as a military target, and far from 
being secret, the technical details of the ARPANET were openly published”.  At the same time, however, Edwards 
(1997: 43-74) shows the role of computers during the Cold War in the United States.  He shows that the research for this 
was mostly funded by military agencies before, during and for years after World War II.
24 The term ‘structural adjustment’ was originally used by the World Bank in its 1978 World Development Report (1978: 
14-15).  This was in reference to OECD countries’ breakdown of the Multi-Fibre-Arrangement (MFA) and the resulting 
restructuring of their industries.  However, following the rapid increases in developing countries’ debt and balance of 
payments problems, it was thought that the application of this term would be more apt in the latter context (Mosely et 
al. 1991: 22).  
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facilitating the networked globe on which global capital would increasingly depend.  The effects of 
policies which ensured that “poverty-alleviation was demoted to priority zero so that the ‘structural 
adjustment’ of  the  developing  economies  could  take  place”  (Mosely et  al.  1991:  22)  has  been 
widely explored in politics and economics ( Moore 2007; Mosley et al. 1991; Sender 2002; Stiglitz 
1998b).  
The relationship between the ensuing and predominant economic framework and ICTs was 
bonded by the  support  for  limited  government  intervention  in  public  service,  by US President 
Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.  In an attempt to not fall too far 
behind the United States and Japan in the electronic sector, 1982 was proclaimed by Thatcher as 
‘Information  Technology  Year,  IT-82’.   With  the  wedded  activities  of  the  ‘economy’  and 
‘technology’  union  consistently  improving,  Al  Gore’s  proclamation  of  an  ‘information 
superhighway’ during the 1992 US presidential elections, received much attention.  The aim of this, 
as defined in the Agenda for Action on the National Information Infrastructure (NII), was to “put 
vast amounts of information at users’ fingertips” (United States Government Department of Energy 
1993: 5).  Distinctly moving beyond use by the United States Defence Department since the 1960s25 
there was an expansion of network technologies to include the economic development of private 
and  public  sectors  within  the  United  States  and  also  as  part  of  development  strategies  for 
developing countries.  This shift towards the use of ICTs in American internal policy and foreign 
development policy was encouraged through the concurrent  emphasis  on market liberalism and 
technological innovation. 
With  the  shift  of  technological  manufacturing  to  Asia,  the  emphasis  in  North  America, 
Northern and Western Europe shifted to creating a sophisticated information-based economy, which 
would draw on “an elite class of knowledge workers” (Burnett  and Marshal  2003: 128).   It  is 
arguably  from  this  that  sprouted  similar  energies  towards  an  information-driven  economy, 
particularly since the late 1980s, which would replace the industrial manufacturing alternative in 
other  developed countries.   The association between political  rhetoric,  free-market  policies  and 
information technology began to spread through the developed world.  Australian Prime Minister, 
John Howard (1996-2007) (cited in Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy 2002) identified that:
[t]he information age represents an opportunity to improve all Australians’ living standards and 
offers us enormous possibilities for the way we live, work, learn and interact. The challenge is to 
25 In  1969, a U.S. Defence Department research agency,  the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), created 
ARPANET.  This was intended to facilitate the sharing of computing resources amongst research sponsors of ARPA, 
most of whom were based at American universities.  In the 1970s, the next generation of networking technologies, the 
Internet, was born.  For a detailed account on the history of the Internet, see Abbate (2001).
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maximise the potential benefits for all Australians, and to enhance our competitiveness as part of 
the global information economy”.
In 1998, Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, emphasised the importance of internet access.  In 
his speech, he publicised a new strategy called ‘Connecting Canadians’.  It was aimed mostly at 
expanding Internet access in the country, particularly to connect all schools and public libraries via 
this electronic medium.  In addition, this strategy would create 10 000 public access Internet sites in 
Canadian  rural  and  urban  areas  (Prime  Minister’s  Office  1999).   Romano  Prodi  (1999),  the 
President of the European Commission (1999-2004), argued strongly that, “[m]odern economies are 
increasingly knowledge-based, and this is an area where we have a competitive advantage at world 
level. Encouraging the use and development of information technologies will therefore be a priority 
for the new Commission”.  In 1999, efforts were expressed, by France’s Chirac administration, to 
completely deregulate telecommunications in France.  This was hoped to, amongst other ambitions, 
facilitate greater “French presence” on the internet (Blocman 1999). 
The idea of this kind of technological attention spread in the economy and politics between 
these  countries,  and  others,  and  contributed  to  the  rejuvenation  of  capitalism  (Castells  1996: 
201-203).   Simultaneously,  this  encouraged  developing  countries  to  further  deregulate  their 
telecommunications  sectors  and,  more  generally,  embrace  the  economic  policies  noted  above. 
Following the methodology of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) of the 1980s, developing 
countries in the 1990s had to perform specific (re)structuring to ‘benefit’ from the possibilities of 
technology transfer.   It  this  precisely at  this  point  that  Chapter  3  commences  with ICT-related 
policies becoming increasingly characteristic of African political discourse.
2.4  Culture-ideology of consumerism
Because  the  culture-ideology  of  consumerism  is  not  generally  discussed  in  orthodox 
development  theory,  it  is  granted  separate  attention  here.   Before  even  engaging  with  the 
relationship  between  consumerism  and  capitalism  in  general,  and  the  culture-ideology  of 
consumerism in particular, it is essential to make specific mention of Trentmann’s (2004) Beyond 
Consumerism:  New  Historical  Perspectives  on  Consumption.   This  work  highlights  the 
significance, historically, of the various interpretations and implications of ‘consumerism’ as a term 
based on the goods or services consumed, why they are consumed, and of course, the consumer.  He 
explains that because,  over the last 20 years, philosophical interpretations of consumerism have 
been based on modernity as a subject.  They have, ironically, “followed on a changing assessment 
of ‘modernity’, not vice versa, and this theoretical dynamic inevitably had a decisive effect on how 
consumption  and  the  consumer  are  portrayed”  (Trentmann  2004:  373).   While  historical 
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understandings  of  consumption  are  necessary  to  compare  the  individual,  society  and  state  in 
different regions and at different historical moments (not always for the furtherance of capitalism), 
this  thesis  escapes  such  a  complexity.26  This  is  because,  despite the  historical  evolution  of 
technology,  new ICTs are a modern invention and have, even more recently, been introduced into 
the consumer markets of the developing world.  As a result, the technology transfer of the Internet 
and cellphones are discussed in this thesis, as being positioned within modernisation theory.  
Amid the  popularity  of  the  Modernisation  School,  Wells  (1972)  began  to  develop  an 
alternative view to modernisation.  He suggested a dissection of this into ‘consumption’ (increases 
in  developed  countries’ consumption  of  material  culture)  and  ‘producerism’ (increases  in  the 
productivity of work in non-consumerist economic sectors).  With this dichotomy, he asserted that 
“development requires the maximisation of producerism” not the “antithetical” alternative (Wells 
1972:  47-48).   His  general  categorisation  of  countries  continues  today along the  lines  of  high 
producer-consumer societies, high producer and low consumer societies, low producer-consumer 
societies, and low producer and high consumer societies.  
High producer-consumer societies include countries like the United States, those in Western 
Europe and South and Eastern Asia.  Of these countries, perhaps the most descriptive accounts are 
to be found on  China (Clark 2003), Japan (Holden and Tsuruki 2003) and South Korea (Fowler 
2005).  There, consumer markets are rapidly growing, to the extent that McGray (2002: 34-35) 
writes of “Gross National Cool” being the appropriate indicator of assessments on contemporary 
Japan.  High producer and low consumer countries would refer to those such as the former Soviet-
Union.   There is  a growing body of case study literature  to suggest  that  with the invention of 
modern ICTs,  and their  usage in  those regions which Wells  (1972) described as low producer-
consumer societies, such societies are becoming low producer and high consumer societies (Burke 
1996; Hudson 2006: 13-14; Inusa and Bytheway 2006: 133).  This trend appears to be expanding in 
large parts of  the developing world.  In some of Africa’s poorest countries, the globalisation of 
commodities and the western culture of consumerism seem to account, at least in part, for why 
some argue  that  NICTs  are  purchased  by local  people  at  the  expense  of  other,  arguably more 
beneficial  goods and services (Alexander et  al.  2006; Arellano et  al.  2003; Hedley 1998; Main 
2001; Msiska and Chigona 2006).  Castells et al. (2007: 59, emphasis added) show that “...because 
of their  association with higher income and education,  mobile communication gadgets serve as 
indicators of social status in the context of developing countries, thus adding a peculiar dimension 
26 Stearns (cited in Trentmann 2004: 378) traces the origin of ‘consumerism’, as is commonly understood as being based 
on material possession, to early modern China.   It  was during that time that expensive goods,  such as cloth, were 
purchased as items of luxury for the first time in recorded history.   
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to the processes of social appropriation”.  Evidence of this – described by Rafael (2003: 404) as a 
“display effect” – is notable in the developing world.  Examples range from the Philippines (Rafael 
2003; Arnold 2000; Strøm 2002) to Rwanda (Donner 2005) to Ghana (Leger 2007).  While evidence 
does point to increases in globalisation and a usually associated consumerism, Rafael (2003: 404) 
sheds light on other contributory factors.  These include the purchasing and ownership of second-
hand cellphones, the use of pre-paid services and weak fixed-line infrastructure.
As a result, “it is very easy to see how consumerism can be said to serve the interests of the 
global capitalist system” (Sklair 1995: 149).  The expanding ability for the  global  aspect of this 
system, described in part by a portion of the title of Dyer-Witheford’s 1999 publication –  High-
Technology Capitalism – has allowed for the promotion of the traditional separation of the worker 
and the means of production.  This is because “[t]he specific task of the global capitalist system in 
the Third World is to promote consumerism among people with no regard for their own ability to 
produce for themselves, and with only an indirect regard for their ability to pay for what they are 
consuming” (Sklair 1995: 149).  This was described as early as 1979 when Kumar (1979) described 
the  ‘communications  revolution’ as  global  ‘knowledge systems’ which began in  the 1970s and 
coincided, intentionally or not, with modernisation thinking.  The effects of the training and transfer 
of ‘knowledge’ which this school gave to developing countries were described by Nair (1980) as a 
‘cultural imperialism’ with profound effects and consequences for the people to whom such systems 
and devices were promoted.  
It has been argued that the culture-ideology of consumerism is the third prong (political 
imperialism  and  economic  neo-imperialism  being  the  other  two)  of  focusing  attention  on  the 
“economic  and political  consequences  of  First  World  hegemony over  the Third World”  (Sklair 
1995: 159).  This neo-Marxist conception of the ‘powerful’ exploiting the ‘poor’ is used in this 
thesis as a possible explanatory tool to account for the introduction of NICTs  in Africa.  
The culture-ideology of consumerism, it would seem, encompasses a wide range of elements 
in developed world paternalism over the developing world.  This includes such elements as cultural 
and  media  imperialism transmitted  through the  media’s  various  forms  (Y’au  2004).   Although 
overlapping somewhat, this thesis is concerned specifically with the cultural form.  This is analysed 
from the perspective of it being facilitated by information and communication technologies in the 
creation of a ‘new world information order’.  This potentially implicates global imbalances in the 
production,  advertising  and  usage  of  technological  devices  as  the  root  contributors  to  the 
contemporary situation of human poverty in developing countries.  This is because, as evidence 
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tends  to  show,  such  technologies  as  the  Internet  and  cellphones,  are  marketed  through  social, 
political and cultural engineering to meet the “material basis for the promotion of a standardised 
global culture” (Janus 1988: 135).  
2.5  Concepts and definitions
2.5.1What is development?
No single definition of development can do justice to its complexities since, “[i]ts  analysis 
and promotion extends across disciplines” (Leftwich 2005: 573).  Indeed, chapters and entire books 
have been written dedicated simply to interrogating the term (Chambers 2005; Power 2003; Rist 
1999).
The 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva (WSIS 2004: 2), resolved 
that,
...education,  knowledge,  information  and  communication  are  at  the  core  of  human  progress, 
endeavour and well-being. Further, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have an 
immense impact on virtually all aspects of our lives.  The rapid progress of these technologies 
opens completely new opportunities to attain higher levels of development. The capacity of these 
technologies to reduce many traditional obstacles, especially those of time and distance, for the 
first time in history makes it possible to use the potential of these technologies for the benefit of 
millions of people in all corners of the world.
Because of the implied association with human development in this  resolution (which exists in 
different forms as shown throughout this thesis), a definition pleasing to both the concepts of human 
development27 and to the ideological paradigm within which that be considered are required.
With  the  need  to  adopt  a  definition  which  is  encompassing  of  both these  concepts,  a 
potentially useful definition is offered by Castells (1996: 113), who states that: “By development I 
mean … the simultaneous process of improvement in living standards,  structural  change in the 
productive system, and growing competitiveness in the global economy”.  However, this does not 
suit the purposes of this thesis because, as some would argue, in a competitive world – not least one 
based on a global economy propped by the free-market – human development cannot be improved 
(Duffield  2002;  Moore 2004).   Hoogvelt  (summarised in  Schech 2002:  18),  elaborates on this, 
ideologically, arguing that “development is dead for those who are excluded from the global system, 
made irrelevant to its high-tech information-driven capitalism both as producers and as consumers”. 
Along  this  line  of  thought,  Sagar  and  Najam (1999:  747)  ask,  “when  does  development  start 
27 The United Nations Development Programme first used the concept of ‘human development’ in its 1990 Human 
Development Report  (HDR); it  opened with the lines “This Report  is about people – and about how development 
enlarges their choices” (UNDP 1990: 1).  
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becoming ‘inhuman’?”.28
The very idea that something intended to be developmental has a range which, it seems, can 
stretch to the ‘inhuman’ is perhaps avoided with such positions as that of Sen (1999a: 241, 1992: 
293) in his analyses of human development.  In his texts on welfarism, he is insistent on notions of 
promoting the possibilities for people to live the lives they have reason to value.  However, the 
purposeful ambiguity of such an idea does not question the ideological context may support, or 
even  shape,  peoples’ ‘values’.   Similarly,  there  is  no  suggestion  by  Clark  (2002:  78,  original 
emphasis) of evaluating the ideological rationality of values (or even of who assesses ‘genuine 
rationality’) in his expression that “we must accept any  genuinely rational assessment of [local] 
values that local people see fit to provide”.  
In light of such predicaments, Chambers’ (2005: 186) definition of development, implying 
“good change”, is used hereafter.  While this is equally neutral or infringing on human development 
and ideological choices, it does not address the concern of what exactly ‘good’ is.  Nonetheless, 
with its only specificity being its ambiguity, it is arguably the best suited for the purposes of this 
thesis.  At the same time, however, given the complexities involved in defining development, as 
well  as  its  contradictions  when interpreted  by different  people,  it  is  used  hereafter  in  inverted 
commas.29    
2.5.2  The digital divide and its associated complexities
According to Hudson (2006: 6), the digital divide refers to “…gaps in access to the Internet, 
both within industrialised countries and between industrialised and developing countries”.  These 
gaps are accounted for by the Benton Foundation30 (2004: 307).  They observe that “[t]he simple 
fact  is  that  poor  communities  are  entering  the  Information  Age  far  behind  their  wealthier 
neighbours”.  
Rhetoric from ICT-related discourses are abundant with positivist concepts of the digital 
economy: ‘smart city’, ‘intelligent city’ and ‘knowledge-based economy’, are but three examples 
(Bunnell 2004: 348; Coe and Wai-chung 2004: 354; Graham and Marvin 2004: 341; Madon 2004: 
28 The most formidable literature on this is arguably provided in the development discourses of the political ecology of 
capitalism.  One of the most devastating with respect to the idea of ‘inhumanity’ of development is provided by Kovel 
(2002).  He describes catastrophic human consequences in the name of global capitalism in Bhopal, India in 1984.
29 In The Anti-Politics Machine, James Ferguson (199) questions the structure of the development discourse, primarily 
within the context of Lesotho.  He argues that the ‘development’ aspect of this is faulty.  Therefore, he uses the word in 
inverted commas throughout.
30 This is an American-based urban social research think-tank.
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309; cited in Mosco 2004: 199; Odendaal 2003: 586; Solnit and Shwartenberg 2004: 296).  If we 
are to pause for a moment and consider the first of these terms – ‘smart city’ – it appears that it  
contributes in academic literature, whether intentionally or not, to the polarisation of the global 
economy.31  Seemingly in contrast to a ‘stupid village’, the ‘smart’ alternative is mostly suggestive 
of a technologically abundant society (whether pertaining, generally, to a country, region, city, or 
part of a city), whose characteristics should, implicitly, be aspirations to those who are not ‘smart’ 
(Bgoya 2001: 285).32  On a country basis, this distinction is very often based on the geopolitical 
trend of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries.  In terms of cities and villages, this would point to 
an  interpreted  technological  might  of  New  York,  London,  Paris,  Johannesburg,  Tokyo  and 
Melbourne over Mukono (Uganda), Nahar (India), Penglipuran (Indonesia), Ndumu (South Africa) 
and Sicabazini (South Africa).33  Although many of these villages do possess ICTs and have even 
used them for ‘development’ purposes, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (2002) 
observes  that  the  so-called  “new”  or  “quality”  digital  divide  is  not  attributable  to  the  lack  of 
equipment  or  connections  but,  in  its  present  form,  is  changing  from  “basic  to  advanced 
communications and from quantity to quality”.
A supplementary  argument  can  be  made  of  a  ‘knowledge-based  economy’ (possibly  in 
opposition  to  an  ‘information-based  economy’).   The  distinction  between  ‘knowledge’  and 
information’ is not a minimal one.  As Leclerc (1999: 80; emphasis added) argues,  “knowledge 
possesses a more durable value than that of  information because it is linked to a structure, to a 
stable system, to a durable reality, otherwise to an invariable; on the other hand information refers 
to a state of things which are more or less transitory and sometimes evanescent”.  Hudson (2006: 
10-11) argues that because “information...may be shared without being transferred” knowledge is 
“an organised body of information”.  The issues which this thesis is sensitive to, at the most extreme 
level, is the implicit association of ‘smart’ with ‘knowledge’ and ‘stupid’ with ‘information’.34  
In addition to providing understandings and definitions of key concepts, the purpose of this 
chapter  has been to  highlight  those ‘development’ theories which are  most  relevant  to  ‘digital’ 
31 Many of the texts cited here offer uni-polar accounts of ‘smart cities’ and appear to not be intentionally modernist. 
However, it is by implication that their descriptions are bi-polar, and indeed, deem necessary the pessimistic counterpart 
to ‘smart city’ in any analysis of global relations.  With this in mind, it is tempting to ask, in the words of Graham and 
Marvin (1996: 343-344, emphasis added), “how do you translate this technological potential, or indeed do you want to 
– into sustainable applications that actually meet the day-to-day needs and demands of a largely urban society…?”
32 Duffield (2002: 1052) elaborates on the conventionalism of such a dichotomy with respect to the political economy of 
war.  Their wars possess “traits of barbarity” while our wars are characteristic of “civility, restraint and rationality”.
33 This is probably emphasised by the expectation that the countries within which these villages are located needs to be 
provided.
34 Contrary to this, ‘information society’ is used in this thesis outside of this argued context.  This is simply for ease of 
reading since the term is somewhat generic in many discourses.  
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political economy.  It has been stated that when ICTs are identified by implementers as necessary to 
‘development’,  the  context  in  which  they  are  introduced  is  seemingly  reminiscent  of  a 
modernisation paradigm.  Within this context, a culture-ideology of consumerism is applied in an 
investigation of the appropriation of ICTs in African ‘development’ policies.  
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Chapter 3: The Appropriation of ICTs in Mainstream African Politics
3.1  Introduction
This chapter examines the adoption of ICTs, as modernising agents, ‘developmental’ ‘tools’ 
and consumer icons, in African politics.  Because it is, on a regional level, ICT-related policies and 
rhetoric  which  generally  play a  role  in  determining  these  outcomes,  these  policies  are  closely 
examined.  The chapter argues that African ICT policy and rhetoric seem to be concerned more with 
the embrace of the information society and its interpreted connotations, that with the effects and 
implications of such an embrace.  The chapter is divided into four sections: the first examines the 
role of the digital divide and NEPAD’s policy of ‘e-readiness’, and the remaining three provide an 
investigation into the regional economic communities of SADC, COMESA and ECOWAS.
The preceding chapters have shown that ICTs have been given much interest, particularly by 
ICT policymakers and politicians.  In fact, many socio-economic and political changes which have 
been witnessed in ‘developed’ countries can be traced,  on some level,  to ICTs (Thioune 2003). 
Referred to by many synonyms – such as the information, knowledge and digital economies – ICTs 
facilitate the distribution of data, in constantly cheapening and innovative ways.  Despite the trend 
towards  the  embrace  of  ICTs,  there  continues  to  be  a  considerable  gap  between  ‘developed’ 
countries and their ‘developing’ – notably African – counterparts.  It is argued that this digital divide 
limits access to, ownership and use of ICTs.  These limitations, in turn, reduce the contribution of 
these technologies to ‘development’,  including the creation of wealth,  reduction of poverty and 
other ‘development’ indicators (Sen 1999a: 162; Ayanwale and Adekunle 2006: 17; Hudson 2006: 
20).  
Perhaps it is not necessarily these limitations which must be directly addressed, but rather 
the seemingly questionable ways in which ICT benefits are appropriated by African politicians. 
Further, it is argued that this appropriation allows for transnational companies (both African and 
otherwise) to market, and profit from, ICTs with limited evidence of Africa escaping the poverty 
and other humanitarian crises which it continues to face.  It is argued that “[m]any initiatives have 
been  taken  at  the  international  level  to  support  Africa’s  efforts  to  develop  communication 
infrastructure and services that are connected to the world information highways” (Thioune 2003). 
However, this ‘connection’ matters little when its benefits are not forthcoming.  On this,  Thioune 
(2003) does concede that “the links between development and the use of ICTs are yet to be clearly 
established [with] results from Africa”.  While the adoption of ICTs may reflect basic economic 
forces of supply and demand, the market efficiency which this satisfies is not necessarily linked to 
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“the needs of the poor, who have very weak purchasing power” (UNDP cited in Thioune 2001).
3.2  Digital divides and ‘e-readiness’
The e-Africa Commission was created as the NEPAD Task Team responsible for Africa’s 
ICT sectors.  It was launched on 14 September 2002.  Its mandate was to create an ICT strategy for 
NEPAD – regarding policy and infrastructure – and to conceptualise measures to deal with the legal 
and regulatory aspects  of such a strategy (bridges.org 2003:  2).35  The Commission justifies its 
dedication to resolving the digital divide because of ICTs’ “crosscutting  impact on all aspects of 
human  life”  (bridges.org  2003:  2,  emphasis  added).   Such  a  claim  is,  by  implication  of  the 
associated link between the digital divide and a positive ‘impact on human life’, in reference to a 
paralleled relationship between being technologically ‘rich’ and socio-economic betterment.36  On 
this  basis,  bridging  the  digital  divide  is  constructed  by emulating  technologically  ‘rich’ cities, 
regions and countries.  This seems to shift focus from questioning and interrogating how Africa is 
disadvantaged from being technologically poor, to a presupposition that Africa is disadvantaged 
because it is technologically poor.  
As  the  diagram  below  illustrates,  it  is  only  Europe  and  the  Americas  which  show 
proportions of the ICT indicators (listed on the vertical axis) as being greater than the percentage 
size of their populations, in relation to the rest of the world.  Africa and Asia illustrate the opposite, 
with the clearest indicator being the virtually non-existent broadband subscription in the former.  It 
seems that such evidence, by implication, contributes to the basis for the e-Africa Commission’s 
argument that the digital divide is the cause of negative impacts on human life.
35 bridges.org is a non-profit organisation which works with governments and the private sector in Eastern and Southern 
Africa.  In addition to this, the company is involved in international technology policymaking for the World Economic 
Forum, New Partnership for Africa’s Development, G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force, United Nations ICT Task Force 
and the Glocal Forum.
36 This is not to suggest that human life is limited to socio-economic characteristics.  A useful starting point to the 
complexities of improving human life is Sen.
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Figure 3.1  Broadband, Internet, mobile and fixed line indicators in relation to GDP and population size
across continents (2006)
Source: ITU (2007b: 1)
From the desire which has been expressed by African leaders and their regional economic 
communities to reduce the digital divide for ‘development’, it seems that if such negative impacts 
are to be found, they would lie in evidence directly linking hunger, poverty, famine and civil war, 
for  example,  to  the comparative absence of  technology.   However,  this  seems inaccurate  when 
considering that such concerns plagued Africa even before the appropriation of NICTs.  In fact, a 
well-known economic  historian  of  Africa,  Bill  Freund (2001:  546),  has  shown that  these  have 
historical causes and origins.  The e-Africa Commission seems to, rather awkwardly, position ICTs, 
or the information society more broadly, as the origin of present African concerns.  
Arguably, the most influential element of African Economic Communities’ positions toward 
ICTs is shaped by NEPAD’s promotion of ‘e-readiness’.  This process has received much input from 
the UNECA-promoted National  Information and Communications  Infrastructure (NICI)  and the 
African Information Society Initiative (AISI).  The impetus which these participants have given to 
the digital economy serves two main interests.  Firstly, that of broader African incentives toward 
national, regional and international market competition.  From Figure 3.2 it is clear that the most 
competitive of those included are fixed and mobile telecommunications.  The second interest which 
this serves is, as a result of the first, the “greatest economic and social benefits” to African countries 
(bridges.org 2003: 8).  The relationship between market competition and such benefits is questioned 
by some authors (see Chapter 2).  To the contrary, its potential has culminated in the “unanimous 
agreement among Africa’s leaders and pan-African structures on the benefits that ICT can bring and 
the impact they can have on a wide range of development issues” (bridges.org: 2003: 7).  
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Figure 3.2  Levels of Internet, mobile and fixed line competition in sub-Saharan Africa (2006)
Source: ITU (2007b: 4)
Convincing African leaders, key policymakers and regional bodies of this in the first place is 
not difficult.   This is because the kinds of benefits to be derived from the digital economy are 
evident in the simultaneous growth rates and usage of ICTs in countries of the ‘developed’ world. 
For example, COMESA (2008a) has expressed its enthusiasm for “an information society in the 
footstep  of  the  developed  economies”.   One  of  SADC’s  (2004a:  51)  aims  is  to  mirror  the 
‘developed’ world’s 60:1 proportion of knowledge-based workers to other workers.  Of course, both 
views overlook the fact that these statements are in reference to economies already fully-fledged in 
digital market operations.  Illustrative of how unrealistic these aspirations are, some member states 
do not even have fully-functional government websites (Ivory Coast and Mauritania) while such 
websites of other member states do not even exist (Eritrea and Mali).  In attempts to overcome the 
comparative  imbalances  with  ‘developed’ countries  in  the  digital  economy,  Africa’s  Economic 
Communities have been, in collaboration with NGOs and transnational corporations, taking steps 
towards the ‘digitalisation’ of their economies.  Spearheaded by NEPAD’s ‘e-readiness’, Africa’s 
regional  bodies  and  economic  communities  have  shown  their  intended  steps  to  move  in  this 
direction.
Despite the promotion, the world over, of ICTs and their necessity to life in this era, the very 
concept of ‘e-readiness’, its implications and assumed interpretations are problematic on various 
levels.  bridges.org (2003: 6) defines it as “how ready a country is to gain the benefits offered by 
ICT in terms of policy, infrastructure and ground-level initiatives”.  The very identification in this 
definition of being ‘ready’, as the initial step of efforts towards the information society, assumes 
some  kind  of  supportive  foundation  to  embracing  the  information  society.   In  complete 
contradiction,  the  state  of  African  telecommunications  infrastructure  is  by bridges.org’s  (2003: 
57-81) own admission, generally weak.  The organisation even concedes that it this infrastructure is, 
in some cases, non-existent.  This exposes a vulnerability.  Despite vehement ICT promotion at a 
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policy level, “the people of sub-Saharan Africa, especially those living in rural areas, do not easily  
understand how ICTs will provide them with their basic needs for livelihood such as food, access to 
basic health care, shelter [and] clean water” (Mutula 2005: 124, emphasis added).  Perhaps more 
illuminating  of  this  is  Dode’s  (2007)  analysis  of  e-governance37 in  Nigeria.   He identifies  the 
country’s embrace of digitised social service delivery as nothing more than “lip service” (Dode 
2007:  381,  emphasis  added).   This  is  because  the  country  remains  with  a  “poor  state  of 
accompanying infrastructure”, including, but not limited to “adequate supply of electricity and the 
development of human resource capabilities of the populace” (Dode 2007: 380).
Such shortcomings do appear to offer a connection with an association of ‘e-readiness’ and 
‘benefits’.  The implicit assumption is that being ‘ready’ is directly connotative of the ‘successful’ 
or ‘beneficial’ implementation of ‘development’ initiatives.  In other words, being ‘e-ready’ and 
supporting  the  reduction of  the  ‘digital  divide’,  it  would seem, point  to  ends  in  themselves  in 
African ICT policy and rhetoric.  They do not appear to point to a required level of infrastructural 
investment  which  countries  should  attain  in  order  to  become  ‘ready’  to  proceed  along  the 
‘information superhighway’.  Is the mere possession of technology to seemingly elevate a country 
or region’s information ‘richness’ a sufficient achievement of ‘development’?  Is the possession of 
ICT infrastructure and statistically improving a technological image in the global arena the end 
point of measuring achievement?  Some would argue so (Wade 2004; Mbarika 2002; Kenny 2002). 
This is especially likely with consideration of the rapid growth of mobile cellular subscription in 
Africa, which increased by 55.3 million in 2006 alone, and by 44 million Internet users in the same 
year (WEF 2002: 6).  
While the concept of a Task Force is potentially productive, there are concerns with the 
ways in which the ‘e-readiness’ assessment continues to be performed.  The most critical is the 
country bias in choosing which countries to assess.  According to bridges.org (2003: 8-9), this is 
based on countries’ existing levels of ‘development’, which arguably, plays a role in determining 
the ease (and hence, willingness) of assessment.  In their view, “e-readiness assessment is not used 
effectively overall” (bridges.org 2003: 8).  They argue this because countries such as Egypt and 
South  Africa  have  been  assessed  nine  and  seven  times  respectively  while  far  poorer  and 
impoverished countries – believed to gain most from this programme – have not been assessed at all 
(bridges.org 2003: 8-9).  The organisation reveals that:
23 of the 54 countries had never been assessed for e-readiness at all. The fact that 43 percent of 
Africa’s countries have never been assessed means that those facing the most severe problems also 
37 This refers to the trend, in the information society to replace traditional state bureaucratisation of its citizenry, with 
more participative social service delivery facilitated through digital means. 
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do not have access to some of the key tools for comparison that might help them put ICT to work 
in their countries.  (bridges.org 2003: 9)
3.3  Regional steps toward an information society
3.3.1  Southern African Development Community (SADC)
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), as it was initially 
known, was formed in 1980.  It represented the alliance of nine majority-ruled frontline states in the 
region:  Angola,  Botswana,  Lesotho,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  Swaziland,  United  Republic  of 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Its original aim, as developed in the Lusaka Declaration, was 
that of “coordinating development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then 
apartheid South Africa” (SADC 2007a).  This was expressed in the motto: ‘Towards Economic 
Liberation’.  In 1992, in Windhoek, five additional members joined the economic community: the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa.  
Continuing the ‘e-readiness’ incentive provided by NEPAD, SADC (2007b) has outlined its 
efforts towards “[b]uilding a self-sustaining process with the positioning of the community as an 
effective  participant  in  the  information  and  knowledge-based  society  –  i.e.  transition  from e-
readiness to e-participation.”  This clearly moves beyond NEPAD’s initial views on how the digital 
economy can be used as  a  ‘tool’ for  African  development.   This  is  because  the  assumption  is 
movement  from  being  ‘ready’ to  encouraging  citizenry  and  local  governmental  involvement. 
SADC outlines the process of this transition with the classification of three different groupings. 
The first level is the ‘fundamental level’.  This refers to those countries which cultivate positive 
attitudes  towards  ICTs  and  possess  basic  ICT strategies  and  policies.   These  compliment  the 
required  infrastructure  such  as  basic  telecommunications,  electrification,  human  resource 
development and capacity building.  South Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles are identified as taking 
the lead in terms of such infrastructure, with Botswana and Zimbabwe at the opposite end of the 
spectrum.  The second level is the ‘middle level’.   This identifies those SADC countries which 
show clear progression from their levels of ICT policy to their increases in possession of certain 
ICTs such as personal computers.  It  is only South Africa,  Mauritius and Seychelles which are 
classified in this category.  The third level is the ‘advanced level’.  This refers to those countries 
which have incorporated digital technologies into mainstream economic activities.  It is only South 
Africa which is identified in this category (Ramsamy 2003). 
This model is important in terms of its potential to identify different countries according to 
different levels of ICT integration.  However, it fails to account for those countries which have 
shown limited steps towards ICT strategies and policies.  While it can be argued that it is difficult to 
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assess progress in countries where ICT-related progress hardly exists, SADC (cited in Ramsamy 
2003, emphasis added) recognises the  “diverse nature of our  Member States in the area of ICT”. 
Despite this, the Executive Secretary of SADC, Praga Ramsamy (2003) only identifies the above 
three countries in his description of the model.  Furthermore, SADC (2007b) has itself, ironically, 
acknowledged  that  “[t]echnological  innovation  is  a  key  factor  in  the  development  and 
competitiveness of the regional economies, which leads to wealth creation and the improvement of 
living standards”.  In addition, the regional group notes the importance of ICTs in the “contribution 
to  poverty  reduction  and  eradication;  development  integration;  balanced  and  equitable 
development; integration into the continental  and global economy; sustainable development and 
gender  equality”  (SADC 2007b,  emphasis  added).   With  only South  Africa  categorised  in  the 
‘advanced level’,  perhaps  more  has  to  be  done  to  assist  other  counties  to  develop  ICT-related 
infrastructure.  Despite the consistent notion of developing an inclusive information society, there 
does appear to be a void in SADC member states’ ‘e-readiness’.  If its political rhetoric and regional 
policy are to have any significant correlation with its ICT-related actions, perhaps efforts must be 
invested  in  addressing  the  regional  digital  divide  before  addressing  the  international  variety 
(Muchanga 2004, SADC 2007b, WEF 2002: 8).
This seems necessary because the motivation for ICTs points only to their benefits, but not 
to the process of developing the ability of member states to embrace such benefits.  This possibly 
offers an explanation as to why SADC does not classify, or have a category for, those member states 
other than the three levels mentioned above.  Perhaps this also suggests the need to address the 
contrasting perceptions towards ICTs within SADC.  Despite the regional economic community’s 
positivist interpretation of the digital economy, it admits, in its ICT Declaration, that amongst some 
members, there is a “reluctance of acceptance for ICT culture and innovations” (SADC’s 2007c, 
emphasis  added).   One  such  example  is  Zimbabwe,  where  President  Robert  Mugabe  has 
downplayed  the  benefits  of  ICTs.   This  is  because  “while  ICTs  can  be  used  as  a  tool  for 
development”, his priority, as ironic as it may seem given the present socio-economic climate in 
that country, is to “put food on the table and provide shelter” (Mugabe cited in SADC 2004b). 
Irrespective of a suggestion that member states have the right to prioritise ICT-led ‘development’ 
below other forms of ‘development’, entertaining such individuality contradicts SADC’s (2007b) 
intention of creating  an “inclusive”  ICT-based society (Muchanga 2004).  With this in sight, one 
needs to question the kind of information society that SADC envisions.  This is especially necessary 
since South African president,  Thabo Mbeki recognised that the information society offers “the 
possibility,  which  we must  seize  with  determination  and enthusiasm,  to  put  our region on the 
information super highway” (Mbeki 2000, emphasis added). 
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SADC values the need to “[s]trengthen...governments’ capacity to develop effective policy 
and regulatory frameworks to create conducive environments to ensure market development and 
public participation in the information and knowledge-based society” (this, of course, in spite of 
member  reservations  of  joining  such  a  society)  (SADC 2007b).   Just  a  few words  before  this 
excerpt, SADC emphasises that it must “shift gear in order to move beyond the current emphasis on 
backbone  infrastructure  development  towards  addressing  structural  bottlenecks  such  as: 
Reinforcement of citizens’ connectivity and ability to effectively use ICT” (SADC 2007b, emphasis 
added).  In the face of the widespread absence of backbone infrastructure in the region, SADCs 
commitment to this infrastructure is questionable.  This is mostly because it seems to show a desire 
to  benefit  from the  process  –  or  ‘tools’ of  ‘development’ –  before  even  entirely  ensuring  the 
accomplishment of its stated ‘goal’ of ‘development’.   This confusion is all  the more worrying 
because  SADC’s  (2007d)  own  report  of  its  progress  towards  an  environment  conducive  to 
widespread  ICT  implementation  notes  that,  “in  practice  at  the  strategic  level,  no  serious 
implementation [has] taken place”.  In fact, this lack of commitment contradicts SADC’s (2007b, 
emphasis added) aim which is that “[t]he application of ICT in the public sector [with respect to e-
government] must go through a process of re-engineering to ensure that  existing inefficiencies are 
eliminated”.  
In many cases, such inefficiencies within SADC apply to telecommunication infrastructural 
weaknesses.  They are not individually classified in a model of some sort, let alone in the above 
three-level  model.   This  failure  could be addressed by making room, in  its  ICT model  for  the 
‘advanced  level’ to  feed  back  to  the  initial  levels  as  this  may  provide  necessary  support  and 
experience  in  terms  of  policymaking  and  strategising.   This  will  reduce  SADC  countries’ 
dependence  on  South  Africa’s  infrastructure  in  the  medium-to-long  term.   In  addition,  it  will 
promote the regionally-desired (at the level of regional policy) “balanced, and socially equitable 
information and knowledge-based society” (SADC 2007b).  As a simple illustration of the need to 
refocus attention in basic infrastructure, Muchanga (2004), SADC’s Deputy Executive Secretary, 
points towards:
The lack of conducive infrastructure as a basic fundamental prerequisite for the development of 
ICT;  The  lack  of  regional  harmonised  policies  for  ICT;  The  low  proportion  of  electrified 
households across the majority of the countries in the region, with only two SADC countries close 
to 100 percent electricity penetration and the rest of the countries below 50 percent; Affordability, 
due  to  lack  of  financial  resources,  is  a  key issue  to  address  when  considering  all  aspects  of 
universal  service.  There is  still  a  very low Personal  Computers (PC) penetration in the SADC 
region with two countries at a little over 120 PCs per 1,000 people. The other countries have a 
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range of 2 to 60 PC per 1,000 people; Poor telecommunications facilities with low fixed line tele-
density, with the majority of SADC countries having fixed line tele-density of below 5 percent of 
the population; Low access to Television (TV) and Radio in the SADC region with the majority of 
countries having less than 20 percent of their population access to TV and less than 60 percent to 
Radio; and, High illiteracy levels in the SADC region with the majority of Member States having a 
population of school going children of 25 percent and tertiary students of less than 5 percent” 
(Muchanga 2004).
Taking  this  into  account,  SADC’s  (2007c)  Declaration  on  ICTs  recognises  that  the 
Community “needs a coherent regional policy and strategy on Information and Communications 
Technology...that promotes sustainable economic development, technology and bridges the digital 
divide within the Region and the rest of the world” (SADC 2007c).  It has no doubt advanced in 
these respects.  However, more effort is required to translate policy and strategy into catalysts for 
using ICTs, firstly in the horizontal form (see Chapter 1), as ‘tools’ of ‘development’.  
3.3.2 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
COMESA was formed in 1994 as a successor to the 13-year-old Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA),  which  had  existed  since  1981.  COMESA  was  formed  “as  an  organisation  of  free 
independent  sovereign  states  which  have  agreed  to  co-operate  in  developing  their  natural  and 
human resources for the good of all their people” (COMESA 2008b).  The regional integration 
which this  refers to,  together  with the creation of a customs union and the promotion of trade 
liberalisation, is believed to promote the economic prosperity of all its 19 member states.38  
COMESA has signalled its economic intentions and movement toward economic integration 
and trade liberalisation.  Within this context, it has highlighted that its group’s social and economic 
development must be “underpinned” with ICTs (COMESA 2008a).  To this end, it has developed 
various policies and regulatory frameworks to assist towards the direction of an information society. 
In its ICT policy documents (COMESA 2008a, c), it groups key driving factors which are required 
for its creation of such a society.  These factors are:
a) A facilitative policy, legal and regulatory framework; b) Encourage research and development in 
ICTs;  c) Investment capacity of network and service providers;  d) Technology challenges;  e) 
Management of competition;  f) Recognition and development of skills in ICTs;  g) Affordability of 
users;  h) Universal service/access;  i) Awareness and literacy of population and potential users;  j) 
Human Resources Development;  k) Mainstreaming of gender and other empowerment issues to 
38 COMESA’s member states are:  Burundi, Comoros,  the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt,  Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.
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ensure inclusivity, internalisation, participation and achievement of the right to communicate by 
all; and  j) Effective participation in regional and global e-governance. (COMESA 2008c) 
If it is indeed the absence of the above driving factors which “inhibits the development and 
application of ICTs in COMESA”, as the body explains, then what of basic ICT infrastructural 
development (both technical and social) on which many of these factors rely (COMESA 2008a)? 
Most  COMESA  member  states  are  deprived  of,  political  and  social  peace,  undamaged 
telecommunications  (due  mostly  to  war),  specialised  personnel,  sufficient  and  adequate  ICT-
supportive  electrical  power  (alternatively,  even  sustainable  infrastructure  to  support  wireless 
connectivity)  and  combinations  of  these  (bridges.org  2003:  57-81;  ITU  2007c).   Perhaps  the 
greatest  of all  such infrastructure requirements is  that  up to the end of 2007, 85 percent of all 
African Internet bandwidth traffic was diverted through Europe to its final  destination.   This is 
particularly a problem in East Africa which lacks any direct link to the global Internet backbone of 
fiber-optic cabling.39  The proposed NEPAD broadband East African Submarine Cable (EASSy) is 
only set for completion in 2009 (ITU 2007b: 15).
Figure 3.3 Optical Fibre Network in Africa
Source: ITU (2007b: 15)
39 According to  a  study by the NEPAD e-Africa  Commission in  2004,  Africa  still  lacks  52 040 km of backbone 
infrastructure necessary for Internet broadband: 15 950 km in central Africa, 2 200 km in northern Africa, 19 330 km in 
western Africa and 145 060 km in eastern and southern Africa (ITU 2007b: 15).
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It is only outside of the above key concerns that the necessity of backbone infrastructure is 
recognised.  COMESA (2008a) does acknowledge that a “major capital injection, far above current 
trends”, is required for the “scaling-up and modernisation of ICT infrastructure to...meet current and 
future demand for national, regional and global ICT services”.  Despite this, it gives little urgency to 
this problem elsewhere.  Although COMESA (2008a) articulates the need for financial resources for 
ICT-related infrastructure, this is not always forthcoming.  The key reason is simply that it fails to, 
by and large, commit to the channelling of these resources towards infrastructure development.   
The absence of this infrastructure has allowed the private sector to benefit.  This is mostly 
achieved through COMESA’s creation of an inter-regional mobile cellular market.  Certain mobile 
service providers, such as Celtel, have offered customers in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania borderless 
cellular phone usage at no additional cost to local charges.  In 2007, this was expanded to Congo, 
Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (ITU 2007b: 11; Celtel International 2007).  Other 
service providers, such as MTN, began to do the same in 2008.  The argument can certainly be 
made  that  such  private  sector  initiatives,  at  the  simplest  level,  promote  a  wider  spectrum  of 
communication.   Furthermore,  they reduce  the  burden of  individual  states  within  COMESA to 
expend resources on ICT infrastructure.  However, these initiatives also seem to undermine the 
regional authority of COMESA (ITU 2007b: 11).  The worrying signs of ICT corporatisation are 
already evident.  For example, in a recent study on cellphones in Rwanda, it was found that a large 
number of participants possess these devices for “style” and “social status” (Donner 2005) – ideals 
not apparent in the ICT policy of any African regional community.   In that country, it is even the 
poorest – often found in Africa’s rural settings – who are keen to own cellphones (sometimes more 
than one per person) as accessories and “social signals” (Varbanov cited in Donner 2005: 4).  This 
symbolises the embracing of an emerging lifestyle associated with technology (Donner 2005: 4). It 
seems possible, therefore, that the embrace of the information society in this context, and the ‘tools’ 
employed to reach COMESA’s broad ICT ‘goals’ are questionable.  
COMESA’s  (2008a)  belief  that  “to  reduce  the  information  gap”  it  must  “improve 
information capacity in its society” must be considered with greater care.  This is mostly because if 
the private sector is left to its own devices, the information gap it seeks to reduce could actually 
expand.  This could happen as companies search for means of generating greater profits.  These 
means  are  not  always  conducive  to  reducing  the  digital  divide  or  to  resolving  the  broader 
suggestions of human development outlined by the WSIS (2004: 2) in Chapter 2. 
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3.3.3  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The Economic Community of West African States is a regional economic community of 
fifteen countries.  It was founded in 1975.  Its mission is to be the “sole economic community in the 
region for the purpose of economic integration and the realisation of the objectives of the African 
Economic  Community”  (ECOWAS  2007).   This  includes  fields  such  as  industry,  transport, 
telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources and commerce. 
ICT-related information on this Economic Community is limited.  Therefore, this section 
primarily serves to enhance understandings of the environment in which ICT policy will be shaped 
if ECOWAS, as a Community, is to consider such policy with greater priority.   
In the face of the recent escalation in digital devices in Africa – most notably the cellphone 
and (to a lesser although still substantial degree) the Internet – people are very quickly subscribing 
to digital communication.  Generally, this is often for social purposes such as entertainment and 
online dating (Hale 2003). As shown in Table 3.1 below, mobile telecommunication companies 
have  identified  the  cellphone  market  as  a  highly  profitable  sector.   The  dominance  of  these 
companies in West Africa is clear with three in the top 10 listed companies operating in Nigeria.  
Table 3.1  Top 10 mobile communication operators in Africa in terms of national subscribers
Source: ITU (2007b: 10)
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Another company in West Africa which build profits from both cellphones and the Internet 
is TradeNet.  Arguably responding to ECOWAS’ (2007) “promotion of joint ventures by private 
sector enterprises”, it works in unison with aid organisations and programmes which co-operate 
with the regional body.  TradeNet is a Welsh-owned company based in the region, which provides 
access  to  agricultural  food  prices.   In  the  absence  of  the  technology  which  it  provides,  this 
information would not be available.  Its  DotCom millionaire and founder, Mark Davies, began a 
software company in an old gas-bottling plant in Accra in 2000.  This allows buyers and sellers in 
West  African  countries  to  indicate,  via  cellphones  and  the  Internet,  who  they  are  and  what 
agricultural products they wish to sell or buy.  The company has set up an Internet café, called 
BusyInternet, in the Ghanaian capital, from which market information is captured electronically and 
puts prospective buyers and sellers in contact.   Because this information is sent via SMS to all 
subscribers free of charge, TradeNet earns it profits through advertisements which are included in 
the text messages.
TradeNet  was  conceived  as  part  of  the  Market  Information  Systems  and  Traders’ 
Organisations  of West Africa (MISTOWA) project  which receives  funding from USAID’s West 
Africa (USAID/WA) mission (AfricanLoft 2007a; MISTOWA 2008).   In addition to the estimated 
$200  000  which  it  provided,  Davies  invested  $600  000  of  his  own money into  the  TradeNet 
initiative.   It  is along these lines that  The Economist (2007: 38) defines this project  as an “aid 
project”.  While this initiative is hailed for its efforts towards economic ‘development’, its actual 
benefits to the region – both immediate and medium-to-long term – can be disputed.  One of the 
examples  flagged  as  illustrating  the  success  of  this  initiative  was  the  sale  of  organic  fertiliser 
between one person in Yemen and the other in Nigeria.  While such an example illustrates the reality 
of the possibilities  of private inter-regional and continental  economic activity,  there are various 
concerns with this.  Firstly, such economic activity contradicts ECOWAS’ promotion of  regional 
trade.  Secondly, TradeNet does not take into consideration the issue of transport.  Even if market 
participants agree on relative pricing and use electronic information to identify the quickest and 
cheapest transport arrangement, transporting the produce to the buyer, given Africa’s poor transport 
infrastructure can be exceedingly costly (WEF 2002: 7).  As a result, it is arguably this kind of 
infrastructure  into  which  resources  should  be  invested  –  whether  directly  for  broader  ICT 
‘development’ or otherwise – before engaging in and promoting intra-regional trade.  Failure to do 
this has the potential to limit cross-border trade to a limited few.  
The success of Trade Net is questionable for three reasons.  Firstly, because TradeNet is 
privately  owned,  there  is  potentially  a  time  lag  between  the  realisation  by  governments,  the 
Economic Community or USAID/WA of the success of its initiatives.  Not only will this time lag 
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impact on stagnation with respect to advances in ICT policy and implementation, but will also be 
too long for TradeNet’s profits to be maintained.  At the extreme, this could result in the termination 
of TradeNet’s operation simply because of a lack of returns which would be a retreat from whatever 
progress such a company makes in terms of ICT ‘development’ in the region.  While companies, by 
definition, rise and fall during processes of economic ‘development’ and processes of accumulation, 
TradeNet is the only such company in the region.  Therefore, if it is to, hypothetically, dissolve, the 
negative impact on this emerging market would be substantial.  If Davies’ decision not to expand 
into  Senegal  and Burkina  Faso is  anything to  go by – because initial  returns  were  lower than 
expected (Hale 2003) – then this hypothetical situation is a very real possibility.  In fact, by Davies’ 
(cited in Hale 2003, emphasis added) own submission, “I’m excited by new frontiers and the first  
wave of development, not [by] sticking around to grow a career”. 
Secondly, on a horizontal level, mistaking ‘tools’ for ‘goals’ promotes a determinism that 
using ICTs, and creating environments for their use, is separate from ICT-related infrastructure and 
support.   If focus is to be placed – by profit makers, the public and regional policymakers – entirely 
on  the  service  which  TradeNet  provides.  This  could  detract  attention  from  infrastructural 
development  which  would  be  essential  for  the  company’s  continued  existence.   Dode  (2007) 
highlights this concern with a Nigerian example.  As a country in which TradeNet operates, and in 
which e-governance is promoted by the government, the overlooking of ICT-related infrastructure, 
and its consequences, are very apparent: 
[E]lectricity generation and supply in the country is unreliable.  Apart  from Abuja,  the Federal 
Capital Territory, where electric power supply from Power Holdings Company of Nigeria (PHCN) 
is guaranteed for many hours in a day, the picture is the opposite in other parts of the country, worst 
hit being the Southern parts of Nigeria. Most of the rural areas are not connected to the national 
grid; hence, such places record a ‘no-light situation’.  Another resource deficiency is personnel: by 
this, we mean the percentage of Nigerians who are not only computer literate but are regular users 
of the Internet. (Dode 2007: 380-381)
Thirdly, ICT policy is leaning in a clear direction.  This direction appears to allow for the 
persuasion of the private sector in commencing with its identification of target markets before the 
solid creation of national or regional ICT laws.   It seems that this environment is, as discussed with 
respect to cellphones in Rwanda above, creating a culture-ideology of consumerism.  Dode (2007: 
380-381) supports this with the claim that “[i]n the 21st century Nigeria, access to the Internet is 
treated as a status symbol available to the few that can afford its cost of installation and servicing. 
Others have to patronise cyber cafés to do their transactions, in the big cities”.
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3.4  Conclusion
Africa’s overarching ICT policies are determined by NEPAD’s assessment of countries’ ‘e-
readiness’.  There are endless problems with this.  These range from the very implication of this 
concept to the ways in which assessments are conducted.  This method, in effect, looks favourably 
towards those countries which show a willingness to embrace the information society.   This is 
largely irrespective of their (un)certainty on how to go about such a process.  On this basis, there is 
a determinism with which African leaders and economic communities promote the necessity of 
benefiting from ICTs as ‘tools’ of ‘development’.  Yet, against this backdrop, movement towards a 
digital  economy  in  Africa  seems  to  overlook,  whether  intentionally  or  not,  the  various 
infrastructural requirements for ICTs. 
One of the central reasons for this is the growing role of telecommunication companies in 
Africa.   Nobel prize-winning economist,  Amartya Sen, (1999a: 140) argues that,  “the forces of 
economic exchange and division of labour are  hard to resist  in a competitive world fuelled by 
massive technological evolution that gives modern technology an economically competitive edge”. 
Therefore,  without  greater  control  by  regional  economic  bodies,  fixed  and  mobile 
telecommunication companies may reduce the possibility of regional ICT policy (whether currently 
or in the future) having any bearing on the ‘development’ of local people.  Further problematic is 
the concern of uneven regional growth and national distribution of technology.  This is resulting in 
ICT benefits being largely sporadic and somewhat uncoordinated.  One of the reasons for this is the 
emerging encouragement given to the private sector to introduce ICTs to Africa.  With the need to 
identify profitable target markets, the instruction of  how  to use cellphones and the Internet, for 
example,  as a “key weapon in the war against  world poverty” are increasingly sidelined (WEF 
2002: 6).40  Initiating ICT-related policy to fight poverty must be conceptualised by countries and 
their regional African bodies and not telecommunications companies.  This is because the latter 
most likely have a central concern with increasing subscriber bases.  
The  urgency of  this  is  a  real  concern.   With  the  Internet  and  cellphone markets  in  the 
‘developed’ world at  near-saturation,  the incentive for transnational  companies  to  enter  African 
markets is that much higher (ITU 2007b: 10).  Therefore, while specific economic policies have 
brought  with them rapid movement  towards the usage of ICTs in  Africa,  this  has largely been 
against the backdrop of limited ICT policy.  This is supported by Alhassan (cited in Donner 2007: 
40 In a debate during the World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva in 2003, Senegalese President Abdoulaye 
Wade, proposed the creation of a ‘Digital Solidarity Fund’ to help bridge the digital divide.  However, this idea was 
dismissed by developed countries with the justification that sufficient funding is available through existing aid sources. 
The Economist (cited in Wilson III et al. 2005: iii) also disagrees with of the formation of such a Fund because “markets 
work better”.
47
20-21) whose work raises concerns over the effects of Ghana’s market liberalisation in the mobile 
telecommunications sector.  He argues that policy dialogue on ICTs is narrow-focused and limited 
to ‘economic fundamentalism’.
ICTs continue to be publicised, by those African Economic Communities which have been 
discussed  in  this  chapter, as  symbols  of  ‘development’ rather  than  ‘tools’ in  the  processes of 
alleviating social ills such as poverty.  This misidentification allows these Communities to compete 
with ‘developed’ economies, at least on a superficial level, of participating in the digital economy. 
Even  in  Africa’s  poorest  countries,  owning a  cellphone  and accessing  the  Internet  has  already 
attached itself to a particular social standard.  In the absence of fully-committed regional efforts 
toward an information society a likely irreversible culture-ideology of consumerism will continue at 
the benefit of the private sector.
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Chapter 4: The South African ‘Information Society’41:  Problems with Policy, 
Legislation, Rhetoric and Implementation
4.1  Introduction
This chapter critically examines the politics of the information society in the ‘new’ South 
Africa.   Since  the  dawn  of  political  democracy  in  1994,  information  and  communication 
technologies (ICTs), such as fixed and mobile telephones and the Internet, have been identified by 
government as critical to various forms of development.  As a result of the perceived importance of 
ICTs, it is essential that government’s 'goals' are met by relevant 'tools' in its attempts to achieve 
those 'goals'.  However, it would seem that government rhetoric is more reflective of deterministic 
interpretations of the potential of ICTs than it is of systematic and methodological undertakings of 
how to actually achieve its policy objectives.  This potential inadequacy is examined in terms of its 
implemental implications for both government and those in ‘need’ of its policies.  The latter is, 
perhaps more aptly, referred to as material consumers of a global culture.
The emergence of ICTs in the ‘new’ South Africa has followed a path mostly paralleled to 
the growth of political democracy since 1994.  The centrality of ICTs to the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP)42 was made very clear with its identification as a key feature in 
meeting  the  'goal'  of  “basic  needs”  (Government  Gazette  16085,  sections  1.3.6  and  3.6.3). 
Similarly,  the  Growth,  Employment  and  Redistribution  (GEAR)43 policies  classify  ICTs  as 
necessary 'tools' in adding to the “quality of life in communities” (Roux et al. 1996: 16).  They also 
seem to contribute to an “increase in...social and community living standards” (Roux et al. 1996: 
21).  During this time, however, it has been acknowledged that the RDP and GEAR policies have 
largely failed to deliver on promises of a more equitable society (Bond: 2000, 2004; Desai: 2004; 
Habib and Padayachee: 2000).  Indeed, wealth continues to be in the hands of an elite minority. 
South Africa ranks 121st out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 
2007: 231).  The trend of this index in South Africa has been downward since 1995 and decreased 
by 4.67 percent over the 2000-2005 period (derived from UNDP 2007: 236).  Worryingly, unofficial 
41 This title should actually read ‘Part of the South African ‘Information Society’.  This is because the chapter does not 
claim to holistically discuss the South African information society.  While it does examine the broad implications of this 
society, its specificity is limited to, as noted in Chapter 1, cellphones and the internet.  Any text which claims to offer a 
comprehensive account of the South African information society,  should also include other ICTs such as biometric 
identifiers.  Perhaps such a text should emphasise biometric identifiers more than the ICTs discussed in this thesis since 
they have a history more particular to South Africa which spans over 100 years (Breckenridge 2005: 270).  
42 The RDP comprises  integrated  policies  based on meeting basic  needs,  developing the country’s  human capital, 
building the economy, democratising the state and improving foreign direct investment.
43 GEAR is market-driven and seeks to, as the name suggests, address social and economic needs of those who were 
oppressed during apartheid.
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unemployment stands at over 40 percent (Mbeki cited in Fin24: 2007).44  Despite the apparent lack 
of impact of ICTs on development indicators, the ANC government continues to embrace them. 
Following the  association  of  global  capitalism and ICTs which  has  been explored  in  academic 
literature (Castells 1996; Dyer-Witheford 1999; Singh 2008: 17-28), it would not be unrealistic to 
position South Africa’s embrace of these technologies within the realm of global capitalist trends. 
Such trends are explored by Habib and Padayachee (2000: 246), in terms of their ideological reality, 
as  being  “the  result  of  the  ANC’s  particular  perception  and  interpretation  of  the  balance  of 
economic and political power, at both the global and local level”.
Based on this, the purpose of this research is to question the levels of clarity, consistency 
and  coherence  of  how ICTs  –  as  'tools'  of  development  –  are  directly  linked to  government’s 
broader  socio-economic  'goals'  of  development.   To  do  this,  the  research  is  divided  into  three 
sections.  The first provides a very brief history of how the information society has emerged as a 
dominant aspect of present political discussion and discourse.  The second examines, separately, the 
attention invested in telecommunications in the form of national legislation and policymaking and 
in the form of government rhetoric and policymaking.  Finally, the culmination of the implemental 
and effectual consequences of all the above are explored in the consumer market of South Africa’s 
privately-owned mobile telecommunications sector. 
4.2  The emergence of the ‘information society’ in South African politics
The presidency of F. W. de Klerk over the 1989-1994 period brought with it increases in the 
already growing divisions in  the ruling National  Party.   These divisions  had both political  and 
economic effects.  Politically, they marked one of the final factors in the history of apartheid which 
led to the regime’s demise and the transition to a Government of National Unity in May 1994.45 
Economically, the transition which this referred to (although evidence of this transition was already 
evident  earlier  in  the  1980s)  was  movement  from a  mostly  state-led  market  arrangement  to  a 
growing free-market,  which had direct  and immediate influences on the political  and economic 
structure of the telecommunications sector.  These were most obvious, as Benjamin (2001: 89-97) 
shows  us,  in  three  forms:  the  introduction  of  the  privately-owned  mobile  telecommunications 
44 Official unemployment stands at 23.1 percent (Statistics South Africa 2008: v).  The difference between ‘official’ and 
‘unofficial’ indicators is that the former includes only those who were searching for employment up to seven days 
before the most recent census.  The latter expands this to include those who had been searching for employment for the 
four weeks prior to the most recent census.
45 This is not to dismiss the justifiable arguments that global economic pressures toward economic liberalism played 
central roles in dismantling apartheid.  In fact, this is even more likely when considering the different stances taken by 
the ANC in its anti-apartheid struggles compared to its ideological framework post-1994 (Habib and Padayachee 2000; 
Bond 2004).
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duopoly of Vodacom46 and MTN47 in 1993, the emphasis of market-led telecommunications in the 
RDP, and the privatisation of Telkom.  
Therefore, by the time political democracy was a South African reality following the iconic 
1994 elections, the “impressionist” socio-economic focus of the ANC government was arguably 
already underway (Habib and Padayachee 2000: 245; Maphatane 2006: 30).  The distinctive role 
which ICTs played in this was very clear from the attention given to them in the 1994 ANC election 
manifesto (ANC: 1994a), the Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC 1994b: section 
2.8) and later, the Under-Serviced Area Licenses (USALs).  The RDP was very specific on the 
direction of telecommunications towards universal access in every household:
Telecommunications is  an information infrastructure  and must  play a crucial  role in South Africa’s 
development programmes.  The RDP aims to provide universal affordable access for all as rapidly as 
possible  within  a  sustainable  and  viable  telecommunications  system;  to  develop  a  modern  and 
integrated  telecommunications  and  information  technology  system  that  is  capable  of  enhancing, 
cheapening and facilitating education, health care, business information, public administration and rural 
development, and to develop a Southern African cooperative programme for telecommunications.  In 
terms of the RDP, telecommunication services must be provided to all schools and clinics within two 
years. (ANC 1994b: section 2.8)
By 1995 the growing emphasis on telecommunications and the use of NICTs, led to the 
appropriation of the concept of an information society in South African political discourse.  Then-
President Nelson Mandela and then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki were the initial  mainstream 
promoters  of  this  in  the  country,  with  clear  reference  beyond  the  generic  concept  of 
‘telecommunications’ (van Audenhove 2003: 3).  The initial thrust to their vehement support for this 
took place a year into political democracy with Mbeki’s (1995) speech at the G7 Conference in 
Brussels  and Mandela’s (1995a)  speech at  the International  Telecommunications  Union’s  (ITU) 
Telecom Conference in Geneva.  While emphasising different forms, both were clear on the ways in 
which the information society, or the information age, are linked to South Africa’s macro socio-
economic policy.  This primarily took the form of Mandela’s (1995a) emphasis on the importance of 
democracy, integration and the elimination of the digital divide, while Mbeki (1995) concentrated 
on economic competitiveness, culture and reconstruction and development (van Audenhove 2003: 
3).  Therefore, it can be argued that the various angles from which the information society was 
handled  was  indicative  of  the  deliberate  attention  it  required  in  the  South  African  case  of  a 
46 Vodacom’s initial ownership percentages were: 50 percent Telkom, 35 percent Vodafone UK and 15 percent South 
African Rembrandt Group.
47 MTN’s  initial  ownership  percentages  were:  30 percent  M-Net,  30  percent  UK Cable and  Wireless,  30 percent 
NAFTEL and 10 percent Transtel.
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racialised past.  Furthermore, in Nelson Mandela’s (1995b) address to the General Meeting of Urtna 
in Johannesburg, he drew comparisons between domestic and international disparities: “How is this 
[global]  village  organised?  The spectre  of  a  privileged  few setting  the  cultural  agenda  for  the 
world’s majority is very real.  If we allow this to happen, then the potential of new technologies to 
build bridges will have been wasted”.  Emerging from a traumatic history of racialised oppression, 
it seems likely that the introduction of the information society in political discourse took forms of 
both  friend  and  foe:  friend  because  of  the  possibilities  it  presented  to  macro-economic  global 
integration  and  local  development;  foe  because  of  the  possibility  of  the  digital  divide  further 
entrenching the predicament of social engineering of which apartheid was the architect (these are 
discussed in further detail later in this chapter).
In the earliest years of political democracy, a fusion of labour, business, civil society and 
government in the form of the National Telecommunications Forum (NTF) proved essential to the 
promotion  and  development  of  telecommunications-related  legislation  in  South  Africa.   It  is 
arguably  this  mix  of  participants  which  contributed  to  legislation  sensitive  to  addressing  the 
country’s  history.   These  participants,  as  well  as  Pallo  Jordan  (then-Minister  of  Posts, 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting) formulated a discussion document which became the Green 
Paper on Telecommunications.48  Those involved initially reached little consensus, but later agreed 
on  the  future  of  the  economic  arrangement  of  telecommunications,  especially  with  respect  to 
Telkom.  This culminated, in 1996, in the emergence of the South African Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority (SATRA) and the Universal Service Agency (USA).49  Emphasis was placed 
on  these  not  being  in  competition  but  on  them working  together  to  best  address  the  issue  of 
universal service in South Africa (Ministry for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting 1996: 
9).   This  was  targeted  as  a  prime  focus  specifically  because  of  the  unequal  access  to 
telecommunications  which  was  inherited  from apartheid.   As a  result,  the  USAASA sought  to 
“promote the universal and affordable provision of telecommunication services” throughout South 
Africa, with subsidies provided by the Universal Service Fund (USF) (Republic of South Africa 
1996: 10).  
With the finalisation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act (Republic of South Africa 1996), 
48 South Africa’s  legislation process follows the British model.   The first  part  of  that  process  is  the creation of a 
discussion document called a Green Paper.  It raises the issues of concern brought to light by policy discussions.  This is 
followed by the drafting of the government’s position on the issue through various drafts  called Bills.  When this 
becomes official, the final Bill is passed by parliament, the resulting White Paper is signed by the President and the Act 
becomes law.
49 By  2001,  the  name  of  the  USA had  changed  to  the  Universal  Services  and  Access  Agency  of  South  Africa 
(USAASA), mainly to eliminate any confusion associated with the ‘USA’ acronym of it being an agency funded by the 
United States of America.  For consistency, the latter is used hereafter.  
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it was decided that the liberalisation of the market and the privatisation of Telkom would bring in 
much needed investment and skills both to Telkom and to the sector in general.  The necessity of 
economic liberalisation, together with its promotion of investment and skills, was seen as a solution 
to  two  factors.   Firstly,  the  excessive  debt  which  Telkom had  accumulated,  and  secondly,  the 
Department of Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting’s need to meet the required roll-out of 
infrastructure,  particularly  in  disadvantaged  areas.   The  implementation  of  the  1996 
Telecommunications Act and the corresponding roll-out of telecommunications which this referred 
to commenced, generally, over the 1997-2000 period, primarily with the creation of ‘telecentres’.50
Sensitivity to socio-historical  realities  were emphasised by Pallo  Jordan’s successor,  Jay 
Naidoo, during his 1996-1999 tenure in office.  It is largely his three-pronged focus which gave 
much impetus to shaping South Africa’s ICT positions at the time.  The first was the identification 
of socio-economic progress which he viewed as directly linked to the possibilities of ICTs.  The 
second element was the interpreted association of ICTs with the basic functioning of social and 
economic activities.  By this association, he foresore productive influences on healthcare, education, 
rural development, youth development and also improvements in social service delivery.  Thirdly, 
Naidoo highlighted the importance of maintaining an up-to-date technology resource base in order 
to promote global competitiveness (van Audenhove 2003: 5-6).
By the end of Naidoo’s term, the emergence of the information society in South African 
political discourse was clearly a reality in its permanency in both policy and political discussion. 
While this trend continued, the arrival of Thabo Mbeki to the Presidency in 1999 as well as his 
choice of new Minister of Communication, Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, resulted in the formulation of 
new and supplementary ICT policies and legislation.  It is these which are now dealt with.
4.3  Contradictions within political processes and discourses around the issue of ‘goals’ and 
‘tools’
4.3.1  Legislation and policy
When  the  Green/White  paper  process  towards  the  1996  Telecommunications  Act  was 
underway,  the  issue  of  a  regulator  was  largely  absent  from these  discussions.   This  possibly 
indicated that the management of telecommunications was prioritised  below the urgent attention 
given  to  addressing  the  effects  of  apartheid  which  created  telecommunication  imbalances, 
particularly in black rural areas (Ministry for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting 1996: 9; 
Benjamin 2001: 93; van Leijden and Monasso 2006: 22; Government  Gazette 16995).  What is 
50 This term is used in South African ICT policy to refer to the points of access which offer services (such as telephone, 
facsimile and Internet usage) to impoverished people.  This is dealt with, in detail, in Chapter 5.
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most striking, in terms of legislation, policy and implementation, is that compared to Broadcasting 
which  had  the  Independent  Broadcasting  Authority  (IBA)  created  in  1993,  the  changes  to  the 
telecommunications sector had no introduction of guiding legislation, regulatory frameworks or co-
ordinated  policy  until  1996.   Although  seemingly  a  short  time  differential  this  could  account, 
partially, for why the Telecommunications Act fell short in many respects despite its advancement 
of the interests of improving nationwide access to telecommunications.   Clause 65.4, for example, 
states that the USF is to be “administered by the Agency subject to the control and in accordance 
with  the  instructions  of  the  Authority”  (Republic  of  South  Africa  1996:  53).   However,  the 
delegation of responsibilities  between the Department of Communication51 (DOC), SATRA, the 
USAASA and the operators was not clear, and sometimes overlapped.  For example, the lack of 
clarity  on  the  functions  of  SATRA and  the  USAASA resulted  in  an  indirect  dual  granting  of 
responsibility to them to oversee the obligatory roll-out by the telecommunication operators.   
The problem this presented to the DoC was two-fold: firstly, due to the lack of clarity and 
common goal, by the end of 1996 Jay Naidoo was reconceptualising the ideas of what function the 
USAASA should fulfil;  secondly,  the  confusion  at  the  time  seems to  have  fuelled  competition 
between  different  departments  to  develop  public  use  of  ICTs  in  their  respective  development 
policies independently of each other.  Indicative of this fact that “there was contestation between a 
number of departments to be seen as championing this new area”,  the Department of Arts and 
Culture and the Department of Science and Technology were beginning steps towards a project 
examining the future prospect of the ICT sector in the Foresight Project (Benjamin 2001: 99).  At 
the same time, the Department of Trade and Industry commenced research into its South African 
Information  Technology  Industry  Strategy.   It  was  arguably  a  partial  response  to  this  which 
motivated the Department of Communication to conceptualise the 'goal' of providing 3000-5000 
telecentres  to  under-serviced  areas.   It  seems,  however,  that  many  of  the  initial  aims  of  the 
USAASA and the Department of Communication’s info.com programme (a programme intended to 
showcase the possibilities of ICTs to government) were emotionally based on historical imbalances 
of access to telecommunications rather than on setting achievable 'goals' for its initial roll-out.  As a 
result, “ambitious” 'goals' such as those concerning the number of telecentres to be constructed were 
likely to have only been conceptualised because of the looming digital  divide (van Audenhove 
2003: 19).  This was highlighted by the evidence that once the difficulties of fulfilling the initial 
promises were encountered, it was too late to prevent the ensuing “crisis” of juxtaposed policy and 
implemental shortcomings (van Audenhove 2003: 19).  This was the result of,
serious problems with the implementation of...policy.  This was true for all sectors relating to ICTs, 
51 Throughout the official documentation of this department, it refers to itself as the ‘Department of Communication’ 
and as the ‘Department of Communications’.  For the sake of consistency, the former is used hereafter.  
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but  particularly for  the  telecommunications  sector...the  [national]  regulator  did  not  succeed  in 
developing a proactive policy geared at the development of the telecommunications sector or more 
generally directed at universal service in support of social development.  van Audenhove (2003: 
19)  
Because of this, by May 1998, the USAASA’s Universal Computer Project which sought to deliver 
on the promise of telecentres,  was closed down by the DoC.  In addition to the growing costs 
incurred  by the  Project,  growing tensions  with  the  USAASA led  to  its  further  exclusion  from 
mainstream actions, activities and meetings of the DoC (Benjamin 1999: 102).  
With Mbeki victorious in the 1999 presidential elections, the resignation of Minister Naidoo 
from politics and the appointment of his successor, Minister Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, the face of the 
South African ICT sector changed in focus.  This was primarily because the new Minister was less 
focussed on universal access than was Naidoo which arguably hampered the progress of the already 
dwindling success of the USAASA.  It was only later that year, with the implementation of the 
‘Telecentre Implementation Plan’ of David N. Townsend and Associates, a private consultancy firm, 
that the actions of the USAASA changed.  It became less focussed on the direct implementation of 
telecentres (which had proven too costly for the DoC) and more on three other outcomes.  These 
included electronic training, education and public awareness of the importance of ICT literacy.  
This was evident in the USAASA’s influence in the license obligations of fixed and mobile 
operators.  It promoted universal access to public telephones in schools and hospitals, especially in 
the poorer parts of the country.  These were initially formalised in the Telecommunications Act 
(1996).  Although protected from competition for local and international voice communication in 
the fixed line sector for a period of five years beginning in 1997, this did not reduce its obligations. 
Telkom had to install 2.69 million new lines (60 percent of which were to be in disadvantaged 
areas), provide telecommunication services to 3 204 villages, install 120 000 public payphones and 
provide access to 20 000 ‘priority customers’ (such as community centres, clinics and schools). 
However, the Telecommunications Act (1996) made no mention of the affordability of telephone 
lines to local consumers (Republic of South Africa 1996).  This accounted for the 50 percent to 70 
percent rate of disconnected lines as consumers were unable to pay their accumulating phone bills. 
Benjamin (2001: 109) shows that in the first three months of 2000, the company had disconnected 
223 386 lines.  Importantly, because of the nature of Telkom’s license conditions, disconnections 
did not negatively impact on its license obligations.
Despite the unsustainability and lack of success of these license obligations in many cases 
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(van Leijden and Monasso 2005: 22), the initial roll-out figures of the fixed-line operator greatly 
exceeded those of Vodacom and MTN.  On one level, this was because “from a legal perspective, 
universal service is defined as individual access to basic telecommunications at the level of the 
household via the fixed network” (van Audenhove 2003: 21, emphasis added).  On another level, the 
mobile communication duopoly enjoyed less demanding Community Service Obligations (CSOs) 
of 22 000 and 7 500 community service lines respectively, and fulfilled these three years before the 
1999 deadline (Benjamin 2001: 98).  As a result of this, the introduction in 2001 of the third mobile 
telecommunication operator, Cell C, did little to interfere with Vodacom and MTN’s comparatively 
higher prices which they were able to maintain after their initial CSOs were fulfilled.  
Beyond legislation,  South Africa has  failed to  formulate  a  formal  and all-encompassing 
information society policy (van Audenhove 2003: 2; Esselaar et al: 2006: 13).  This has allowed for 
various departments to manifest their own implementation strategies and develop what seem to be 
‘independent’  bureaucratic  arrangements  for  ICT  management  and  intended  public  roll-out. 
Consequently,  there  is  an  incredible  complexity  in  the  content  of  ICT-related  discussions, 
statements and documents.   Partially in  response to these complexities  and their  uncoordinated 
effects on implementation, the Department of Communication began a new strategy in 2001 to re-
legitimate itself as director of ICT initiatives and co-ordinator of ICT policy.  This commenced with 
the awarding of Under-Serviced Area Licences.   The main aim of this,  based on the American 
National Telecommunications Cooperative Association (NTCA), was to allow small and locally-
owned companies the opportunity to provide universal ICT access to ‘under-serviced areas’.  In the 
first round, seven licenses were issued to new small-scale operators.52  However, this was done 
formally only in October  2004 while Gazette 22959 of December  2001 had originally published 
information regarding applicants’ submissions.  As a result of this three year delay, the many more 
potential  licensees  who had applied  “could  not  sustain  themselves  during  the  lengthy process” 
(Cohen 2001; Smit 2004: 19).  
Due  to  the  pressure  which  the  DoC  was  under  in  terms  of  urgently  addressing  Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE), it sped the process by granting licences to those BEE companies 
which could introduce their own physical infrastructure.  Although attaching regulatory standards to 
this  in  the  form of  the  2001  Telecommunications  Amendment  Act,  costs  in  rural  areas  were 
relatively high and were mostly passed on to the consumer (van Leijden and Monasso 2006: 26). 
As van Leijden and Monasso (2006: 26) conclude, “the regulations were not based on an analysis of 
52 This was formalised in the 2001 Telecommunications Amendment Act.  The seven named operators were:  Ilizwe 
Telecommunications,  Amatole  Telecommunications  Services,  Bokone Telecoms,  Kingdom Communications,  Thinta 
Thinta Telecoms, Karabo Telecoms and Bokamoso Consortium.
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cost  structures,  but  on  the  mere  determination  of  an  operator  as  a  USAL”.   Furthermore,  the 
insistence on the provision of particular technologies in specific under-serviced areas limited the 
ability of the new licensees to compete with established operators and choose the technologies most 
suited to them.  
The aim of the licenses was to empower local, previously disadvantaged businesspeople, 
and in turn, achieve two objectives: the stimulation of black-run business in the formal sector of the 
economy and the creation of universal telecommunication access in marginalised communities (ICT 
Charter Steering Committee 2005: 5).  Despite the logic of the argument, there was, and continues 
to be, a concern.  The encouragement of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) in South 
Africa is based on the possession, by definition, of skills and capital upon entering any competitive 
market.  To the contrary, South Africa’s skewed history of resource distribution has ensured that 
high skills and access to capital are, as acknowledged by government, limited in possession of those 
targeted  entrepreneurs  (Government  Gazette  16995).   As a  result,  the  stimulation  of  economic 
competition  at  the  point  of  entry  to  any  sector  is  mostly  counter-intuitive  to  redressing  the 
imbalance of resources in South Africa.  
With this shortcoming partially recognised by government,  the second round of licences 
began in 2005 and was led by the combined broadcasting and telecommunications regulator, the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) (Government Gazette 27166). 
This regulator received its authority in the ICASA Act (2000) which was most recently amended in 
2006.  The clearest difference to the first reform round was greater state involvement, which was 
formalised  both  in  South  Africa’s  Telecommunications  Amendment  Act  (2001)  and  the  new 
economic strategy of Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) in 2005. 
The structural changes to the adopted “managed liberalisation” have meant the slowing down of the 
entire  universal  service  provision.   Had  these  changes  been  done  initially,  the  roll-out  would 
arguably have been further along its process by this stage.  With hindsight aside, the reality of this 
time lag renders any further analysis  of the operational effects  of the second round of licenses 
premature at the time of publication.  
4.3.2  Rhetoric and policy 
In the face of implemental shortcomings juxtaposed against the progressive ICT legislation 
they are intended to represent, the role of political rhetoric must not be overlooked.  It would appear 
that, in a South African context where debate over ICTs is often very fragmented, rhetoric is the 
origin of legislation and the promoter of policy once that legislation is in place.  In the case of South 
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Africa, this has already been shown with the praise granted to the information society by Mandela 
and Mbeki one year before the formalisation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  One could even 
argue that their speeches played key roles in catalysing the 1995 Green paper which led to this Act.  
With  apartheid-created  inequalities  fuelling  most  of  the  impetus  awarded  to  universal 
service  and  universal  access  (terms  which  were  used  synonymously  in  the  1996 
Telecommunications Act and which are still not clearly separated in definition), the digital divide53 
is a useful starting point to understanding the role of political rhetoric in ICT policy (Republic of 
South  Africa  1996).   While  a  generic  definition  of  the  digital  divide  may be  somewhat  self-
explanatory, a critical policy-deciding element to that definition differs between countries.  This 
largely revolves around socio-centricity and techno-centricity as the key focus areas of policy.54 
The former emphasises the use of technology for the improvement of lives and the latter emphasises 
the increase in technological possession, largely, for reducing comparative statistical imbalances. 
Although these can be complimentary they can also be counter-productive if promoted uninformed 
of each other.  
Along  this  line  of  thought,  perhaps  the  term  digital  divide  is  more  qualitatively  than 
quantitatively useful and encouraging to the creation, promotion and mobilisation of efforts in the 
interest of ‘curing’ the problem of this divide (if it is a problem to begin with).  In other words, does 
the digital divide focus attention on statistically increasing the availability of technologies to those 
people  who do not  already have  such  access  or  on using ICTs to  bring  about  socio-economic 
betterment?   Although  obviously  linked,  the  difference  in  specific  and  direct  attention  to 
quantitative and qualitative factors has the potential to, it is argued, dramatically influence on-the-
ground effects of ICT policy implementation.  Consider the four definitions of the digital divide in 
Table 4.1: 
53 In its simplified form, the ‘digital divide’ refers to distinctions between countries based on them being technologically 
‘rich’ and technologically ‘poor’.  Although not always the case, this generally follows the well-known classifications of 
countries in the global ‘north’ and the global ‘south’.  The term is also expanded to refer to those differences between 
regions, cities and suburbs.  
54 This  difference  in  perspectives  is  reminiscent  of  a  social  inclusion framework  which  “redirects  the  focus  from 
providing  access  to  technology to  the  effective  integration  of  ICT  into  communities  and  institutions  for  social  
development” (Warschauer cited in Mutula 2005: 124; emphasis added).
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Table 4.1  Table showing interpretations of the digital divide by members of South Africa’s Cabinet (2001/2002)
Interpretations of the digital divide GOAL TOOL
“Our  first  task  is  to  close  the  digital  gap  that  already  exists 
between the developed world and ourselves. As we carry out this 
task, we cannot seek to tie our country to outdated technology as 
this  would  guarantee  that  we  further  widen  this  digital  gap” 
(Mbeki 2001)




“We must bridge the gap between urban and rural communities, 
between blacks and whites and the digital literacy gap...efforts to 
bridge the divide [are] primarily about  people and not primarily 






“As government,  while  committing  ourselves  to  an  information 
revolution  in  our  country,  we  are  fully  aware  that  bridging  the 
digital divide is  not the cure-all for social ills that afflict society, 




revolution’ as part of 
a larger social 
transformation
Bridge the digital 
divide, amongst other 
'tools'
“Another challenge identified is the bridging of the digital divide 
between  Africa  and  the  developed  world  through  developing 
infrastructure  and  ensuring  the  transfer  of  technology.”  (Mbeki 
2002)
Bridge the digital 
divide between the 





On one level, these views may appear to be complimentary and implicit of the prescriptions 
for synchronised foundations to ICT policy.  However, when considered in terms of ‘goals’ and 
‘tools’, it is very clear that these are not always consistent and therefore have the potential to be 
counter-productive to each other.  There does appear to be an element of consistency in Mbeki’s 
interpretations: in both his excerpts, he identifies a techno-centric strategy in achieving the 'goal' of 
bridging  the digital  divide.   The  second quote  is  clearly socio-centric.   The  'goal'  is  to  bridge 
geographic and digital literacy divides and the 'tool' for achieving this is social development.  In the 
third quote, Zuma implies that the 'goal' is embracing the information revolution, within a holistic 
context, and that bridging the digital divide is one facet to realise this. 
While there is some similarity in certain cases, the 'goals' and 'tools' are mostly inconsistent. 
The  criticism will  undoubtedly be  levelled  against  this  that  the  above quotes  are  taken  out  of 
context.  Even so, they are excerpts from the same government administration, at a time when all 
were members of Cabinet (and therefore, seemingly in close contact),  between national elections 
and from the same policy period of 2001/2002.  As such, they should be reflective of consistency, 
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be written in an informed manner and, indeed, subject to such interrogation.  While 'goals'  and 
'tools'  will  always  overlap  in  vertical  linkages  (such  as  Cabinet  to  Department  to  agencies  to 
implementers), the appearance of ‘bridge the digital divide’ in Table 4.1 should not, at the very 
least, appear as both 'goal' and 'tool' at the same political level of Cabinet.55  The argument even, 
that perhaps the above 'goals' and 'tools' are holistically assumed in all the respective cases by all 
the speakers, does not stand.  If the assumptions are as simple as the members of Cabinet may think, 
then there is actually no obstacle to conceptualising them in such speeches.  
Furthermore, this inconsistency of views towards the digital divide emphasises an important 
concern.   The lack  of  common identification  of  what  exactly this  term refers  to  impacts  on a 
problematic culmination in implemental policies.  In the view of van Audenhove (2003: 3), “[b]y 
trying to construct a vision on the basis of fragmented political discourse and political statements, 
one risks creating a vision that is more comprehensive than the underlying reality”.  Similarly, the 
above  inconsistencies  possibly  account  for  the  claim by Esselaar  et  al.  (2006:  13)  that  “[t]he 
mechanism to achieve the objectives of the Department [of Communication] is not clear”. 
This suggestion of the DoC taking a lead is evident in its very own self-labelling.  It has 
identified itself as being at “the forefront of Government initiatives to bridge the digital divide and 
provid[e] universal access to Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) for all South 
Africans” Department of Communication’s (2007).  Despite this claim, between 1995 and 2008, 
eight government departments or institutions were involved, whether independently of each other or 
otherwise, in ICT-related policy initiatives (van Audenhove 2003: 10).  
But  such  a  problem  is  not  easily  remedied  simply  by  restricting  which  Departments 
ultimately decide on ICT policy.  This is because it has its own internal concerns, some of which 
have  already  been  revealed.   Further,  the  Department  of  Posts,  Broadcasting  and 
Telecommunications (which was dissolved into the present Department of Communication in 1996) 
outlined an important position towards the information society.  Then-Minister, Jay Naidoo (1998, 
emphasis added) stated that,
[i]n  the  Global  Information  Society,  there  is  a  direct  positive  correlation  between  access  to 
telecommunications and socioeconomic development.  We realise that telecommunications is  no 
longer the consequence of development; rather it is a necessary precondition.
55 Interestingly,  before  the  end  of  1996,  the  Task  Group  on  Government  Communications  which  Mbeki  had 
commissioned in his capacity as Deputy-President to examine the role, benefit and management of e-government and e-
governance in South Africa,  produced its report.  Of its 83 recommendations, one of the most  interesting was the 
proposal that ICT-related policies should be conceived, managed and co-ordinated by a Cabinet Committee led by the 
Presidency (Communications 2000: 1996).  
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In this quote, Naidoo displays an understanding of the idea that telecommunications, as a concept, is 
only the initial stage of broader developmental potential.  On a deeper level, he identifies access to 
telecommunications as a precondition for development.  There is, of course, nothing empirically 
wrong with such a statement because with telecommunications being viewed as a precondition in 
such  a  context,  access  to  telecommunications,  implicitly,  facilitates development  and  is  not  a 
product of development.  The issue which  is of concern is that  such statements contribute to a 
problematic imbalance between, on the one hand, attention to the possibilities which can be derived 
from access to telecommunications, and on the other hand, attention to the precondition for that 
access to telecommunications.  It is the latter which is glanced over, whether intentionally or not. 
Surely the ultimate precondition for development would be the infrastructure for the 'tools' which 
can then be used to bring about that development?  
Of course, one may argue that the above quote is, like those in Table 4.1, isolated and out of 
context.  Even so, it does not account for the paralleled contradictions and shortcomings within the 
DoC regarding its emotional determinism and devolutionary controversies which have already been 
shown.   In  this  instance,  the  idea  that  the  importance  of  physical  infrastructure  is  sometimes 
overlooked in political  speeches does appear to have associations with ‘trickle-down’ effects to 
departmental  agencies,  policymakers  and  the  public.   It  is  arguably  the  effect  of  ignoring 
infrastructural necessities which has alarming consequences on the ground and can lead to the lack 
of  sustainability  of  government-led  ICT projects.   In  other  words,  the  resources  required  for 
telecentres,  for  example,  require  electricity,  cellphones  require  signal  towers  from  which  the 
topography  of  the  land  does  not  interfere  with  signals  etc.   The  problem,  however,  is  that 
policymakers in South Africa seem, too often, to begin the process at the point of access and not the 
precondition for that access.56  One could very well argue that the various infrastructure which this 
points to is so obvious that its expectation is assumed.  Paralleled to the argument above regarding 
Table 4.1, is that if the infrastructure is so obvious a conception why then are they not mentioned as 
often as they could or should be?  The overlooking of this obviousness arguably accounts for the 
determinism which is the reality of many government-initiated ICT policies and programmes.  
The  repercussions  of  interpreting  the  digital  divide  in  this  way  and  overlooking  the 
importance of physical infrastructure (both of which have been described) have the potential to 
breed complexities in the ICT policy debate.  The failure of government to ensure the consistency of 
56 In support of such a claim, David Quail, spokesman on education for South Africa’s opposition Democratic Alliance 
Party said, “We’re not opposed to the concept of giving people computer skills. That’s great, we need to do that. The 
problem is the pragmatics of the situation....A lot of schools don’t have sufficient classrooms. There are not sufficiently 
trained teachers. Until those concerns are addressed, I don’t think you should try to give all schools computers” (Itano: 
2001).
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policy and implementation in the specific targeted localities it identifies as technologically ‘poor’ 
points to two factors (Gazette 1995; Mbeki 2001).  One, the national ambiguity of policy and, two, 
the lack of co-ordination between policymakers and the implementers of those policies.  
These are clearly illustrated with the juxtaposition of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below.  Although 
the former may suggest that efforts are being invested in reducing the digital divide, the latter shows 
that this is not the case.  In other words, although the implementation of public Internet access 
points is seemingly responsive to government calls to reduce the digital divide  throughout South 
Africa’s nine provinces, the reality is that these Internet terminals are predominantly grouped in 
‘digital villages’ which are mostly in major towns and cities (Maphatane 2006: 3).  When viewed 
from  this  perspective,  the  great  inequality  of  Internet  distribution  is  startlingly  obvious  with 
emphasis predominantly on Gauteng, South Africa’s financial heartland (Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.1  Numbers of public (community) Internet terminals in South Africa (as at December 2006)
Source: Adapted from Maphatane (2006: 3)
Figure 4.2  Roll-out of digital villages (as at December 2006)
Source: Adapted from Maphatane (2006: 3)
It  seems likely that the aim to implement an ‘infrastructural  revolution’ in rural  areas – 
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South Africa’s “domestic Third World” – is based on an assumption (Mbeki 2001); because this in-
frastructural revolution has occurred in some urban areas and is still occurring in other urban areas – 
South Africa’s “first world” – the same level of ‘development’ will occur with the same level of 
‘ease’ and certainty in rural areas (Mbeki 2001).  The assumption of the willingness to accept these 
technologies in rural areas is based on the expectation of ICTs, such as cellphones, being endlessly 
advertised through the medium of other ICTs such as radio and television.  Despite the reliance on 
this advertising, it largely overlooks the harsh reality of the different stages at which ‘urban’ and 
‘rural’ operate with regard to ICTs.  For example, while cities such as Durban, Cape Town and Jo-
hannesburg popularly use ICTs as 'tools' of development for city governance, many rural areas – 
largely through the second round of USALs – are still attempting to achieve the 'goal' of basic infra-
structural construction necessary for a similar kind of development.   
4.4  Implementation – subjects of development or members of material consumerism?
The awarding of licences by the National Party in 1993 to Vodacom and MTN without 
consulting the ANC alliance sparked controversy outside of minority leadership.  If the then-ruling 
party’s  attempts  to  privatise  Telkom  were  anything  to  go  by,  the  introduction  of  the  mobile 
telecommunication companies at  a critical  time in South Africa’s  history is  intriguing.   This is 
argued by Battersby (1990: 3) to be an attempted shift of capital to white businessmen before the 
political transition to black majority rule (Battersby 1990: 3).  However, given the more threatening 
possibility of this with the already existing fixed-line operator, Mandela and de Klerk reached an 
agreement in September 1993.  This was that in exchange for the National Party  not privatising 
Telkom immediately through an amendment Bill, the ANC alliance would not oppose the mobile 
telecommunication licences any longer (Business Day cited in Benjamin 2001: 90).       
Fifteen years later, the South African economic arrangement which has allowed Vodacom 
and MTN (and Cell C to a lesser degree) to be ‘price makers’ is one in which they are largely 
influential.   This  is  clear  in  Figure  3.1  above  which  shows  the  extent  of  this  influence  on  a 
continental level.  This plays a role in undermining much success of smaller  license-holders in 
under-serviced regions which are forced to be ‘price takers’.57  By the end of March 2004, these 
three operators “had a total of 18.3 million subscribers representing a penetration level of more than 
40  percent”  (see  Figure  4.3)  (Maphatane  2006:  11).   The  overlap  of  the  Mandela  and Mbeki 
governments  brought  with  it  a  growth  in  the  mobile  telecommunications  consumer  market  by 
1347.7 percent (Figure 4.3).  This provided the market creation of Vodacom, MTN and Cell C 
57 In  economic  theory,  a  market  dominated  by a  duopoly or  oligopoly most  often  has  the  characteristic  of  such 
participants being able to set prices above market efficient levels.  While smaller participants can change their levels of 
production, they have little influence on market prices. 
63
subscription  bases,  with  Vodacom claiming the  largest  increase (Figure  4.4).58  The  Economist 
(2007:  38)  estimates  that  over  the  2000-2005 period,  South  Africa’s  cellphone subscribers  had 
increased by 297.8 percent to a level of 71.6 subscribers per 100 inhabitants.
Figure 4.3  Numbers of Vodacom, MTN and Cell C subscribers (2000-2003)
Source: Adapted from Maphatane (2006: 10)
Figure 4.4  Cellphone subscribers in South Africa (1996-2004)
Source: Adapted from Maphatane (2006: 11)
Providing affordable ICT access to the South African public is seen by the Department of 
58 Data for the years after those contained in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 are not available from government.  According to the 
Department  of  Communication,  this  is  because  “[m]easuring  ICT’s  as  a  driver  and  enabler  of  socio-economic 
development is a challenge.  In the first  instance,  generic data on ICT’s is  not  kept.  Instead service providers are 
collecting the data, and this makes the validity and reliability of such data questionable” (Maphatane 2006: 28).  If  
anything,  this  response  further  adds  to  the  lack  of  control  and  involvement  of  government  in  socio-economic 
development.  
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Communication as the “cornerstone” of its ICT policies (Maphatane 2006: 13).  The investment in 
this direction is targeted at equating access to ICTs as fundamentally equivalent to basic healthcare 
and education  on the  level  of  basic  human rights  and  as  an  “inherent  attribute  of  citizenship” 
(Maphatane  2006:  13).   However,  with  the  phenomenal  progression  towards  a  technologically 
consumerist society, the Department of Communication, by its own admission, acknowledges the 
problems associated with this: due to the “recent proliferation of new technologies as a result of 
advances and the evolutionary nature of ICTs”, the composition of basic needs and “‘bare’ essential 
service[s]” suffer from a lack of consensus (Maphatane 2006: 13).  This then raises the possibility 
that ICTs are not necessarily consumed for the developmental purposes suggested by government. 
Instead, the possibilities of consumerism in a material culture seem more likely.  This questions the 
ability of government ICT policy, with its contradictions and inconsistencies, to ensure the use of 
technologies, such as cellphones, for its intended purposes. As a result, while this need not affect 
policy decisions in the associations of ICTs to human and social development, it has a direct impact 
on both the roll-out of ICTs by the private sector and the nature of acceptance of these technologies 
by the public.
One needn’t look beyond South Africa’s Electronic Telecommunications Act (2002) 
which provides mobile network operators with the luxury, in terms of their consumer markets, that 
“[t]here aren’t any no-go areas” (Knott-Craig 2007: 6).  Similarly, there appears to be no incentive 
to question the possibilities of the technological devices which provide us with this information. 
Browsing through any cellphone magazine or brochure,  one is  bound to  find pages advertising 
different ring tones, cellphone desktop images, downloadable jokes and many others.  Because such 
advertising  is  within  the  confines  of  legality,  can  it  be  suggested  that  their  promotion,  by 
implication,  is  inclusive  of  government  policy (albeit  fragmented)  to  promote  the  existence  of 
private network operators in South Africa? Does the possession of a cellphone from which such 
downloads are possible help create the status necessary to live the lives people have reason to value 
(Sen  1992:  293;  1999a:  241)?  In  promoting  the  ability for  “living  a  better...life”,  what  is  the 
qualification for the level of betterment?  (Vodaworld 2007a: 13, emphasis added).  Following the 
lead from government, the Chief Executive Officer of the Vodacom Group notes,
The world is full of mountains of information that grow bigger every moment.  Services that help 
our customers to dig into the mountain of information and sculpture the content to their specific 
needs will add an important new dimension to our business…[w]hatever it is, Vodacom wants to 
provide what consumers want…nothing is impossible. (Knott-Craig 2007: 6)
Along this line of thought, Vodacom, and its competitors are largely praised by government 
for the cellphone technologies and other services which they offer as 'tools' in the development of 
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peoples’ individual  ‘needs’ (whatever  these  may  be)  (Goodenow  1996:  199).   Given  that  the 
political leaders of this country associate these ‘needs’ with ICTs, ‘trust’ is evidently given to these 
companies to create the 'goals' of livelihoods which people want to live.  This is despite the failure 
to, at a policy level, explicitly trace the association between ICTs and ‘essential services’ in terms of 
horizontal and vertical linkages.  This ‘trust’ is seen to be linked to the “valuable contribution” of 
the mobile telecommunications operators and its associated technological producers to provide the 
‘tools’ for the identification of these 'goals' (Maphatane 2006: 22).  
To illustrate  one of  the ways in  which the commitment  provided by government  to  the 
private sector has manifested, consider the Nokia E90 Communicator.  This is one of South Africa’s 
newest and most recently introduced communicative devices (‘new’ when this chapter was written, 
but probably outdated by the time the thesis is concluded).   The old English proverb ‘knowledge is 
power’ refers primarily to the world being the oyster of the person with knowledge.  It is advertised 
in  this  case  with  the  same  English  proverb  except  that  knowledge  is  used  in  reference  to 
technological empowerment and not social or intellectual empowerment (Nokia 2007: 5).  Although 
still a 'tool' regardless of how it is packaged or marketed, emphasis seems to shift from any stated 
'goals' of the DoC towards fashion trends.  With this in mind, the flexibility of ‘living the life which 
one has reason to value’ is clearly subjected to the times and environments in which people live. 
This is largely irrespective of whether or not those times or environment is conducive to healthy 
living or indeed, to the satisfaction of ‘essential services’.  
4.5  Conclusion
This  chapter  has  explored  the  emergence  and  interpretation  of  ICTs  at  the  level  of 
government in the ‘new’ South Africa.  Based on this, it has invested its attention, with the use of a 
simple  framework  of  'goals'  and  'tools',  in  exposing  the  shortcomings  and  contradictions  in 
government  legislation  and  rhetoric  targeted  at  the  implementation  of  policy.   This  has  been 
extended  to  the  role  of  mobile  telecommunication  operators  and  their  inconsistency  with 
government legislation and policy.  
        
The  conclusion  of  this  analysis  points  squarely  to  the  failure  of  the  South  African 
government to effectively act on its initial 'goals' for embracing the information society in its aim to 
address  the  inequalities  it  inherited  from  apartheid.   It  had  conceptualised  a  role  for  these 
technologies in the early 1990s, but, because of inconsistent and counter-intuitive 'tools' which have 
been employed, has largely failed in this regard.  Evidence in support of this lies in the politics of 
disagreement originating in an unclear Telecommunications Act (1996).  This mostly relates to the 
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USAASA and SATRA over  control  of  the  USF and universal  roll-out.   The  'goals'  and  'tools' 
framework shows that the vision of ICT policy was based so strongly on dealing with apartheid that 
decisions  made  in  all  sectors  of  the  economy tried  to  accomplish  and redress  more  than  was 
possible and more than these sectors were individually capable of.  
This is evident in three key forms: firstly, the roll-out target of the DoC and the USAASA 
was unrealistic from the outset.  Therefore, the self-anticipated shortcomings could not culminate in 
anything more than implemental failure;  secondly,  competing actions,  decisions and projects by 
various  government  departments  exposed  the  uncoordinated  'tools'  in  striving  for  what  was 
seemingly the same 'goal'; thirdly, USALs were introduced by trying to deal simultaneously with 
BEE and universal access – however, the simultaneous intentions were contradicted by the chosen 
economic arrangement of market liberalism.  Such logic, when conceptualised in conjunction with 
counter-productive political rhetoric, shows that the issues raised in this research have not merely 
been  about  harmless  semantics.   Rather,  the  research  has  exposed  the  relationship  between 
contradictions and fragmentations of political  rhetoric and the inconsistencies in legislation and 
policy formulations.  
What this reveals is that such contradictions and fragmentations of political rhetoric, within 
the context of the globalising market arrangement, are implicitly continued at an implemental level. 
When asking the  question,  ‘does  this  interfere  with  the bureaucratic  management  of  the  South 
African state and its policy objectives?’, the answer is an unmistakable ‘yes’.  This is because the 
contradictions they breed promote deterministic perspectives towards a slogan:  ‘possess ICT and 
lives  will  improve’.   This  seems  to  be  done  with  little  due  attention  to  the  importance  of 
infrastructure necessary to support ICT possession.  
There  is  no  indication  from  the  involvement  of  national  departments  or  from  any 
government speeches or documents that the uncoordinated views which have been discussed will 
change in the political scene of South African politics in the near future.  If anything, these views 
appear  to  be  playing  a  role  in  fuelling  the  interests  of  corporate  marketing  in  the  mobile 
telecommunication sector.  As a result, one cannot help but be driven towards the idea that while the 
Department  of  Communication has  identified  a  specific  role  as  leader  in  the  use  of  ICTs  for 
development there is clearly a ‘missing link’.  This has been identified as the lack of clarity in 
legislation, inadequate co-ordination of policy prescriptions, questionable devolutions of power in 
government, the failure by political players to all understand the complexities of ICT discourses, 
and of course,  the questionable  effects  of  implementation.   This  is  largely because the lack of 
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common ground at government level of what the digital divide is or of how to address apartheid-
created inequalities, impact on confusion in identifying the 'goals' which need to be achieved and 
the corresponding 'tools' which should be employed to meet those 'goals'.
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Chapter 5: Case Study: Experiences with Cellphones and the Internet in Ndumu 
and Sicabazini 
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the effects of ICT policy implementation at grassroots level in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal.  As shown in the previous chapter, the ICT policy attempts by the South African 
government,  the  Department  of  Communication  (DoC)  and  the  Universal  Services  and Access 
Agency of South Africa (USAASA) have largely failed.  This is mostly because these attempts have 
led  to  marginal  and  sometimes  counter-productive  ‘development’  before policy  is  even 
implemented.   This  seems  to  have  created  an  unregulated  window  for  organisations  and  the 
corporate private sector to intervene in ‘development’.  Regarding such players, this chapter focuses 
on the failure of the USAASA in the rural  villages of Ndumu and Sicabazini in rural  northern 
KwaZulu-Natal  and  traces  the  ways  in  which  the  Agency  has  interacted  with  the  P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation and Vuvuzela Communications.  The lack of co-operation between these players has 
contributed  to  local  perceptions  which  are  reflective  of  the  ‘globalising  of  the  local’ and  the 
‘localising of the global’.  It is argued that such perceptions contribute to the existing ‘development’ 
dilemma of poverty.  
The chapter comprises five main sections:  the first three (Sections 5.1,  5.2 and 5.3) are 
purely narrative and the remaining two (Sections 5.4 and 5.5) are critically engaging.  This structure 
allows for the stories of the USAASA telecentre initiatives, the Ndumu telecentre and the Sicabazini 
Computer  Centre  to  be  told  and  to,  qualitatively,  establish  the  periods  of  analysis.   With  this 
background, the roles of the abovementioned players can be closely scrutinised in their involvement 
in these rural communities.
5.2  USAASA ‘telecentres’
The Universal Service Agency was established in May 1997, in terms of Section 58 of the 
1996  Telecommunications  Act  (Republic  of  South  Africa  1996).   The  Universal  Service  Fund 
(USF), which was created at the same time, could be used for two purposes.  One was to subsidise 
marginalised communities with ICT-driven projects.  Another was to subsidise telecommunications 
companies in their roll-out of infrastructure to meet their Community Service Obligations.  A major 
problem experienced by the USAASA, in the view of Mandla Sithole, was identifying communities 
in such a way which would not open up the Fund to abuse.  With political pressure for ‘delivery’ 
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mounting,  the  idea  of  establishing  ‘telecentres’ was  quickly  conceptualised.   Because  of  the 
pressure under which this conceptualisation took place, attention was primarily invested in creating 
generic  templates  for  telecentre  creation  and Fund usage.   This  was  at  the  expense  of  paying 
specific attention to how best to use the Fund in different local communities.  It seems that this 
contributed to the initial top-down process of implementation representative of the ICT policies 
efforts which were described in the previous chapter.
Commenting  on  the  ways  in  which  to  ‘protect’ the  Fund from abuse,  KwaZulu-Natal’s 
USAASA representative, Mandla Sithole (2008), commented:
we ran into problems...we did not know how to come up with that answer, and then we said ‘if that 
is the case, there is no way we could touch the Fund’.  We sat down and said, ‘that means we 
should not work, we should lose our jobs!’  Then we came up with a clever way of coming up with 
the  telecentre  concept...And then we went  to the Minister  Jay Naidoo and he bought  into our 
idea...that’s why we set up the telecentres.   In setting up the telecentres we became excited…
However, that created problems for us because people were judging us about the functionality of 
the telecentres...if the telecentres had problems, then people would say we’ve misused the funds. 
Despite Naidoo agreeing to the telecentre concept, the accountability of the USAASA in 
proceeding with its roll-out was minimal: because of its initial financial problems dating back to 
1998,  the  Department  of  Communication,  very quickly,  began  to  associate  itself  less  with  the 
Agency (see Chapter 4) and increasingly overlooked its activities and importance.  Because the 
telecentre concept was created after the finalisation of the Telecommunications Act (1996), this 
aspect of the USAASA’s activities not only reflected poor strategic management and planning but 
implied that it was not accountable to legislation. 
Supposedly  aware  of  this,  Minister  Naidoo  allowed  the  USAASA to  proceed  with  its 
activities.  The USAASA did this almost immediately by advertising in the local media.  This was 
directed at community organisations and asked them to apply for fully-funded telecentres to be 
established  in  their  localities.   With  the  provision  of  subsidies  from  the  USF,  the  USAASA 
concentrated on providing access to telecommunications primarily in marginalised areas of South 
Africa which had been most badly affected by apartheid (Republic of South Africa 1996: 10).  By 
the end of 1997, 30 sites for telecentres were selected.  The required application forms requested 
information dealing with the reasons for wanting a telecentre, how it would be managed and how it 
would be sustained.  Even though no financial burden would be incurred by the local people in the 
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construction of the telecentres, there was an underlying implication that the very sustainability of 
the telecentres was reliant on local financial resources.  This was because after a two year period of 
USAASA ownership  and  maintenance  of  the  telecentres  and  their  equipment  they  were  to  be 
handed over to the respective communities.  This, it was hoped, would foster local ‘development’ 
through the use of  telecentres by providing local people with skills and offering them access to 
global possibilities.  
By 2001,  the  USAASA had  established  a  total  of  65  telecentres  in  rural  South  Africa 
(Schofield and Sithole 2006: 27), which were spread throughout the country as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1  Total number of USAASA-established telecentres in rural South Africa (2001)
Northern Province 13 Eastern Cape                         10
KwaZulu-Natal               10 Free State                                6
Western Cape                      6 Gauteng                    5
Mpumalanga                5 North-West                    5
Northern Cape                5
Source: Benjamin (2001: 125) 
This comprised 54 ‘full’ telecentres and 11 ‘mini’ telecentres.  The main difference between 
these telecentres related to cost, size and hardware.  The ‘mini’ telecentres cost approximately R15 
000  and  the  ‘full’ telecentres  ranged  in  price  between  R150  000  to  R200  000.   Despite  the 
possibility  of  the  different  kinds  of  centres  which  had  different  functionalities,59 the  hardware 
provided  was  not  always  sensitive  to  the  needs  of  respective  communities.   This  was  mostly 
because, to cut costs, it was purchased by the Agency in bulk.  As Benjamin (2001: 136) observes, 
“[o]verall, there was little variation in the equipment provided.  In particular, there was little or no 
effort  to match the equipment provided with the specific needs of the local area,  and the local 
telecentre managers or owners had no say in the equipment they received”.  This was increasingly 
the case as telecentres created after the initial 30 were provided with refurbished hardware despite 
the initial promise to the contrary.  It seems that neither the Agency nor the applicants took into 
account  the  sustainable  supply  and  affordability  of  this  equipment.   This  means  that  when 
consumers needed to replace consumables, such as ink cartridges, this took a very long time to do, 
if  done at  all.   The nearest  supply stores,  especially in  relation to  deep rural  telecentres,  were 
59 The ‘mini’ was provided with one cabinet for a Pentium computer and a 3-in-1 printer, photocopier and scanner. 
Telephone functionality was also provided with two Vodacom ‘Sigi’ phones.  The ‘full’ telecentre was provided with 
three to five Telkom or Vodacom Sigi telephone lines and management software to track costs of calls, between two and 
four new computers, a printer, photocopier and facsimile machine.  It has been reported that, on occasions, one scanner, 
television and video recorder were also provided.
71
sometimes hundreds of kilometres away.  If computers needed to be repaired, firstly locating, and 
secondly, convincing technicians to travel to the region, was a major challenge.  
Having to constantly travel to repair equipment, the USAASA simply continued providing 
whatever it could.  This often implied continuing to provide hardware which was not tailor-made 
for the interests of the intended communities.  Further, the USAASA had no obligation to repair the 
hardware it provided after the initial two year period of ownership and maintenance.  This helped to 
reduce the Agency’s growing costs but, at the same time, led to the stagnation of many telecentres 
when hardware became inoperable.  Despite crediting itself with having installed 65 telecentres, 
there were simple, yet integral shortcomings with USAASA’s  of this.  This related mostly to the 
increasing problems associated with Internet connectivity and broken computers.  As a result, there 
was a stage at which, despite the classification as a ‘telecentre’, 92 percent of these did not have 
Internet connectivity,  51 percent did not have working telephones, and 25 percent did not have 
computers.  In 16 telecentres, electricity was a major problem with frequent blackouts (Benjamin 
2001: 129).  
On one  level,  one  cannot  deny the  benefits  which  these  telecentres  brought  to,  mostly, 
impoverished areas.  This ranged from SMME empowerment and gender-sensitive job creation to 
increases  in  access  to  information  for  people  who  had  never  before  been  exposed  to  such 
information.  Despite this, by the end of 2001, it was clear that such benefits were short-lived in 21 
of  these  telecentres.   This  was  because they were shut  down for  reasons  including  corruption, 
burglaries, technical faults and managerial weaknesses (Schofield and Sithole 2006: 27; Benjamin 
2001: 129).   
These  problems,  shortcomings  and  failures  provided  incentives  for  non-governmental 
organisations and the private corporate sector to intervene in ICT-related ‘development’.  While 
some chose to partner with the USAASA in the fulfilment of its mandated responsibilities, others 
opted to intervene independently in local communities.  The remainder of this chapter examines two 
of those communities in rural KwaZulu-Natal: Ndumu and Sicabazini.  
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5.3  Experiences with cellphones and the Internet in Ndumu and Sicabazini 
5.3.1  The story of the Ndumu P.E.A.C.E. Telecentre60
Against the backdrop of poor telecommunication infrastructure in Ndumu, the P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation, in the late 1990s, approached Vodacom for cellphone signals to be provided “to make 
life easier for local people” (Dorothy 2008a).  Despite Community Service Obligations (see Chapter 
4), this region remained with no mobile connections from either Vodacom or MTN.  Furthermore, 
when approached by Dorothy, Vodacom did not look optimistically at the proposition of providing 
coverage to the region.  It justified this to her with the view that the spread of the local population 
was not consistent with the company’s target market, and as a result, that it was not economically 
viable to provide coverage.  However, the persistence of the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation eventually paid 
off: 
...initially,  Vodacom were reluctant  to provide a network for that  region as they felt  that  there 
would not be an adequate market to justify doing that.  On visiting the area, however, they agreed 
to assist with this and the result has been that many people in the area now have cellphones and 
since the  landline service  is  very erratic,  this  has  assisted them a great  deal.  (Dorothy 2008c, 
original emphasis)
By way of cellphone coverage increasing in rural northern KwaZulu-Natal, and with MTN 
also providing connectivity more recently, the effects of poor landline connectivity have been less 
noticeable.  In other words, in 2001, the ward which includes Ndumu, had a total of 967 public 
telephones but nobody had private access to fixed line telephony.  Furthermore, 296 households had 
absolutely  no  access  to  such  telecommunications  (National  Census  2001).   In  contrast,  the 
availability of  cellphone coverage not only diminished the impact on locals of Telkom’s obligatory 
shortcomings by actually acting as substitutes.
In  1998,  when  demand  for  cellphones  and  interest  in  other  new  information  and 
communication technologies (NICTs) was slowly increasing, the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation established 
a P.E.A.C.E. Multi-Purpose Community Centre.  This comprised a community hall, crèche, spaza 
shop, bakery, catering facility, an educational resource centre, permaculture gardens and a waste 
management facility, accommodation and a library.  The aim was for this Centre to be a rendezvous 
of access to important information and resources for the residents of Ndumu.  To this end, offices 
were created for the tribal authority, municipal councillor, and Home Affairs representatives.  It was 
also hoped that this strategic positioning would improve public access to local leaders and provide 
60 The first telecentre in KwaZulu-Natal was established on 29 April 1998.  This was in Bamshela,    For more, see 
Schreiner (1999).
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local people, in theory,  with greater influence in the decisions which affect them most (such as 
social service delivery).  Also included in the building of the Multi-Purpose Community Centre was 
a telecentre which sparked much interest from the community.  It is this aspect of the Centre which 
is now dealt with.  
The  USAASA proceeded in  1999 with  Ndumu as  one  of  its  projects.   The  telecentre’s 
funding was received from the government of the Netherlands.  Its establishment benefited from the 
assistance of KPN International Consultancy.  According to Mandla Sithole (2008a), the P.E.A.C.E. 
Community Centre was originally provided with five computers, one photocopier, one scanner, one 
telephone, and assistance to introduce Internet connectivity.  He reports that all the hardware was 
new  on  delivery.    Although  identified  by  him  as  “successful”  in  this  regard,  the  P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation has its reservations (Sithole 2008).  While grateful for the attention which the USAASA 
gave to Ndumu, “they fell far short of expectations. Some of the five computers that they installed 
were never  connected properly,  and,  therefore,  weren’t  operational  and...the Internet  was  never 
connected”  (Dorothy 2008c).   As  a  result,  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation  had  to  find  independent 
service providers, at its own cost, to rectify these problems.  
When questioning Sithole (2008) about this – specifically with respect to the P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation’s  claim of no Internet  connectivity and that  some of  the hardware provided by the 
USAASA had exposed wiring without any plugs – he expressed, with shock, that “this is news to 
me”.  Similarly, the Community Centre’s first Manager who was appointed in April 2001, has no 
recollection of ever witnessing, or being told of, such failures.  He responded positively when asked 
if computers were in working order when delivered by the USAASA.  Despite this, it is intriguing 
that there are many reports of unusable hardware – on delivery by the USAASA – in telecentres 
throughout South Africa (Benjamin 2001: 151).
The three women placed in charge of Ndumu’s telecentre by the USAASA were expected to 
run  it.   However,  there  seems to  have  been  definite  confusion  between the  Agency and those 
employed in the telecentre.  On the one hand, the Agency maintains that the locals “...were to be 
responsible for the day to day running of the telecentre from the beginning...we didn’t go up to the 
extent of assisting them with providing wages for the people who are involved in it” (Sithole 2008). 
On the other hand, at no stage did the actions of the three women in the telecentre reflect that they 
were attempting to  earn  their money.  It was their  understanding that they would be paid their 
salaries  simply  by  maintaining  a  presence.   This  further  stagnated  the  very  operation  of  the 
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telecentre  which,  as  it  was,  had hardware  which  was allegedly not  immediately ready for  use. 
During  this  time,  the  telecentre  remained  under  the  control  of  the  USAASA.   As  per  general 
practice in South Africa, this control continued for two years, in partnership with Telkom.  Some 
time after the USAASA’s installation of equipment, Telkom provided Internet connectivity.  This 
connectivity  was  possible  through  a  satellite  dish  provided  by  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation  but 
sponsored monthly by the Agency.  According to Dorothy (2008c), “[o]ne of the boxes for the IT 
[the server box] had never been unlocked and they didn’t even have a key…we had to smash it to 
get in…”.  To the contrary, Sithole (2008) maintains that this was not the doing of USAASA.  His 
argument is that it was the local telecentre staff that lost the key and this was only brought to the 
attention of the Agency when Telkom needed this key to provide an Internet connection.
During the days  when the telecentre  was  being connected,  Sithole  was very vocal  with 
promises.  These included its operation as a useful facility for locals as well as the improvement of 
computer literacy amongst community members.  However, neither of these promises was fulfilled. 
This is due largely to the fact that after computers were initially provided, USAASA did not visit 
the Ndumu telecentre again.  When asked about what improvements the Agency has brought to the 
Ndumu telecentre since that time, Dorothy (2008d) replied that their involvement will always be an 
important concept, but has been limited: 
We have had ongoing disappointments from government – even at local Municipal levels where, at 
a  site  like  Ndumu  we  have  had  no  follow  through...in  providing  the  support  for  the  Centre 
Manager, nor in the utilization of the Centre for purposes of providing the community with better 
access to government services, and this is disappointing. (Dorothy 2008c)   
She went on to say that:
The services that USAASA has provided in terms of the telecentre concept and also the training 
programmes that they provide are appreciated and are very important. It is regrettable, however, 
that their service provision often falls short of what is expected for a telecentre to be a sustainable 
business. (Dorothy 2008c)
Against the backdrop of stagnant functionings under the authority of three managers and the 
false  promises  of  Mandla  Sithole,  Jabu  was  nominated  to  take  over  the  management  of  the 
telecentre  in  April  2001.   He  was  a  local  entrepreneur  elected  through  a  local  imbizo 
(gathering/forum), and he assumed the position of manager soon thereafter.  His dedication to his 
job was not questionable.  When, in the event that computers required repairs, he packed them in his 
Fiat Uno and travel to Empangeni to get them attended to.  His entrepreneurial talent and sincere 
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dedication to providing the community with a functioning telecentre became apparent very quickly. 
This continues to earn praise from Dorothy (2008d) and Sithole (2008).  
At one stage,  Jabu was able to  get all  five computers  to operate.   This allowed him to 
conduct computer literacy training on all these machines.  He did this with an accredited computer 
literacy course from the University of Liverpool, which he researched online on his own initiative. 
These courses were targeted at school-going youth and adults who had completed secondary school 
not too long before.  They were facilitated by Jabu himself and instructors from nearby towns. 
Gradually, an increasing number of graduates paved the way for more tutors.  Other locals who 
became tutors had travelled to Durban to be trained.  
The cost of the courses, which stood at R1 500 for the three-month duration, attracted many 
local people.  As shown in Annexure 1, only one of the Ndumu participants earns an income in 
excess of the required R500 a month for the course.  Despite this, Jabu (2008a) describes its cost as 
“reasonable to accommodate our rural people”.  With limited employment available, many people 
saw the course as a direct avenue to job opportunities.  Because of this, one can argue that they 
were willing to redistribute the spending of income on other ‘poverty alleviating’ resources.  In fact, 
at one stage, the demand was so high for Jabu’s courses that the ratio of people to computers was 
estimated at 20:1 (Thabo 2008a).  Importantly, the international course which Jabu had found was 
not one directly targeted at economically marginalised people, which was clearly reflected in its 
costs, in real terms, even before converting from Pounds to Rands.  On this point, Sithole (2008) 
expressed  great  disappointment  because  the  telecentre  was  actually  charging  poverty-stricken 
people  international  rates  for  computer  literacy  courses.   Ironically,  the  USAASA offered  no 
remedy, despite this criticism.  The only training it provided was basic business training intended 
for those involved in the administration of its nation-wide telecentres.    
After  the  initial  period  of  the  USAASA-sponsored  Internet  connectivity,  Jabu  was 
responsible for settling the telephone account (which reflected both fixed-line and Internet usage). 
This was with funds generated through the operations of the telecentre.  He paid this account at the 
local  post  office  or  in  Empangeni  when he  used  to  drive  there.   After  a  few months,  Telkom 
changed its billing system by creating a single government code for all the USAASA’s telecentres. 
This reflected the telecentres’ accounts in sum.  Based on this, a partially subsidised account was 
sent to the telecentres.  However, when many managers throughout the country went to pay the 
accounts, they were told that the accounts had already been settled by the USAASA.  This created 
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confusion.  The managers, including Jabu, were told by the USAASA, from the outset that, “this is 
your responsibility...we go as far as providing connectivity and then from there you [the managers] 
take over and run it” (Sithole 2008).  Because of the accumulating unpaid accounts, Sithole (2008) 
estimates the debt of the Ndumu telecentre alone to have been approximately R180 000.  
It was only many months later, after talking to a few telecentre managers in KwaZulu-Natal, 
that  Sithole  (2008)  became  aware  of  what  he  describes  as  “havoc”.   This  was  because  these 
managers expressed, with confusion, “we’ve been to the Post Office to pay, but Telkom doesn’t 
want to take our money” (Sithole 2008).  The reason for this was that both Telkom and telecentre 
managers were under the impression that the USAASA was,  and would continue,  paying these 
accounts.  Telkom, understandably, held this view because the USAASA was the original applicant 
and had signed a contract with them.  To complicate matters, the USAASA had a verbal agreement 
with telecentre managers.  This agreement explained that although the Agency used its name in the 
application to Telkom, the managers were actually responsible for payment.
In Dorothy’s (2008c) view:
USAASA are mandated to provide connectivity to rural communities, but our experience has been, 
at  Ndumu,  that  after  supporting  the  connectivity  for  some  time,  it  was,  without  warning, 
withdrawn, apparently due to some arrangement between Telkom and USAASA which had broken 
down.
The cross-agreements were very unclear.  While the USAASA maintains that it would never have 
signed such an agreement with Telkom, telecentre administrators remained confused, but satisfied, 
nonetheless, that they were not paying.  Sithole (2008) clarifies the problem: 
...we went to Telkom – they said because you guys are the applicant we thought we should bill you. 
We said, ‘no, but you didn’t make any arrangement with us, how can you do that?’  Then they 
produced a document where one of our staff members had signed – she was a junior person in the 
organisation.  When we asked her, she said ‘Telkom said I must sign it’.  With that, we said we 
were not going to apply for other telecentres.
It  has been reported by Dorothy (2008c) that  without informing her  of this,  Jabu continued as 
manager  of  the  telecentre   (and  the  Community  Centre  as  a  whole)  even  though  Internet 
connectivity had been removed.  This was unexpectedly brought to her attention some months after 
it first happened.  She  discovered, to her amazement, that  Jabu had not been paying the Centre’s 
telephone account.  According to Dorothy (2008c), neither Sithole nor Jabu informed her of the 
problems and confusion regarding account balances and payments.  
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At  the  same time,  the  Community Centre  experienced financial  problems.   These  were 
mainly due to the fact that the electricity usage in its bakery, to meet growing local demand, raised 
costs beyond any anticipated or budgeted expenditure.  As a result, initial start-up equipment could 
not be paid for in full.  With Jabu’s (2008a) estimation of the associated equipment debt for the 
bakery to have stood at R24 000, it is likely that total debt for the entire Community Centre greatly 
exceeded  this  figure.   With  the  Community  Centre’s  inability  to  meet  the  required  electricity 
payments, Eskom, eliminated power supply to the Centre.  
For  the  telecentre,  the  problems  associated  with  Telkom  and  Eskom  exposed  the 
vulnerability in the Centre’s management.  Customers were also unable to browse the Internet for 
information or to access e-mail and locals could no longer be taught computer literacy.  As a result 
of these contributory factors, Jabu is reported to have had, in September 2005, a fall-out with the 
community.  In his defence, it seems that local perceptions were largely unaware of the internal 
politics  between  telecentre  managers,  the  USAASA and  Telkom.   At  the  same time,  however, 
reports of Jabu “earning lots of money through the telecentre” have emerged..  These claims could 
be in reference to that money which he had originally set aside for telephone account payments 
(Thabo 2008b).  This link is most likely the justification for members of the community pointing to 
Jabu’s expansive improvements to his house and his purchasing of a new car.  On the other hand, 
Jabu (2008) has indirectly distanced himself from such suggestions by saying that, “I left the centre 
because I got the job at Ithala Bank as a bank manager...that was the only reason”.
Contrary to much of the above,  Jabu (2008) has provided a different account of events. 
Firstly, he has argued that he was not Manager, or in any associated position, when Eskom cut 
electricity to the bakery.  Secondly, he maintains that Telkom cut connectivity to the Community 
Centre only after he resigned.  In fact, when asked about this, he stated that “during my time [as 
Manager] everything was in order, this happened after me” (Jabu 2008).
 
Sipho was Jabu’s successor.  He became manager through the same process of election. 
Because he was originally his predecessor’s assistant, he had knowledge of the success which could 
be garnered from this telecentre.  However, by the time he took over in the last quarter of 2005, the 
computers which originally worked no longer did so and the Internet was still not reconnected.61 
61 Dorothy (2008b) has commented that since the initial concerns she had with Jabu and the USAASA, she attempted to 
find a service provider who could provide, over and above the connectivity, a software system specific to the needs of 
rural  communities.   In search for such providers,  she encountered various disappointing experiences which proved 
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For the duration of his employment in this position, a few computers lay stacked on the floor, in 
potentially  further  damaging  direct  sunlight,  with  no  way to  repair  them.   The  others  on  the 
tabletops  were connected but  were temperamental  in  their  irregular  functionings.   If  they were 
indeed brand new, as the USAASA claims they were when provided in 1999, it is neither clear why 
Jabu had to travel to Empangeni so often to repair them, nor why none were in working order when 
Sipho took over as manager.   
Figure 5.1  Before: Ndumu telecentre in operation 
(exact date unknown; estimated to be between January 2002 and December 2004)
Source: P.E.A.C.E. Foundation (2006: 33)
Figure 5.2  After: Ndumu telecentre with inoperable hardware, 2 July 2008
Source: Own images
Sipho is reported to have lacked the entrepreneurial personality of his predecessor.  He had 
no vehicle  in  which to  transport  broken computers  for  repair  and his  managerial  skills  proved 
inadequate for the functioning of the Community Centre.  Further, Dorothy (2008c) reports, that “he 
financially costly .  
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never complied with our reporting systems on the Centre management side”.  Perhaps it is this 
which gives reason to the belief of many members of the community that he too was responsible for 
the abuse of Community Centre funds.  In fact, even Dorothy (2008c) is aware of the view – albeit 
unproven  –  which  points  to  “dishonest  dealings”  which  took  place.   Sithole  (2008)  expressed 
similar disappointment in Sipho: “You can set up a communications centre, but you need someone 
who can run it...if the administration is not done properly, it is bound to collapse...he tried to swim 
but he didn’t prevail”.  Under Sipho’s leadership, it became clear, as it was under Jabu...that there 
was a general dissatisfaction with the management of the Community Centre’s finances.  Thabo 
(2008b) said that “choosing Sipho after Jabu – that was the biggest mistake”.  Thabo estimates that 
Sipho was responsible for the Community Centre losing R60 000-R70 000.  Thabo (2008b) went on 
to say, “[i]f Sipho was responsible for this much money, you can only imagine how much more 
Jabu cost the community”.  
By the end of 2007, Sipho resigned.  Even though the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation handed over 
the  Multi-Purpose  Community  Centre  to  the  community  in  2004,  it  maintained  a  role  in  its 
management.  Possibly because of the problems which the Multi-Purpose Community Centre had 
experienced with its  previous  two  managers,  and in  contradiction to its  model,  Thabo was  not 
elected by the Management Board and community (P.E.A.C.E. Foundation 2007a: 4).  In Thabo’s 
(2008b) own words, “I was hand-picked by [Dorothy].  She has known me since my school days 
and she is aware of all the things I have done.  We have had too many problems here so I think she 
wanted somebody she knows”.
Like it was under the management of Sipho, the computers in the telecentre were still not 
repaired.  On the author’s last visit to the Community Centre in July 2008, they had deteriorated 
further to the extent that “we are lucky if one even switches on” (Thabo 2008b).  With Vuvuzela 
Communications, a private company based in Durban, the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation hopes to revive 
the functions which the telecentre once performed.  It seems likely that the IT-based company will 
reinstall an Internet connection and repair the broken computers before the end of 2008.62  
5.3.2  The story of the Sicabazini Computer Centre
The Community Centre in Sicabazini was built in 2001.  This was done by the Department 
of Social Development even though it was constructed off the plans originally developed by the 
62 In private conversation with the author, it was noted that a trip was planned by this company to install five workable 
computers in this telecentre during the week 20-24 October 2008.
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P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation.   The  fact  that  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation  was  excluded  from  any 
involvement in what was intended by the provincial department to be a skills development centre 
for local weavers  and carvers from the Umkhanyakude community.   It  was only after  stagnant 
‘development’ and usage, that the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation was approached by the Department in 
early  2007.   It  was  hoped  that  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation  would  transform the  Centre  into  a 
productive information and community-driven resource hub.  Efforts  in this  regard commenced 
with funding from Toyota Tsusho Africa.   When the Sicabazini Community Centre was finally 
launched on 26 November 2007, it housed a large community hall, pre-school, bakery, craft centre, 
computer centre and accommodation for 40 people.  
Although comparable, on some level, in potential and promise, to the Ndumu Multi-Purpose 
Community Centre at its respective infant stage in 1999, the Sicabazini Community Centre differs 
most strikingly in managerial  and bureaucratic design.  It  has a central manager and individual 
entrepreneurs, or ‘operators’, who each run and profit independently from the other services which 
the Centre offers.  Mpho is the central manager of the entire Sicabazini Community Centre.  If the 
operators  decide  that  they  want  to  improve  an  aspect  of  their  businesses,  which  will  require 
financing, Mpho decides if this is financially possible and within the budget of the entire Centre. 
Despite  this  centralised  reliance,  all  the  operators  have  their  own budgets  and  earn  their  own 
salaries from the earnings of their respective individual businesses.  
The  computer  centre  in  the  Sicabazini  Community  Centre  was  networked  by Vuvuzela 
Communications.   The  intention  of  this  company,  in  line  with  the  motives  of  the  P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation, is to promote local entrepreneurship.  The intention is that this will be sustainable and 
will meet the needs of the local economy (Jerry and Slevin 2007: 6).  Musa and Winnie are the 
franchisees  of  the  computer  centre.   According  to  the  marketing  director  of  Vuvuzela 
Communications, Jerry (2008a) “...they get all the profits.  If they can’t pay their expenses, it is 
their call.  If it goes well, they do well”.  At the same time, however, one must not forget that that is 
the intention of the model.  At the moment, Musa (2008b: 2) complains that, “we suppose to be at 
the office daily but now it get hard cause we do not receive the salaries may be some things have do 
about this issues cause it difficult to work fulltime without payment.”  The reason that profit is not 
yet forthcoming is that, up to July 2008 when fieldwork was concluded, the P.E.A.C.E. model had 
not been fully implemented.  Also, operator training had not been completed.
The computer centre has 10 computers, all of which were donated by the USAASA and 
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were connected by Vuvuzela Communications on 13 February 2008.  The Internet connection was 
set up with an antenna on the roof of the Centre.  This connects to the Vodacom tower, situated 
approximately five kilometres away.  Because cellphone coverage rarely reaches Sicabazini, it was 
necessary to use an antenna shared through a wireless router with a data card.  Once the Internet 
installation was completed,  training was conducted on 14 February 2008 for the six operators. 
These comprised three from Makhanes School, three from Sicabazini, and one Project Manager 
(who is also the present manager of the Ndumu telecentre).  The training covered basic differences 
and meanings of ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ and the use of various training applications.  During this 
workshop consumer prices were discussed.     It  was agreed by the operators to base prices on 
market forces of demand and supply.  This was because they emphasised that such a mechanism 
reflected that the services would be affordable for the surrounding community (Jerry 2008d).  When 
operations commenced in the computer centre on 12 February, prices began at:
Table 5.2  Market-based prices of resources and facilities in the Sicabazini Computer Centre
Office Applications  50c per min 
Printing  R1 per page 
Copying  R1 per page 
Faxing  R4 per page (dialling code specific) 
Internet  50c per minute. 
Training  R20 per course 
Source: Dorothy (2008b)
Figure 5.3  Sicabazini Computer Centre, 1 July 2008
Source: Own Image
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All 10 computers are currently loaded with a Microsoft self-learn programme, Microsoft 
Office and other training software.  Vuvuzela Communications also designed a software package, 
called MyVuvuzela which provides users with a user-friendly public interface.  ‘Loyalty members’ 
are  provided  with  an  e-mail  address,  a  usable  facsimile  number,  electronic  storage  space,  free 
Vuvuzela Computer Time (V-time) to the value of R5 (which is based on the method of  pre-paid 
cellphone airtime) and the use of a wizard tool to generate a curriculum vitae.  The computer centre 
also has a photocopier, printer, and a Vuvuzela tubing kiosk (Figure 5.4) which allows users to 
browse the Internet, use a webcam, do online banking and also make use of other more detailed 
applications.   All  the services offered by the computer centre are based on pre-billing with the 
purchasing  of  ‘V-time’.   The  way the  management  of  the  computer  centre  has  been  designed 
ensures self-accountability by the users for every action they perform in the computer centre.  This 
is dictated by the amount of money they choose to spend.
Figure 5.4  Vuvuzela Kiosk in the Sicabazini Computer Centre, 1 July 2008
Source: Own Image 
At  this  time,  commenting  in  further  detail  on  the  computer  centre  in  the  Sicabazini 
Community Centre is not possible due simply to the fact that it  is still  in its infant stage.  The 
tentative forecast by Vuvuzela Communications is that “the computer centre will be sustainable 
because people are willing to pay...instead of driving down to the nearest facility they can do it 
here” (Jerry 2008a).   Also,  a financial  injection,  from UNISA, into the computer  centre seems 
likely.  This is because given its many students in the vicinity, the University has expressed interest 
in paying up to R1800 per month to facilitate the use of the computer centre by its students.  
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5.4   An  assessment  of  the  implementation  of  the  Internet  and  cellphones  in  Ndumu and 
Sicabazini
The roles of USAASA, the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation and Vuvuzela Communications needs to 
be  critically  analysed.   This  is  because  of  their  commitment  –  albeit  in  differing  levels  –  to 
providing ICTs to poverty-stricken communities.  Although their primary focus lies with computers 
and the Internet, cellphones also comprise the broader category of NICTs and have an associated 
impact, it is argued, on local people.  Questionnaires were compiled as a basis for an analysis of 
both past and present ‘developmental’ actions of these players.  This was also done to understand 
their effects on local communities in Ndumu and Sicabazini.  From the initial sample of 20 from 
each of these locations, those in possession of cellphones were asked to, voluntarily, complete a 
questionnaire (Annexure 2).  17 participants (13 males and 4 females) in Ndumu owned cellphones, 
but 2 females chose not to participate in this questionnaire.  In Sicabazini, 15 participants (14 male 
and 1 female) owned cellphones and all agreed to participate in this questionnaire.
The results are shown in Table 5.3 below.  In both locations it was predominantly males who 
were found to be in possession of cellphones.  Interestingly, both females from Ndumu answered 
consistently for six of the nine statements.  Responses to Statements 1 and 2 show the impact of 
poor  cellphone  coverage  in  Sicabazini  compared  to  Ndumu.   Despite  poor  connectivity  in 
Sicabazini,  the balance  of  responses  to  Statement  3  shows that  one of  the greatest  benefits  of 
cellphones is that they drastically reduce the distances which people have to travel to communicate. 
This  reduces  time  and  money  spent  on  travel,  which  are  very  often  spent  in  search  of  work 
(Statements 4 and 5).  
Most interesting, when considered collectively, are the responses to Statements 6, 7, 8, and 
9.  There is agreement in the responses to Statement 6 between those interviewed both in Ndumu 
and Sicabazini.  This reflects that, in real terms cellphone rates are more expensive than Telkom 
rates.  Despite this, responses to statements 8 and 9 show that  insufficient income is generated to 
support  the  upkeep  of  a  cellphone.   Compared  to  Sicabazini,  the  Ndumu  participants  earn 
comparatively less, yet match the number of cellphone subscribers from Sicabazini.  In Ndumu, 
income is not consistent for 60 percent of participants as responses to Statement 9 show.  At the 
same time, 87 percent (Annexure 2) owned more than one cellphone largely for status (Statement 
7).  
Sipho was presented with these results, and it was highlighted that 9 males own more than 1 
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cellphone, while females chose the ‘never’ option to Statement 7 and own only one cellphone each. 
He responded, “...if a man has 2 cellphones, then all the girls will like him!” (Sipho 2007).  The 
complexities of the superior ‘man’ and diminutive ‘girl’ aside, this is possibly grounds for another 
study into the social constructions and gender dynamics of technological status.  Unfortunately, 
from the perspective of the present thesis, that would consume an entirely new study.    
Table  5.3 Responses of the survey (Annexure 2) regarding the perceptions towards cellphones in 
Ndumu and Sicabazini
NDUMU
Having  a  cellphone  is  
beneficial to me because...
ALWAYS SOMETIMES NEVER
1.  It  improves 
communication  with  my 
family and friends.
7 4 4 (2)
2.  It  helps  me  in 
emergencies.
4 (2) 5 6
3. I don’t need to walk to a 
Telkom callbox.
12 (1) 3 (1) 0
4. It helps me find work. 0 12 (1) 3 (1)
5.  It  saves  me  money 
because  I  don’t  have  to 
travel as much.
6 8 (2) 1
6.  It  saves  me  money 
because  it  is  cheaper  than 
using a fixed line.
3 (1) 2 (1) 10
7.  It  improves  my  life 
because  it  is  a  status 
symbol.
13 0  2 (2)
8.  I  allow  family  and 
friends to make calls and I 
charge them for it.
5 2 8 (2)
9.  I  am  able  to  constantly 
afford  its  expenses  with  a 
constant form of income.
3 3 (2) 9
SICABAZINI
ALWAYS SOMETIMES NEVER
0 15 (1) 0
0 1 14 (1)
13 (1) 2 0
2 (1) 13 0
0 13 (1) 2
1 0 14 (1)
4 5 6 (1)
5 4 (1) 6
2 2 11 (1)
*Figures in brackets denote the contribution of female responses to the stipulated totals.
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The same 20 participants agreed to participate in the study shown in Annexure 3.   The 
interviewees were asked to identify the cellphone which ‘can realistically help you most to improve  
and sustain your living standards and quality  of  life from what  they currently  are,  and reduce 
poverty  if  you  are  affected  by  it’.   They were  then  asked  to  provide  a  substantiation  for  that 
response.   In  Ndumu,  55  percent  (11  participants)  chose  cellphone  1,  while  65  percent  (13 
participants) chose cellphone 2 in Sicabazini.  These responses are shown below in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Responses to Data Survey on Cellphones
Ndumu responses to D900
1.  It  is nice! It  can play music and take photos, 
which I like.  Now I won’t need to buy a radio or a 
camera!
2. Maybe it will have better capabilities to help me 
find a job.
3.  It  is  more  durable,  so  my husband and  I  can 
share it.  
4. Employers will know I am ‘the man’ if I have 
this phone and they will employ me!
 5. It will last longer than the other phone.
6. My boss will think I am worth more than what I 
am.
7. With this phone, I will have the girls waiting for 
me!
8. It  is  a  more recent  model,  so I can sell  it  for 
more.
9.  I think I will find a job.
10. I  like John Cena and I want his song for my 
ringtone!
11. I will feel good with this phone in my pocket!
Sicabazini responses to Ericsson GSM628
1.  I cannot afford Cellphone 1.  All I need is a phone 
which can make and receive calls.  
2. As long as it works, I am happy.
3. This phone is very simple, but at the moment I have 
nothing, so it will help me.  Cellphone 1 must be for 
rich people!
4.  It  is  not  the  extra  features  of  the  phone  that 
matter...as long as it works.
5. If my family and friends can contact me, it will save 
me taxi money or having to walk to a call box.
6. Sending messages and receiving calls is all  that  is 
important.  These other  fancy phones  are just  for  the 
creators to make money.
7.  It is not the features which matter, but if the phone 
works.  
8. This cellphone works, right? What is the problem?!
9. I already have 3 different covers which I can change 
for this phone! I can have a different colour everyday!
10.  I want this phone to get started, but eventually, I 
want cellphone 2.
11.  I  know  that  if  I  am  connected,  I  can  get 
employment. 
12.  If  I  buy  cellphone  1,  I  can  communicate  with 
everybody.
13. This is what I can afford.
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The evidence shows the value which is attached to different cellphones in different contexts. 
These results do seem to put forth an implication regarding perceptions.  One could argue that ICTs 
in  Ndumu  are  more  ‘developmental’  to  fashionable  images  and  assumptions  of  automatic 
associations between ‘technological literacy’ or ‘technological possession’, and ‘employment’.  On 
the contrary, the level of technological provision, educational assistance and technical support in 
Sicabazini are potential (yet tentative because the Sicabazini Computer Centre it is relatively new). 
explanations for the different results.
Looking more broadly at these two villages, it is also possible to argue that that the differing 
levels of technological perceptions, desires for possession and availability of functioning ICTs are 
linked, on some level, to two contributory factors.  The first is the extent of government policy 
implementation.  The second is the design of the P.E.A.C.E. Development Centre (PDC).  On the 
former,  the  shortcomings  of  the  USAASA in  Ndumu  have  already  been  explored.   These 
shortcomings range from lack of government representative presence in the Ndumu telecentre to the 
provision of inoperable equipment.   
To the contrary, the Department of Social Development has played (after its stagnant role 
from 2001-2007), a comparatively more active role in local ‘development’.  It would seem that this 
government  involvement  has  had  a  contributory  influential  impact  on  perceptions  of  local 
‘development’ in  Sicabazini.   Simultaneously,  the  regulatory  framework  of  the  Ndumu  Multi-
Purpose Community Centre differed considerably to that of Sicabazini.   By her own admission, 
Dorothy (2008d) reflects that in Ndumu “there were  no appropriate contracts and regulations in 
place” for the managers (particularly the first).  Beginning operations this way made it very difficult 
to “provide him with the guidance and legislation and support that was required”.  It is clear that 
this has been taken into account in the Sicabazini Centre where the rules and regulations of the 
Management  Board are adhered to,  as a  matter  of insistence.   Such a framework has certainly 
played a role in the development of perceptions towards NICTs.  The next task is to identify the 
promoters of the different perceptions.  
5.5  Shaping perceptions towards the Internet and cellphones
In the context of Ndumu, what role does the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation play in promoting the 
perceptions  towards  technology  which  were  gathered  for  this  thesis?    Because  of  the 
marginalisation of this community, identifying possible promoters of these perceptions is arguably 
less complicated than it would be in a different context.  
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The P.E.A.C.E. Foundation has  provided a portal to information for local residents.  The 
potential of this must be recognised.  In fact, the organisation has stated the importance of ICTs to 
paving a path to globalisation and reducing poverty (P.E.A.C.E. Foundation 2006: 6, 11; Dorothy 
2000: 13).  Despite this, evidence seems to be limited on the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation’s efforts to 
convince locals of  how  and  why  ICTs are associated with poverty alleviation and the benefits of 
globalisation.  For example, concepts such as ‘putting the world within reach’,63 suggested by an 
advertising board outside the telecentre, seemingly have little effect when the realistic benefits of 
that ‘global interaction’ for alleviating poverty is not directly focussed on.  It is argued that any 
failure  to  transfer  this  conception  to  local  people  potentially  inflates  existing,  and  other,  pre-
conceptions in the community of what technology can provide.  
To illustrate this, consider the following response from a graduate of the computer literacy 
course.  At the time of communication, this individual worked as a parcel packer in a supermarket 
in Empangeni.  He commented: 
The course was interesting, but I never got a job like how they promised.  I sacrificed everything to 
attend...family,  money...but  I  cannot  go  back  there  [to  Ndumu]...after  I  graduated  I  took  my 
certificate to employers in Empangeni to give me a job.  They said ‘good – you have a certificate, 
but  to  get  a  job  with  technology,  this  is  useless...you  need  to  go  to  learn  computers  in  the 
university’.  How am I supposed to do that?...[In the Ndumu telecentre] I gave them my money, 
they  gave  me  a  certificate,  I  have  no  job  like  how  they  said  I  would  get...The  P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation is good for the children, but I tell you, they didn’t do for me like how they said they 
would.  (Anonymous 2007)
Sipho (2007) interprets the cost of the Ndumu computer courses described by this individual 
as “highly expensive”.  Despite this, he deems it necessary because, “when they [students] learn 
how to use the computers and the Internet, it is easier to get a job”.  While reasonably true in a 
generic sense, the association between ICTs and employment seems to be a popular one.  This is 
also reflected in the responses which were generated in the data surveys.
Dorothy  (2008a)  revealed  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation’s  vehement  support  for  ICT-led 
‘development’ by saying that,  “[t]he  people urgently need  improved access  to  water,  improved 
roads, and more schools, but providing these was never within the budget or the mandate of the 
63 This  board  shows that  the  Embassy  of  the  Netherlands  and  KPN  International  Consultancy  sponsored  the 
establishment of the telecentre.
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P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation,  so  it  is  not  that  these  needs  were  dropped  in  order  to  supply  ICT. 
Elsewhere, she commented that, “First when I went in there [to Ndumu], I thought, ‘no, I can’t 
bring computers in here because these people haven’t got water’, but then I said, ‘even if I don’t 
bring in computers they still will never have water’” (Dorothy 2008c).  While acknowledging the 
importance of other needs, the support for ICTs is clearly dominant in the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation’s 
‘development’ policies.  Despite this emphasis, the organisation has no social impact assessment of 
its ICT-related ‘development’ in the Ndumu Community Centre.  It also does not have a preliminary 
one for the relatively more recent  Sicabazini  Community Centre.   As a result,  it  would not be 
inaccurate to question the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation’s awareness of the social dynamics which have 
been revealed in the data for this study.  Indeed, if the local views towards technology (of high 
levels  of  fashion  and  status  consciousness)  had  been  researched  by  this  organisation,  its 
commitment to poverty alleviation would presumably have shown sensitivity to this.
The apparent failure to do this, or indeed, to conceptualise the role of ICTs more holistically, 
is captured in contrasting responses towards the priority of ICTs for ‘development’.  Sipho (2007, 
emphasis added) argues, “yes, the computers are not primarily essential to us, and yes, the courses 
are expensive.  But at the end of the day,  what can we do? We have nothing here”.  Furthermore, 
Ndumu’s  ward  councillor  (2007,  emphasis  added)  has  commented,  “...while  we  recognise  the 
importance of the telecentre, it is not at the top of our agenda.  It is a long way down, but it is still 
there”.  The chairperson of the Ndumu Community Centre (2007), echoed similar sentiments in 
saying that “they [graduates] go to find work in the nearby towns and cities…Empangeni and other 
places…Durban too…from the perspective of Ndumu and those who they leave behind,  it  is  a 
tragedy, but for the individuals, we cannot stop them from trying to improve their lives”.  
These  views,  with  particular  emphasis  on  desperation,  lack  of  necessity  and  tragedy 
respectively, are clearly in contrast to those of the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation in its efforts towards ICT 
implementation.   With  this  in  mind,  the  attention  granted  to  motivating  its  own  perceived 
importance of the association between ICTs and poverty alleviation is found wanting.  Crucially, it 
seems that this motivation has not been provided to key local figures.  In light of this, one can argue 
that priority – as a point of entry – is given to ICT implementation by the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation at 
the expense of greater focus on educating locals as to why that priority is necessary.  
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5.5.1 The P.E.A.C.E. Foundation and Ndumu telecentre managers
Dorothy (2000: 13) supports managerial skill-based training which is provided to the micro-
entrepreneurs who manage P.E.A.C.E. Community Centres.  While necessary, this must not detract 
attention from the reported inability of Sipho to perform any meaningful managerial role in the 
telecentre (see section 5.3.1 above).  Furthermore, attention should also not be detracted from the 
fact that managerial training is different to the kind of awareness which is argued here as necessary. 
Ironically,  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation  recognises  that  “[l]imited  information”  is  a  problem  of 
poverty  (P.E.A.C.E  Foundation  2006:  8).   However,  it  does  not  seem  to  provide  training  to 
telecentre managers in response to this.  This failure is reflected in the entrepreneurial actions of 
Jabu.   As  manager,  he  performed  his  own research  into  the  computer  courses  offered  by  the 
University of Liverpool, with little reported evidence of P.E.A.C.E. Foundation guidance.  This was 
presumably because Jabu’s research into the course was seen by the Foundation as evidence of the 
learned managerial  skills  it  had passed on to  him.   There does  appear  to  be an absence of  an 
interventionist role to explain the intended model of use to managers and other locals.  This failure 
arguably allows for the popularity of those perceptions towards ICTs which have been shown.  
While preliminary evidence has shown that responses in Sicabazini to the data surveys vary 
with  respect  to,  and  sometimes  contradict,  those  in  Ndumu,  it  would  be  premature  to  offer 
substantial  reasons  for  this.   This  is  mostly because ICT implementation in  this  community is 
relatively recent.  Therefore, one cannot dismiss the view that responses similar to those of Ndumu 
participants will be evident in Sicabazini if the same study is to be repeated at a later stage.  
Nonetheless, the concerns raised above with respect to the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation’s role in 
the Ndumu telecentre are not entirely absent in Sicabazini.  Vuvuzela Communications is critical, 
perhaps as much as the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation,  to promoting the idea to the local community of the 
ways in which ICTs can be functional and useful to local ‘development’.  Commenting on Ndumu 
and Sicabazini, Vuvuzela Communications’ marketing manager commented that, 
[i]n Africa, everything is donor driven and it creates a culture that has their hand out wanting to 
receive  something...we  need  to  change  that  mindset.   They  need  to  come  to  the  P.E.A.C.E. 
Foundation,  hungry,  having  completed  a  business  plan,  bought  a  car...at  least  they’ve  risked 
something, they’ve got self-actualisation and self-worth that they’ve achieved it themselves.  When 
things stop working, they will then fight harder for it. (Jerry 2008b)  
Although  understandable  in  principle,  this  shows  little  sensitivity  to  local  socio-economic 
conditions and the extent of poverty in the region.  It possibly points to the need for better and 
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holistic  understandings  of  local  conditions,  as  suggest above.   Most  clearly is  the predominant 
financial inability of those people who ICT-led ‘development’ is targeted at in Sicabazini to perform 
the prerequisite tasks described in this comment.  
5.6  Conclusion
This chapter has explored the roles of the USAASA, the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation, Vuvuzela 
Communications and local people in ICT-related ‘development’ initiatives.  With the approach of 
cellphone and Internet analyses, the chapter has paid very close attention to the ways in which these 
players are largely unaware of local ICT perceptions, and the implications of that reality.  This has 
been shown in comparison of Ndumu and Sicabazini.  This comparison revealed the influence of 
NICTs in the decisions which affect the lives of local people.  
The P.E.A.C.E. Foundation places unequivocal trust in the premise that paving a way to 
globalisation,  by way of  computers  and  the  Internet,  leads  to  the  ‘development’ of  local  rural 
people.  The synonymous association in the minds of local participants in the data surveys that ‘e-
literacy’ equals ‘employment’ is of potential concern.  This is partially because, in general absence 
of government commitment,  ICTs are promoted with little emphasis  on how and why they are 
useful.  These definitions seem to be left to local people to conceptualise for themselves.  This is 
against  the  backdrop  of  a  seemingly  inadequate  provision  of  education  to  detail  the  realistic 
poverty-alleviating and job-creating potential of ICTs.  Perhaps it is the state which needs to play a 
greater  role  in  addressing  such  ‘macro’  concerns  and  simultaneously  create  an  enabling 
environment for organisations such as the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation to foster local rural development. 
The  failure  to  do  this,  particularly in  Ndumu,  has  arguably contributed  to  the  emergence  of  a 
culture-ideology of consumerism.  Of course, evidence of such trends is apparent in any city around 
the world.  This must not, however, deviate attention from the fact that if the ‘globalising of the 
local’ is not seriously addressed, then it is likely that this trend will be followed in Sicabazini, where 
NICT introduction is still in its infant stages.
National  government,  USAASA,  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation,  and  Vuvuzela 
Communications, seem to have contributed, at various stages, to the adoption of an understanding 
of ‘local empowerment’ through local discretion as opposed to local support.  This has most clearly 
been shown in two forms.  Firstly, in USAASA’s absence of involvement in Ndumu since providing 
inoperable hardware, local people were largely left to their own devices with little assistance from 
this Agency.  Secondly, is the failure by the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation and the Ndumu Community 
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Centre’s  Management  Board to  implement  rules  and regulations  by which  its  managers  would 
operate.  This granted unprecedented control to local managers to act as entrepreneurs for personal 
gain despite the P.E.A.C.E. Foundation’s stated ‘development’ objectives.  Although the idea of 
promoting local empowerment and incentives is an important one, this should not detract attention 
from the extent to which it may contribute to the worsening of local socio-economic conditions. 
The  ways  in  which  this  has  been  jeopardised  by  the  P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation  and  Vuvuzela 
Communications have been closely analysed.  In short, it points to an inadequacy in a well-rounded 
understanding of ICTs as a social tool (as opposed to a technological tool) and the application of 
that tool to specific contexts.    
Although the central aim of this chapter, within the broader context of the thesis, is to draw 
attention to problems with government policy, it has also focussed on other players involved in 
Ndumu  and  Sicabazini.   This  approach  has  been  adopted  to  reveal  the  shortcomings  of  the 
P.E.A.C.E.  Foundation  and  Vuvuzela  Communications.   The  dominant  failure  is  that  of  not 
educating people of the realistic potential of ICTs, particularly the new ICTs of the Internet and 
cellphones, before introducing them in the communties  of Ndumu and Sicabazini.  It is sometimes 
this problem which leads to pre-conceived and misconstrued local perceptions to dominate.
  
It  has  been  argued that  these  shortcomings  are  linked,  on  some level,  to  the  failure  of 
government policy and implementation.  As a result, perhaps it is addressing the lack of leadership 
at this national level which will contribute to greater understandings and  less deterministic points 
of view amongst all concerned ‘developmental’ implementers.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1  Review of Study
This thesis examined the role of ICT policy in the global information economy.  It did this 
through the lense of political  economy,  or what has been suggested to be,  more aptly,  ‘digital’ 
political economy.  The core of the argument was that the appropriation of ICT policy in Africa has 
not  informed  or  certain  of  realistic  intended  benefits.   It  has  also  not   been  conceptualised 
holistically with attention to the processes involved in creating societies which can benefit from 
ICTs.  This discourse was localised by directly concerning itself  with the politics of the South 
African information society.  This revealed a host of internal contradictions and inconsistencies in 
the politics of ICT-related policy formulation.  It was shown that ineffective policy implementation 
is a direct result of the absence of clearer and more insightful policy conceptualisation.
The  framework  employed  to  prove  this  was  an  analysis  of  ‘goals’  and  ‘tools’  of 
‘development’.  This was done by operating on two central plateaus: horizontal and vertical.  The 
first was a ‘horizontal’ analysis of international ‘digital’ political economy.  It paid attention to a 
range of social, political and economic processes which have formed relationships with, and have 
given birth to new features of,  the information economy and capitalist development.  These saw 
notable shifts  from the emergence of the information networks of the late 1960s  to the current 
promotion of ICTs as ‘tools’ for the ‘developing’ world.  It  has been argued, however, that the 
associated interests  of such a promotion by those who promote it,  fulfil  the vested interests  of 
cultural and ideological incentives more so than they do the supposed intentions.  This has been 
shown with comparisons between the appropriation of ICT-related rhetoric in African politics and 
the effects of the culture-ideology of consumerism at the individual level.  It is their relationship 
which ironically contributes to the polarisation of the ‘digital divide’ despite the appropriation of 
ICTs as a solution to this concern.  
With an exploration of the complexities of this geopolitical plateau, the second feature of 
this thesis has been a ‘vertical’ analysis of internal politics.  From a methodological point of view, 
the vertical analysis has offered justification to the broader analyses of global relations and western 
culturalisations which fall under the horizontal form.  The internal politics of the vertical plateau 
has mostly been shown in the form of a detailed account of the South African information society. 
With the case studies of Ndumu and Sicabazini, this thesis has shed light on the politics of policy 
formulation and implementation as well as revealed the details of internal inadequacies at these 
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levels.   Altogether,  this  has  shown  the  lack  of  relation  between  policy  intentions  and  local 
implementation and adoption. 
6.2  Final conclusion
At the outset, the postulation of this thesis was that ‘the digital economy is a complex one 
requiring greater understanding by ICT policymakers and implementers.  It would seem that lack of 
clarity between ICTs as goals of development and ICTs as tools of development is the source of 
much failure  of the ‘development’ potential  of policy implementation’.   The complexity of the 
digital economy cannot be denied.  That it requires improved understanding is obvious.  Exposing 
this  has been the basis  of the adopted ‘goals’ and ‘tools’ methodology.   Further,  this  has  even 
revealed the failures of policy implementation,  mostly on the basis  of them being riddled with 
problems  in  their  conceptualisation.   As  a  result  of  these  inadequacies,  the  private  sector, 
particularly shown in COMESA states and in South Africa, has had little difficulty in establishing 
and proceeding to achieve its own objectives.  Very often, these objectives are in contrast to the 
original intentions – however problematic – of government policy.  
The postulation then offered two reasons for the complexities of the digital economy.  The 
first asked, ‘is the confusion between goals and tools due to technological determinism on the part 
of  politicians  whether  this  be  in  the  arena of  national,  regional  or  continental  socio-economic 
legislation, policy and rhetoric?’  This has been answered with an unmistakeable ‘yes’.  This is due 
to the formulation of templates of ‘development’ at national, regional and continental levels.  These 
templates stand in juxtaposition to idealistic promises from politicians and other ICT policymakers 
in  addressing  local  concerns.   In  Africa,  NEPAD’s assessment  of  ‘e-readiness’ is  based on the 
existing levels of ICT ‘development’ on the continent.  The assumption of creating a platform from 
which  to  assist  African  countries  without  actually  providing  them with  strategies  to  attain  ‘e-
readiness’ bears connotations of technological determinism.  In South Africa, the promotion of the 
USAASA’s  (later  known  as  USAASA)  telecentre  concept,  without  even  mention  in  the  1996 
Telecommunications Act, or in the 2001 Amendment to this Act, serves as a further illustration of 
determinism.  This is because the establishment of telecentres encountered a host of political and 
logistical  problems,  mostly  because  it  lacked  any  guiding  legislation.   At  the  same  time,  the 
widening set of rights granted to South Africa’s mobile telecommunication companies in terms of 
full market penetration, continues to be legally endorsed by the Electronic Telecommunications Act 
(2002).  Therein is an implicit technological determinism of the state.  This is because in the face of 
attempts to shape policy, it has assumed that successful implementation will occur with a decreasing 
94
self-interest in implementation. 
The second reason for consideration was, ‘is the confusion between goals and tools due, 
simultaneously, to the unbridled impact of modernisation at grassroots level – even in the most rural 
settings – which instils a ‘commodity fetishism’ in the end-user?’  Against the backdrop of weak 
and  questionable  policy formulation,  the  private  sector  has  contributed  to  growing  commodity 
fetishisms in consumer markets.  In different parts of Africa, even in the poorest regions, this is 
sometimes credited, by local people, with more priority than their interest in alleviating personal 
poverty.  One reason for this result is the way in which governments allow ICTs to be marketed, by 
the private sector, as symbols of fashion and status.  
6.3 The future direction of the ‘information superhighway’?
The  future  of  the  information  society  in  the  ‘developing’ world  is  one  which  must  be 
approached with greater caution.  While the topography of ICT policy with greater coherence and 
holistic formulation is possible, being able to reverse the existing effects is more questionable, and 
in fact, less certain.  With this in mind, the key policy prescription of this thesis is that because the 
digital  economy  is  one  which  is  more  complex  than  originally  anticipated  by  African,  and 
specifically  South  African,  leaders,  it  requires  greater  understanding  by ICT policymakers  and 
implementers.  While ground can be made in improving consistency in policy formulations on the 
basis of ‘goals’ and ‘tools’, little can be done to reverse the influence of the private sector and the 
global trends of commodity fetishisms in even the most remote African setting.  
The use of cellphones and the internet for reasons beyond those which some would suggest 
to be ‘developmental’ is widespread.  Because of this global trend, the symbol of the cellphone, for 
example, as an accessory to a personal image should possibly not be challenged.  Perhaps it should 
rather be embraced in the more holistic and the clearer intentions of ICT policymakers which have 
been prescribed above.   
To  do  so,  however,  without  being  informed  about  what  ICTs  are  (as  discussed  in  the 
introduction) could lead to a host of concerns beyond those which have been raised in this thesis. 
Only after attention has been granted to ICTs in this way should policies address what ICTs can do. 
The latter ranges from education to social networking to the restructuring of real and virtual spaces. 
A failure to understand these linked, yet individually separate channels of thought, has arguably 
contributed to a key shortcoming in many ICT prescriptions.  Perhaps it is the ease with which ICTs 
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are appropriated that overlooks the point that the “good change” which they can bring are, in actual 
fact,  not directly associated simply with their  adoption.   It  must not be forgotten that ICTs are 
simply technologies.   They are  “no more than catalysts  that  facilitate  these changes” (Thioune 
2003).  
African  Economic  Communities  have  expressed  great  interest  in  using  ICTs  to  reduce 
poverty.  Optimism on the ‘information superhighway’ in the ‘developing’ world can only be found 
if they improve commitment in this regard.  Instead of allowing for the breeding of misconceptions 
of the immediate potential of ICT literacy  (such as the guarantee of employment with a computer 
literacy certificate) a different route must be taken.  Substantial effort must be invested – with a 
reduced  dominance  of  commercial  interests  –  in  guiding  the  awareness  of  how  information 
generated through ICTs can best be used.   This commitment must stretch beyond prescriptions in 
political rhetoric and have greater direct bearing on policy implementation.  
Academic scholarship also has a role in this.  At the moment, the contribution of research to 
the  political  economy  of  cyberspace  is  minimal.   Indeed,  for  this  discipline  to  develop  a 
comprehensive  understanding  of  the  21st Century,  more  effort  must  be  invested  in  this  regard. 
Given the integration of various sources into this thesis from within 'traditional' political economy, 






Anonymous., 2007.  Graduate of Ndumu Telecentre, Cellphone Communication, 4 September
Dorothy., 2008a.  E-mail Communication, 20 March 
–––––––  2008b.  E-mail Communication, 25 April
–––––––  2008c.  Personal Interview, Coffee Shop, Howard College, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
26 June
–––––––  2008d.  Group Discussion, Ndumu River Lodge, 1 July
Jabu., 2008.  E-mail Communication, 23 October
Jerry., 2008a.  Personal Interview, Computer Centre, Sicabazini Community Centre, Sicabazini, 1 
July
–––––––  2008b.  Group Discussion, Ndumu River Lodge, Ndumu,1 July
–––––––  2008c.  E-mail Communication, 8 April
Mabika. D, 2007.  Personal Interview, Ndumu Environmental Centre, Ndumu, 1 September
Mpho., 2008a.  E-mail Communication, 21 May
–––––––  2008b.  Personal Interview,  Sicabazini Community Centre Offices, 2 July
Mthembu, N., 2007.  Personal Interview, Personal Residence, Ndumu, 2 September
Musa., 2008.  Personal Interview,  Sicabazini Community Centre Offices, 2 July
Sipho., 2007.  Personal Interview, Ndumu P.E.A.C.E. Community Centre, Ndumu, 31 August
Thabo., 2008a.  Personal Interview, Ndumu River Lodge, Ndumu, 1 July
–––––––  2008b.   P.E.A.C.E. Community Centre, Ndumu, 2 July
Sithole, M., 2008.  Personal Interview, Steers, Springfield, 10 July
South  African  Broadcasting  Corporation  (SABC).,  2007.   Interview  with  President  Mbeki  
Following the State of the Nation Address, 11 February, available at http://www.info.gov.za/
            speeches/2007/07021315151002.htm   (accessed on 10 September 2007)
B)  South African Government Gazettes and Policy Publications
Gazette 16085., 1994.  General Notice 1954, ‘White Paper on Reconstruction and Development’, 23 
November
Gazette 16995., 1996.  General Notice 291, ‘The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy’, 13 
97
March
Gazette  27166.,  2005.   General  Notice  20,   ‘Invitation  to  Apply  for  the  Provision  of  
Telecommunications Services in the Under Serviced Areas’, 11 January 
Ministry  for  Posts,  Telecommunications  and  Broadcasting.,  1996.   ‘White  Paper  on  
Telecommunications Policy’, available at http://docweb.pwv.gov.za/docs/policy/telewp.htm 
(accessed on 22 April 2008)
Republic of South Africa., 1996.  ‘The Telecommunications Act, Act 103 of 1996, Pretoria: RSA 
State
C)  Archives
i)  South African Government
African National  Congress (ANC).,  1994a.   ‘1994 Election Manifesto of  the African National  
Congress’, African National Congress, available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/
            manifesto.html   (accessed on 13 May 2008)
–––––––   1994b.   The  Reconstruction  and  Development  Programme,  Johannesburg:  African  
National Congress
Communications 2000., 1996.  ‘A Vision for Government Communications in South Africa, Final 
Report of the Task Group on Communications to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki’, October, 
available  at  http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/commissions/comtask.html (accessed  
on 2 May 2008)
Department  of Communication.,  2007.  ‘Historical  Background’,  South African Department of  
Communication, available at http://www.doc.gov.za (accessed on 30 December 2007)
ICT Charter Steering Committee., 2005.  ‘Draft Black Economic Empowerment Charter for the ICT 
Sector’,  ICT  Charter  Steering  Committee,  available  at  
http://ictcharter.org.za/content/ICTbeecharter04May2005-Minister.pdf  (accessed  on  3  
March 2007)
Mbeki, T. M., 2001.  ‘Letter from the President: Bridging the Digital – and Development –Divide’, 
President of South Africa, , African National Congress, available at www.anc.org.za/
            ancdocs/anctoday/2001/at39.htm   (accessed on 10 October 2006)
ii) African Economic Communities
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)., 2008a.  ‘Part I : Information and 
98
Communications Technologies (ICT) Policies for Comesa’,  Common Market for Eastern  
and  Southern  Africa,  available  at  http://www.comesa.int/ict/policy/doc/ICT%20Policy
            %20Part%201/view   (accessed on 21 March 2008)
–––––––  2008b.  ‘About COMESA’, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, available 
at http://www.comesa.int/about/ (accessed on 14 October 2008)
––––––– 2008c.  ‘Part 2 : Strategies for Achieving Policy Objectives’, Common Market for Eastern 
and  Southern  Africa,  available  at  http://www.comesa.int/ict/policy/doc/ICT%20Policy
%20Part%202/view (accessed on 21 March 2008)
––––––– 2007.  ‘Treaty of ECOWAS’, Economic Community of West African States, available at  
http://www.ecowas.int/ (accessed on 1 February 2008)
New  Economic  Partnership  for  Africa’s  Development  (NEPAD)  Secretariat.,  2002.   
‘Communications Workshop Concept Paper’, 14-15 November, Johannesburg, available at 
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/54.pdf (accessed on 15 October 2007)
Southern  African  Development  Community  (SADC).,  2004a.   ‘Regional  Indicative  Strategic  
Development Plan’,  Southern  African  Development  Community,  available  at  
http://www.sadc.int  (accessed on 1 February 2008)
–––––––  2004b.  ‘The Choice Between ICTs and Food is a Tough One’,  The Southern African  
Development Community Today, Volume 6, Number 6, February, pp8-9
–––––––  2007a.   ‘SADC  Executive  Secretary’,  Southern  African  Development  Community,  
available at  http://www.sadc.int/about_sadc/institution/es_cv.php (accessed on 1 February  
2008)
–––––––  2007b. ‘Priority Intervention Areas’, in Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 
Southern  African  Development  Community,  available  at  
http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/risdp/chapter4.php (accessed on 1 February 2008)
–––––––  2007c.  ‘Declaration on Information and Communications Technology (ICT)’, Southern 
African  Development  Community,  available  at  
http://www.sadc.int/key_documents/declarations/ict.php (accessed on 1 February 2008)
–––––––  2007d.  ‘Chapter 3: Review of the Existing Social and Economic Policies and Strategies’, 
Southern  African  Development  Community,  available  at   
http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/risdp/chapter3.php (accessed on 1 February 2008)
iii)  International Organisations, Summits, and Unions
Chapman,  R., Slaymaker, T., and Young, J., 2004.  Livelihoods Approaches to Information and  
99
Communication in Support of Rural Poverty Elimination and Food Security, Department of 
International Development and Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations,  
London: Overseas Development Institute
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations., 2008.  ‘Consolidated Appeals  
2008:  Zimbabwe’,  available  at  http://www.fao.org/emergencies/tce-appfund/tce-
appeals/consolidated-appeals/zimbabwe/en/ (accessed on 4 November 2008)
International  Telecommunication  Union  (ITU).,  2006.   ‘Overview’,  International  
Telecommunication Union, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/digitaldivide/ (accessed on 
4 July 2008)
–––––––  2008.  ‘ITU: Committed to  Connecting the World’,  International  Telecommunication  
Union, available at http://www.itu.int/net/about/vision.aspx (accessed on 16 October 2008)
Ki-Moon, B., 2008.  ‘Foreward’, in United Nations., ‘The Millennium Development Goals Report, 
2008’, Secretary-General of the United Nations, United Nations: New York, available at  
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2008/MDG_Report_2008  _  
En.pdf#page=50 (accessed on 1 October 2008), pg3
Scott,  G.  L.  and  Carr,  M.,  1985.   ‘The  Impact  of  Technology  Choice  on  Rural  Women  in  
Bangladesh, Problems and Opportunities’, World Bank Staff Working Papers, Number 731
Singh,  N.  and  Gilman,  J.  1999.   ‘Making Livelihoods  More  Sustainable’,  UNDP Sustainable  
Livelihoods, available at http://www.undp.org/sl/documents/ (accessed on 17 July 2007)
United Nations., 2004.  ‘Global e-Government Readiness Report: Towards Access for Opportunity’, 
United Nations, available at  http://www.unpan.org/egovernment4.asp (accessed on 1 July  
2007)
–––––––   2008.   ‘End  Poverty   by  2015’,  United  Nations,  available  at  
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.shtml (accessed on 2 October 2008)
United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination., 1997.  ‘Statement on Universal Access 
to  Basic  Communication  and  Information  Services’,  in  World  Telecommunication  
Development Report, New York: Information and Telecommunications Union
United  Nations  Children’s  Fund  (UNICEF).,  2008.   ‘Geneva  2000/Copenhagen  +5  Summit  
Conference’,  UNICEF,  available  at  http://www.unicef.org/media/media_11940.html 
(accessed on 1 October 2008)
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD).,  1997.   ‘Review  of  the  
Activities  of  the  United  Nations  System  in  the  Area  of  Information  Technology  and  
Development’,  Paper  Prepared  for  the  United  Nations  Commission  in  Science  and  
Technology for Development, Geneva, January
100
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)., 1990.  ‘Human Development Report’, New  
York: Oxford University
–––––––  2007.  Human Development Report 2007/2008, New York: Palgrave MacMillan
–––––––  2008.   'Strategies  and Policies  for  Poverty Reduction',  United Nations Development  
Programme, available at http://www.undp.org/poverty/porpoor.htm 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)., 1996.  ‘Information 
and Communication Technologies in Development: A UNESCO Perspective’, Report  
Prepared by the UNESCO Secretariat, UNESCO, CII-96/WS/6, Paris: UNESCO
–––––––, Management of Social Transformations Programme (MOST) and Centre for International 
Research  and  Advisory  Networks  (CIRAN)  Databases.,  2004.   ‘Best  Practices  on  
Indigenous Knowledge’, available at  www.unesco.org/most/bpikpub.htm (accessed 27  
November 2004)
World Bank., 1978.  World Development Report, Washington: World Bank
–––––––  2000.  ‘Global Development Gateway Project Proposal Draft’, World Bank, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/gateway/ (accessed on 5 September 2008)
–––––––  2008.   ‘Knowledge  Sharing  at  the  World  Bank’,  World  Bank,  available  at  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/KnowledgeBankOct2004.pdf (accessed  
on 24 September 2008)
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)., 2004.  ‘Report of the Geneva Phase of the  
World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva-Palexpo,  10-12 December 2003’, 18  
February,  available at  http://www.wsis-edu.org/taskforce.php (accessed on 16 September  
2005)
iv)  Miscellaneous
Department  for  International  Development  (DFID).,  2000.  ‘Sustainable  Livelihoods Guidance  
Sheets’, Department for International Development, London: Department for International 
Development, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ (accessed on 21 May 2007)
Jerry, A., and Slevin, C., 2007.  ‘Business Plan’, Vuvuzela Communications, August
Marker,  P.,  McNamara,  K.  and  Wallace,  L.,  2002.   ‘The  Significance  of  Information  and  
Communication Technologies for Reducing Poverty’, Think!, Department for International 
Development, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk (accessed 2 November 2007)
P.E.A.C.E. Foundation.,  2007b.  ‘Ndumo P.E.A.C.E. Centre’, P.E.A.C.E. Foundation, available at  
http://www.peacefoundation.org.za/peace-success-ndumo0.htm (accessed  on  24  August  
2007)
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)., 1999.  ‘Meeting of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities’,  
101
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO),  Prime Minister’s Office, available at  http://pm.gc.ca/cgi 
win/pmo_view.dll/ENGLISH?798 +0+NORMAL (accessed on 16 September 2008)
United States Government Department of Energy., 1993.  National Information Infrastructure –  
Agenda for Action, Washington: US Government
P.E.A.C.E. Foundation., 2006.  ‘The P.E.A.C.E. Handbook’, Johannesburg and Durban: PEACE  
Foundation
–––––––  2007a. ‘Public Sector Summary’, Johannesburg and Durban: P.E.A.C.E. Foundation
D)  Speeches
i)  South African Government 
Mandela, N., 1995a.  ‘Telecom 95 Opening Ceremony’, President of South Africa,  International,  
Telecommunications  Union,  Geneva,  3  October,  available  at  ww3.itu.ch/TELECOM/
wt95/pressdocs/manddist.html (accessed on 10 October 2007)
–––––––  1995b.  ‘Nelson Mandela’s Address to the General Meeting of Urtna’, President of South 
Africa, African National Congress, Johannesburg, 18 May, available at www.anc.org.za/
ancdocs/history/mandela/1995/sp950518.html (accessed on 10 October 2007)
Matsepe-Casaburri,  I.  F.,  2001.   ‘Speech  by  the  Minister  of  Communication  Dr  IF  Matsepe  
Casaburri, at the Opening of the 2nd National Telecommunications Colloquium’, Midrand, 2 
February,  available  at  http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/010309945a1001.htm 
(accessed on 14 February 2008)
Mbeki, T. M.,  1999.  ‘The Global Information Infrastructure – What is at Stake for the Developing 
World?’,  President  of  South  Africa,  Address  to  the  Infodev  Symposium,  available  at  
www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1999/mbek1109.htm (accessed on 10 October 2007)
–––––––  2000.  ‘Speech at the Opening of the Zimbabwe Trade Fair’,  President of South Africa, 
Bulawayo,  May  5,  available  at  www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2000/mbek0505.htm 
(accessed on 16 June 2006)
–––––––  2002a.,  Address by the President of South Africa, at the Occasion of the Launch of  
Freedom  Park,  Pretoria,  16  June,  available  at  
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02061809461004.htm (accessed  on  10  September  
2007)
–––––––  2002b., Address by the President of South Africa, at the SAP SA’s SAPILA conference 
Banquet,  Sun  City,  30  September,  available  at  
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02100112461001.htm (accessed  on  10  September  
2007)
102
–––––––  2002c.  Address by the President of South Africa, at the National Awards Ceremony,  
Presidential  Guest  House,  10  October,  available  at  
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02101109461005.htm,  (accessed  on  10  September  
2007)
Ngubane, B. 2000.  Speech by Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Hilton Hotel, 16 
March, available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/000320355p1004.htm, (accessed 
on 10 September 2007)
–––––––  2003.  Speech by Minister of Arts, Culture, Science & Technology, Molopo Lodge, South 
Africa,  available  at  www.dst.gov.za/news/speeches/minister/benefit_sharing_san.htm 
(accessed 27 November 2004)
Zuma, J., 2001.  ‘Zuma at Opening of Second Plenary Meeting of the Digital Opportunities Task 
Force  (DOT Force)’,  African  National  Congress,  Mount  Nelson  Hotel,  Cape  Town,  1  
March, available  at  http://www.anc.org.za/show.php  ?  
doc=ancdocs/history/zuma/2001/jz0301.htm (accessed on 24 September 2007)
iii)  African Countries (excluding South Africa) and Economic Communities
Mubarak, M. H., 1999. ‘The Egyptian Information Society Initiative’, President of Egypt, available 
at http://www.misr.gov.eg/english/documents/ (accessed on 10 November 2007)
Muchanga, A. M., 2004.  ‘Statement by Albert M. Muchanga SADC Deputy Executive Secretary 
Delivered at the Opening of The SADC Regional Seminar on Website Policy Development 
Held at President Hotel Gaborone’, Southern African Development Community, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/news/news_details.php (accessed on 1 February 2008)
Ramsamy, P., 2003.  ‘End of Year Media Briefing on Regional Developments by SADC Executive 
Secretary  DR.  Prega  Ramsamy’,  Southern  African  Development  Community, SADC  
House, 9 December, available at http://www.sadc.int/news/news_details.php  
(accessed on 1 February 2008)
iv)  Miscellaneous Speeches
Amoako,  K.Y.,  1998.   Opening  Statement  at  the  Global  Connectivity  for  Africa  Conference,  
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 
2-4 June
Department  of Broadband, Communication and the Digital  Economy.,  2002.  ‘Introduction’ in  
Advancing Australia – The Information Economy Progress Report, Australian Government, 
103
available  at  
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/communications_and_technology/publications_and_reports/2002/
november/advancing_australia_-_the_information_economy_progress_report_2002 
(accessed on 24 June 2008)
Gambari, I., 2004.  ‘Remarks on the African Perspective’, Under-Secretary-General and Special  
Adviser on Africa, Ministerial Workshop on the Role of Nations, Regions, and Networks in 
Tackling Global  Challenges,  Stockholm, Sweden,  United Nations,  21 June,  available  at  
http://www.un.org/esa/africa/speeches/speech_sweden_files/filelist.xml (accessed  on  10  
August 2005)
Prodi,  R.,  1999.  Speech by President-designate  of the European Commission to the European  
Parliament,  Strasbourg,  14  September,  available  at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do  ?  
reference=SPEECH/99/114&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
(accessed on 14 October 2008)
Truman, H. S., 1949.  ‘Inaugural Address’, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, President of the 
United  States  of  America,  20  January,  available  at  
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/educ/inaug.htm (accessed on 23 May 2008)
E)  Statistical Sources
International Telecommunication Union., 2002.  World Telecommunication Development Report:  
Reinventing Telecom, 6th Edition, Geneva: International Telecommunication Union
–––––––  2007a.  ‘ICT Statistics Database’,  International Telecommunication Union, available at 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx (accessed  on  1  September  
2008)
–––––––   2007b.   Telecommunication/ICT  Markets  and  Trends  in  Africa  2007,  International 
Telecommunication Union: Geneva
–––––––  2007c.  ‘Africa, ICT Indicators, 2006’, International Telecommunication Union, available 
at  http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/connect/africa/2007/bgdmaterial/figures.html (accessed on 25  
March 2008)
Maphatane, M., 2006.  ‘ICT Research Bulletin’,  South African Department of Communication,  
Pretoria:  Department  of  Communication,  available  at  http://www.doc.gov.za/index2.php  ?  
option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=108 (accessed on 30 December 2007)
Statistics South Africa., 2007.  Community Survey, 2007, Basic Results: Municipalities, Pretoria:  
104
Statistics South Africa
–––––––  2008.  Quarterly Labour Force Survey’, Pretoria: Statistics South Africa
F)  Newspapers, Magazines, Digital Broadcasters
Arnold,  W.,  2000.   ‘Manila’s  Talk  of  Town is  Mobile’,  New York  Times,  5  July,  available  at  
http://www.partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/07/biztech/articles/05talk.html (accessed  
on 14 May 2007)
Bagalawis,  J.  E.,  2001.  ‘How IT Helped Topple the President’,  Computer World,  30 January,  
available at http://www.wireless.itworld.com/4273/CW_1-31-01_itpfindex.html (accessed 
on 22 May 2007)
Blocman, A., 1999. ‘French Government Keen to Promote the Development of Internet in France’, 
Iris Merlin, available at http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/1999/2/article3.en.html (accessed on 14 
September 2008)
Cronin,  J., 2005.  ‘Africa Counts the Cost of Making a Call’,  British Broadcasting Corporation,  
available  at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/4277477.stm (accessed  on  19  
March 2007)
Hale, B.,  2003.   ‘Dot.com  Tycoon  Turns  to  Africa’,  BBC  News,  16  June,  available  at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2977598.stm (accessed on 15 March 2008)
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa  (ICASA)., 2007.  ‘Telecommunications  
and  the  Interconnectedness  of  All  Things’,  Power  HomeBiz,  20  March,  available  at  
http://www.powerhomebiz.com/News/032007/mobile-phone-telecom.htm (accessed on 25  
March 2007)
Itano, N., 2001.  ‘Fighting Poverty Online in South Africa’,  The Christian Science Monitor, 15  
August, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ (accessed on 3 May 2007)
McGray, D., 2002.  ‘Japan’s Gross National Cool’, Foreign Policy, May/June, pp44-54
Leger, M., 2007.  ‘Cellphones: Status Symbol in a Society Largely Free of Gadgets’,  Canadian  
Broadcasting Corporation News, 22 November, available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/tech/cellphones/ghana.html (accessed on 23 September 2008)
Reuters., 2007.  ‘Africa’s Internet Gap Gets Wider, Says Study’, Moneyweb, 5 February, available at 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page39?oid=66417&sn=Detail (accessed  5  
February 2007)
Sapa,  2007.   ‘State  Firm Promises  Cheap  Broadband for  All’,  Business  Report,  12  February,  
available at  http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=552&fArticleId=3678055 
105
(accessed on 31 January 2007) 
Shapiro, A. L., 1999.  ‘The Net that Binds – Using Cyberspace to Create Real Communities’ in The 
Nation, June 21, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/19990621/shapiro (accessed on 
10 August 2005)
Smith, R., ‘Campaigns Hope to Move from Web to Cell Phones’ (audio recording), National Public  
Radio,  16  March,  available  at  http://www.npr.org/templates/player/mediaPlayer.html  ?  
action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=8959510&m=8959511 (accessed on 1 October 2008)
G)  Miscellaneous
Europa  Technologies,  Cnes/Spot  Image,  DigitalGlobe,  NASA.,  2008.   Google  Earth  Images,  
software available at http://www.google.com (accessed on 14 November 2008)
Independent Democrats., 2007.  ‘De Lille Calls on Government to Regulate MXIT and Internet  
Blogging’, Independent Democrats, 20 May, available at http://www.id.org.za/newsroom/
press-releases/de-lille-calls-on-government-to-regulate-mxit-and-internet-blogging 
(accessed on 22 May 2007)
Planning,  Education, Agriculture, Community and Environment (P.E.A.C.E.) Foundation., 2002.  





Adelman, I. and Morris, C. T., 1973. Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries, 
Stanford: Stanford University
Allen, T. and Thomas, A. (eds)., 2000.  Poverty and Development into the 21st Century, Oxford: 
Oxford University
Amin, S., 1974.  Unequal Development, Sussex: Hassocks 
Atkins, K., 1993.  The Moon is Dead! Give us our Money!  The Cultural Origins of an  African 
Work Ethic in Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900, Portsmouth: Heinemann
Avgerou,  C.  and  Walsham,  G.,  2000.  Information  Technology  in  Context,  Studies  from  the  
Perspective of Developing Countries, London: Ashgate
Ayanwale,  A. B. and Adekunle,  A.,  2006.  ‘The Influence of ICT on Rural Farm Income and  
livelihood in  Oyo State  of Nigeria’,  Community  Informatics  for Developing Countries:  
Understanding and Organising for a Participatory Future Information Society, Cape Town: 
CIDC 2006 Conference Committee, pp16-36
Bell, D., 1973.  The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York: Basic
Benton Foundation., 2004.  ‘Defining the Technology Gap’, in Graham, S., (ed.), The Cybercities 
Reader, New York: Routledge, pp306-308
Bernstein, H., Crow, B. and Johnson, H., 1992.  Rural Livelihoods: Crises and Responses, Oxford: 
Oxford University
Bond, P., 2000.  Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa, London: Pluto
–––––––  2004.  Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms, Pietermaritzburg: 
UKZN 
Bunnell, T., 2004. ‘Cyberjaya and Putrajaya: Malaysia’s ‘Intelligent’ Cities’, in Graham, S., (ed.), 
The Cybercities Reader, New York: Routledge
Burke, T., 1996.  Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women, London: Leicester University
Burkett,  P., 1999. ‘Nature, Labour and Capitalist Production’, in  Marx and Nature: A Red and  
Green Perspective, London: MacMillan, pp58-68
Burnett, R. and Marshall, D. P., 2003.  Web Theory: An Introduction, London: Routledge
Byrne, E., 2006.  ‘Participatory Tools and Techniques: Sharing Experiences From a Community-
Based  Health  Information  Systems  Project,  in  Bytheway,  A.  and  Strümpfer,  C.  (eds),  
Community Informatics for Developing Countries: Understanding and Organising for a  
Participatory Future Information Society, Cape Town: CIDC 2006 Conference Committee, 
107
pp55-69
Byrne, E. and Venter, E., 2006. ‘Where is the ‘Community’ in the South African Health Information 
System?’, in Bytheway, A. and Strümpfer, C. (eds), Community Informatics for Developing 
Countries: Understanding and Organising for a Participatory Future Information Society, 
Cape Town: CIDC 2006 Conference Committee, pp37-54
Castells, M., 1996.  The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: Volume 1. The Rise of  
the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell
–––––––,  Fernández-Ardèvol,  M.,  Qui,  J.  L.  and  Sey,  A.,  2007.   Mobile  Communication  and  
Society: A Global Perspective, Cambridge: MIT
Chambers, R., 2005.  Ideas for Development, London: Earthscan
Chigona,  W.,  2006.   ‘Using  Diffusion  of  Innovations  Framework  to  Explain  the  Communal  
Computing Facilities Adoption Among the Urban Poor’, in Bytheway, A. and Strümpfer, C. 
(eds), Community Informatics for Developing Countries: Understanding and Organising for  
a  Participatory  Future  Information  Society,  Cape  Town:  CIDC  2006  Conference 
Committee, pp79-91
Clark, D. A., 2002.  Visions of Development: A Study of Human Values, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Cleaver, H., 1998.  ‘The Zapatistas and the Electronic Fabric of Struggle’, in Holloway, J. and  
Pelaez, E., (eds), Zapatista!  Reinventing Revolution in Mexico, London: Pluto, pp81-103
Coe, N. and Wai-chung, Y., 2004.  ‘Grounding Global Flows: Constructing an E-Commerce Hub in 
Singapore’, in Graham, S., (ed.), The Cybercities Reader, New York: Routledge
Cooper, F. (ed.), 1983.  Struggle for the City, Beverly Hills: Sage
Cowen, M. P. and Shenton, R. W., 1996.  Doctrines of Development, London: Routledge
Credé, A. and Mansell, R., 1998.  Knowledge Societies...in a Nutshell: Information Technologies 
for Sustainable Development, Ottawa: IDRC
Doremus, P. N., Keller, W. W., Louis, W., Reich and P., Reich, S., 1998.  The Myth of the Global 
Corporation, Princeton: Princeton University
Douglas,  M.  and  Wildavsky,  A.,  1983.   Risk  and  Culture:  An  Essay  on  the  Selection  of  
Technological and Environmental Dangers,  Berkeley: University of California
Dyer-Witheford,  N.,  1999.   Cyber-Marx,  Cycles  and  Circles  of  Struggle  in  High-Technology  
Capitalism, Chicago: University of Illinois
Edwards, P. N., 1997.  ‘Why Build Computers?: The Military Role in Computer Research’, in The 
Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America, Cambridge: 
MIT, pp54-74
Ellul, J., 1965.  The Technological Society, Wilkinson, J. (tr.), New York: Knopf
108
Frank, A. G., 1969.  Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York: Monthly  
Review
Fortunati, L.,  2002.  ‘Italy: Stereotypes, True and False’, in Katz, J. E. and Aakhus, M., (eds),  
Perpetual Contact: Mobile Communication, Private Talk, Public Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, pp42-62
–––––––  Katz,  J.  E.,  and  Riccini,  R.   2003.   Mediating  the  Human  Body:  Technology,  
Communication and Fashion, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates 
Gillespie,  A.  and  Cornford,  J.,  1997.   ‘Telecommunication  Infrastructures  and  Regional  
Development’,  in  Dutton,  W.  H.,  (ed.),  Information  and Communication  Technologies:  
Visions and Realities, Oxford: Oxford University, pp335-351
Graaff,  J.  and  Venter,  D.,   2001.   ‘Dependency Theory,  World  Systems  Theory,  and  Systems  
Thinking’, in Coetzee, J. K., Graaff, J., Hendricks, F. and Wood, G. (eds),  Development  
Theory, Policy and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University, pp77-95
Graham, S. and Marvin, S., 2004.  ‘Planning Cyber-Cities?  Integrating Cybercities into Urban  
Planning’, in Graham, S., (ed.), The Cybercities Reader, New York: Routledge
Gramsci, A., 1971.  Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Hoare, Q. and Smith, G. N., (ed. and 
tr.), New York: International
Guyot, E., 1968.  Histoire de la Détermination de L’Heure, La Chauz-de-Fonds: La Chambre Suisse 
de l’Horlogerie
Hachigian,  N. and Wu, L.,  2003.  The Information Revolution in Asia,  Santa Monica:  RAND  
Corporation
Hegel, G. W. F., 1953.  ‘The Philosophy of History’, in Friedrich, C. J., The Philosophy of Hegel 
(ed.), New York: Random House
Heilbroner, R., 1992.  Twenty-First Century Capitalism, Ontario: Anansi
Holden, T. J. M. and Tsuruki, T., 2003.  ‘Deai-kei: Japan’s New Culture of Encounter’, in Gottlieb, 
N. and McLelland, M., (eds), Japanese Cybercultures, New York: Routledge, pp34-49
Hope, S., 1997. Human Nature: Agricultural Biodiversity and Farm-Based Security, Ottawa: Rural 
Advancement Foundation International
Hudson, H. E., 2006.  From Rural Village to Global Village: Telecommunications for Development 
in the Information Age, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Hunt,  D.,  1989.   Economic  Theories  of  Development.  An  Analysis  of  Competing  Paradigms, 
Exeter: Harvester Wheatsheaf
Inusa, D. and Bytheway, A., 2006.  ‘The e-Community Forums of the Western Cape’, in Bytheway, 
A.  and  Strümpfer,  C.  (eds),  Community  Informatics  for  Developing  Countries:  
109
Understanding and Organising  for  a  Participatory  Future  Information  Society,  Cape  
Town: CIDC 2006 Conference Committee, pp126-138
Jauréguiberry,  F.  and  Proulx,  S.  (eds).,  2002.   Internet,  Nouvel  Espace  Citoyen?,  Paris:  
L’Harmattam
Jonassen, D. H., Howland, J., Moore, J. and Marra, R., 2003.  Learning to Solve Problems with  
Technology: A Constructivist Perspective, New Jersey: Pearson Education
Katz, J. E. and Sugiyama, S., 2005.  ‘Mobile Phones as Fashion Statements: The Co-creation of  
Mobile  Communication’s Public  Meaning’,  in  Ling,  R. and Pedersen,  P.,  (eds),  Mobile  
Communication: Re-negotiation of the Social Sphere, Surrey: Springer, pp63-81
Konkka,  K.,  2003.  ‘Indian Needs:  Cultural  End-User Research in  Mombai’,  in  Lindhom, C.,  
Keinonen, T., Kiljander, H., (eds),  Mobile Usability: How Nokia Changed the Face of the 
Mobile Phone, New York: McGraw-Hill, pp97-112
Kovel, J., 2002.  The Enemy of Nature – The End of Capitalism or the End of the World?, London: 
Fernwood
Leclerc, G., 1999.  La Société de Communication: Une Approche Sociologique et Critique, Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France
Lerner, D., 1967.  ‘Communication and the Prospects of Innovative Development’, in Lerner, D. 
and  Schramm,  W.,  (eds),  Communication  and  Change  in  the  Developing  Countries,  
Honolulu: East-West Centre, pp305-318
Lewis, W.A.,  1955. The Theory of Economic Growth.  London: George Allen and Unwin
Leys, C., 1996.  The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, Bloomington: Indiana University
Ling, R., 2003.  ‘Fashion and Vulgarity in the Adoption of the Mobile Telephone Among Teens in 
Norway’,  in  Fortunati,  L.,  Katz,  J.  E.,  and  Riccini,  R.   Mediating  the  Human  Body:  
Technology, Communication and Fashion, Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum and  
Associates, pp93-102        
–––––––  2004.  The Mobile Connection: The Cell  Phone’s Impact on Society, San Francisco:  
Morgan Kaufmann
––––––– and Yttri, B., 2002.  ‘Hyper-Coordination via Mobile Phones in Norway’, in Katz, J. E. 
and Aakhus, M. A., (eds), Perpetual Contact: Mobile Communication, Private Talk, Public 
Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University, pp139-169
Lister, M., 2003.  ‘Chapter 3: Network Users and Economics’ in Lister, M., in ‘New Media: A  
Critical Introduction’, London and New York: Routledge, pp164-218
Lyon, D., 2007.  Surveillance Studies: An Overview, Cambridge: Polity
Madon, S., 2004.  ‘Bangalore: Internal Disparities of a City Caught in the Information Age’,  in  
110
Graham, S., (ed.), The Cybercities Reader, New York: Routledge, pp887-395
Mandle, J., 2003.  Globalisation and the Poor, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Marx., K., 1859.  A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Ryazanskaya, S. W. (tr.),  
Moscow: Progress
Mattelart, A., 1991.  Histoire des Théories de la Communication, Paris: Editions La Découverte
Matthee, M and Lotriet, H., 2006.  ‘Current Issues in Indigenous Knowledge and the Implications 
for  Human  Activity  and  Interaction  in  the  Context  of  the  Anti-Retroviral  Treatment  
Information System (ARTIS) Project’, in Bytheway, A. and Strümpfer, C. (eds), Community 
Informatics for Developing Countries: Understanding and Organising for a Participatory 
Future Information Society, Cape Town: CIDC 2006 Conference Committee, pp192-199
Mbeki, T. M., 1995. ‘South Africa and the Information Superhighway’, Deputy President of South 
Africa, Speech at the G7 Conference on the Information Society, Brussels, 24 February, in 
Mbeki, T. M., (ed.), 1998.,  Africa: The Time Has Come. Selected Speeches, Cape Town:  
Tafelberg, pp181-185
McCaughey, M. and Ayers, M. D (eds)., 2004.  Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and  
Practice, New York: Routledge
Meyer, H. W. J., 2006.  ‘Stakeholders’ Understanding and Use of Information Are Imperative for 
the Successful Delivery of Community-Based Projects’, in Bytheway, A. and Strümpfer, C. 
(eds), Community Informatics for Developing Countries: Understanding and Organising for  
a  Participatory  Future  Information  Society,  Cape  Town:  CIDC  2006  Conference 
Committee, pp216-228
Mitrovic,  Z.,  and  Bytheway,  A.,  2006.   ‘Community  Informatics  Research  and  Practice:  A  
Discussion  of  the  Status  Quo  and  the  Use  of  Grounded  Theory’,  Bytheway,  A.  and  
Strümpfer, C. (eds), Community Informatics for Developing Countries: Understanding and 
Organising  for  a  Participatory  Future  Information  Society, Cape  Town:  CIDC  2006  
Conference Committee, pp229-244
Moore, D., 2007.  ‘The World Bank and the Gramsci Effect: Towards a Transnational State and 
Global  Hegemony?’,  in  Moore,  D.  (ed),  The  World  Bank:  Development,  Poverty,  
Hegemony, Scottsville: UKZN, pp27-62
Mosco, V., 2004.  ‘Webs of Myth and Power: Connectivity and the  New Computer Technopolis’, in 
Graham, S., (ed.), The Cybercities Reader, New York: Routledge, pp199-205
Mosley, P., Harrigan J. and Toye, J., 1991.  Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based  
Lending, Volume 1, London: Routledge
Msiska, K. and Chigona, W., 2006.  ‘Investigating the Implementation and Challenges of an ICT 
111
Youth  Advocacy in  a  Developing  Country’,  in  Bytheway,  A.  and  Strümpfer,  C.  (eds),  
Community Informatics for Developing Countries: Understanding and Organising for a  
Participatory Future Information Society, Cape Town: CIDC 2006 Conference Committee, 
pp70-78
Myrdal G., 1968.  The Asian Drama.  An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Volume 1, New York: 
Twentieth Century Fund
Nair, B., 1980.  Mass Media and the Transnational Corporation: A Study of Media-Corporate  
Relationships and its Consequences for the Third World, Singapore: Singapore University
Negroponte, N., 1995.  Being Digital, London: Hodder and Stoughton
–––––––  2006.  ‘The African Digital  City:  Augmenting Social  Capital?’,  in Bytheway,  A. and 
Strümpfer,  C.  (eds),  Community  Informatics  for  Developing  Countries:  Understanding  and  
Organising  for  a  Participatory  Future  Information  Society,  Cape  Town:  CIDC  2006  
Conference Committee, pp275-289
Perez, C., 1988.  ‘New Technologies and Development’, in Freeman, C. and Lundvall, B., (eds),  
Small Countries Facing the Technological Revolution, London: Continuum International,  
pp85-97
Perez, C., 1988.  ‘New Technologies and Development’, in Freeman, C. and Lundvall, B., (eds),  
Small Countries Facing the Technological Revolution, London: Continuum International,  
pp85-97
Pilger, J., 1998. Hidden Agendas, London: Vintage
Preston, P. W., 1982.  Theories of Development, London: Routledge
Quélennec, M., 1999.  Technologies et Société de I’information, Paris: Sessi
Rist, G., 1999.  The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, London: Zed
Rostow, W.W.,  1960.  The Stages  of  Economic Growth: A Non-Communist  Manifesto,  London:  
Cambridge University
Saunders,  R.  J.,  Warford,  J.  J.  and Wellenieus,  B.,  1994.   Telecommunications  and Economic  
Development, (2nd Ed.), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Schramm,  W.,  1967.   ‘Communication  and  Change’,  in  Lerner,  D.  and  Schramm,  W.  (eds),  
Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, Honolulu: East-West  Centre,  
pp5-31
Seers, D., 1972.  ‘The Meaning of Development’ in Uphoff, N. T. and Warren, F. I (eds),  The  
Political Economy of Development, Berkeley: University of California, pp75-112
Sen, A. K., 1984. Resources, Values and Development, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
–––––––  1985a. Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science
112
–––––––  1987. The Standard of Living, in Hawthorn, G. (ed.), New York: Cambridge University
–––––––  1992.  Inequality Reexamined, New York: Sage
–––––––  1999a.  Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University
–––––––  1999b.  ‘Poverty and Famines’, in Sen, A. and Drèze, J.,  The Amartya Sen and Jean  
Drèze Omnibus, New Delhi: Oxford University, pp1-257
–––––––  2006.  Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, London: Penguin
Sklair,  L.,  1995.   ‘The  Culture-Ideology of  Consumerism in  the  Third  World’,  in  Sklair,  L.,  
Sociology of the Global System (2nd Ed.), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, pp147-190
Smit,  T.,  2004.   The  Emerging  Under  Serviced  Areas  License  Market,  Johannesburg:  BMI-
TechKnowledge
Solnit, R. and Shwartenberg, S., 2004.  ‘San Francisco: Capital of the Twenty-First Century’, in  
Graham, S., (ed.), The Cybercities Reader, New York: Routledge, pp296-298
Stone,  A.  R.,  1996.   The War  of  Desire  and  Technology  at  the  End  of  the  Mechanical  Age,  
Cambridge: MIT
Strøm, G., 2002.  ‘The Telephone Comes to a Filipino Village’, in Katz, J. E. and Aakhus, M., (eds), 
Perpetual Contact: Mobile Communication, Private Talk, Public Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, pp274-283
Tehranian, M., 1999., Global Communication and World Politics, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Thioune, R. M. A. (ed.), 2003.  Information and Communication Technologies for Development in 
Africa:  Opportunities  and  Challenges  for  Community  Development,  Vol.  1,  Dakar:  
International Development Research Centre
Toye,  J.,  2003.   ‘Changing  Perspectives  in  Development  Economics’,  in  Chang,  H.  (ed.),  
Rethinking Development Economics, London: Anthem, pp21-40
Turkle, S., 1995.  Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, New York: Simon and  
Schuster
van Dijk, J., 1999.  The Network Society, London: Sage
Varbanov, V., 2002.  ‘Bulgaria: Mobile Phones as Post-Communist Cultural Icons’, in Katz, J. E. 
and Aakhus, M. (eds.),  Perpetual Contact: Mobile Communication, Private Talk, Public  
Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University, pp126-136
Wade, R. H.,  2004. ‘Bridging the Digital Divide: New Route to Development or New Form of  
Dependency’, in Avgerou, C., Ciborra, C., Land, F., (eds.), The Social Study of Information 
and  Communication  Technology  Innovation,  Actors,  and  Contexts,  New  York:  Oxford  
University
Walch, J., 1999.  In the Net.  An Internet Guide for Activists, London: Zed
113
Weigel, V., 2003.  Deep Learning for a Digital Age, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Wellman, B., 2002.  ‘Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked Individualism’, in Tanabe, M.,  
Besselaar, P. V. D., and Ishida, T., (eds), Digital Cities ii: Computational and Sociological 
Approaches, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp11-25
World  Economic  Forum (WEF).,  2002.   Southern  African  Development  Community  –  World  
Economic Forum Consultative Report on e-Readiness, Better, Faster, Cheaper: Developing 
and Leveraging World Class ICT Networks for Social and Economic Advancement, World 
Economic Forum: Geneva
Zuboff, S., 1988.  In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power, New York:  
Perseus
I) Articles
Abbate, J., 2001.  ‘Government, Business and the Making of the Internet’, The Business History 
Review, Volume 75, Number 1, pp147-176
Adam, L. and Wood, F., 1999.  ‘An Investigation of the Impact of Information and Communications 
Technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Journal of Information Science, Volume 25, Number 4, 
pp 307-318
Ahluwalia,  M.  S.,  1976.   ‘Income Distribution  and  Development:  Some Stylized  Facts’,  The  
American Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 2, pp128-135
Ahwireng-Obeng, F. and McGowan, P. J., 1998.  ‘Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa’,  
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Volume 16, Number 1, pp5-37
Arrow, K. J., 1999.  ‘A. K. Sen’s Contributions to the Study of Social Welfare’, Scandinavian  
Journal of Economics, Volume 101, Number 2, pp163-172
Atkins, K., 1986.  ‘Origins of the AmaWasha: The Zulu Washermen’s Guild in Natal, 1850-1910’, 
Journal of African History, Number 3, Number pp41-57
–––––––  1988.   ‘Kafir  Time’:  Pre-Industrial  Temporal  Concepts  and  Labour  Discipline  in  
Nineteenth-Century Colonial Natal’, Journal of African History, Number 2, pp229-244
Bagdikian, B.H., 1989.  ‘The Lords of the Global Village’, The Nation, Volume 248, Number 23, 
pp805-820
Bénit, C. and Gervais-Lambony, P., 2005.  ‘The Poor and the Shop Window: Globalisation, A Local 
Political Instrument in the South African City?’, Transformation, Volume 57, pp1-23
Bgoya,  W.,  2001.   ‘The  Effect  of  Globalisation  in  Africa  and  the  Choice  of  Language  in  
Publishing’, International Review of Education, Volume 37, Number 3/4, pp283-292
Bhatnager,  S.,   2000.  ‘Social  Implications of Information and Communication Technology in  
114
Developing  Countries:  Lessons  from  Asian  Success  Stories,  Electronic  Journal  of  
Information Systems in Developing Countries, Volume 1, Number 4, pp1-9
Bloomfield,  B.  and  Coombs,  R.,  1992.   ‘Information  Technology,  Control,  and  Power:  The  
Centralisation  and Decentralisation  Debate  Revisited’,  Journal  of  Management  Studies, 
Volume 24, Number 4, pp459-484
Borenstein, S. and Saloner, G., 2001.  ‘Economics and Electronic Commerce’, Journal of Economic 
Perspective, Volume 15, Number 1, pp3-12
Breckenridge, K., 2005.  ‘The Biometric State: The Promise and Peril of Digital Government in the 
New South Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 31, Number 2, pp267-282
Brohman, J., 1995.  ‘Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies:  
From Modernisation  to  Neoliberalism’,  Third World  Quarterly, Volume 16,  Number  1,  
pp121-140
Castells, M., 1998.  ‘A Rejoinder: On Power, Identities and Culture in the Network Society’, New 
Political Economy, Volume 3, Number 3, pp473-483
Cohen,  T.,  2001.   ‘Domestic  Policy and South  Africa’s  Commitments  Under  the  WTO Basic  
Telecommunications Agreement: Explaining the Apparent Inertia’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, Volume 4, Number 4, pp725-754
Coeur de Roy, O., 1997.  ‘The African Challenge: Internet, Networking and Connectivity Activities 
in a Developing Environment, Third World Quarterly, Volume 18, Number 5, pp883-898
Danowitz, A. K., Nassef, Y. and Goodman, S. E., 1995.  ‘Cyberspace Across the Sahara: Computing 
in North Africa’, Communications of the ACM, Volume 38, Number 12, pp23-28 
Darch, C. D. and Underwood, P. G., 1999.  ‘Dirt Road or Yellow Brick Superhighway? Information 
and Communication technology in Academic Libraries of South Africa’, Library Hi Tech, 
Volume 17, Number 3, pp285-297
Davison, R., Vogel, D., Harris, R. and Jones, N., 2000.  ‘Technology Leapfrogging in Developing 
Countries  –  An  Inevitable  Luxury?’,  Electronic  Journal  of  Information  Systems  in  
Developing Countries, Volume 1, Number 5, pp1-10
Dode, R. O., 2007.  ‘Prospects of E-Government Implementation in Nigeria’,  IceGov, December  
10-13, pp380-383
Donner, J., 2005.  ‘Microentrepreneurs and Mobiles: An Exploration of the Uses of Mobile Phones 
by  Small  Business  Owners  in  Rwanda’,  The  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology  
Information Technologies and International Development, Volume 2, Number 1, pp1–21
–––––––  2007.  ‘Customer Acquisition Among Small and Informal Businesses in Urban India:  
Comparing  Face-to-Face  and  Mediated  Channels’,  Electronic  Journal  of  Information  
115
Systems in Developing Countries, Volume 32, Number 3, pp1-16
Duffield,  M.,  2002.   ‘Social  Reconstruction and the Radicalisation  of  Development:  Aid as  a  
Relation of Global Liberal Governance’, Development and Change, Volume 33, Number 5, 
pp1049-1071
Duncombe, R. and Heeks, R., 2002.  Enterprise Across the Digital Divide: Information Systems and 
Rural  Microenterprise  in  Botswana,  Journal  of  International  Development, Volume 14,  
Number 1, pp61-74
Dunt, E.S. and Harper, I.R.  2002.  ‘E-Commerce and the Australian Economy’, The Economic  
Record, Volume 78, Number 242, pp327-342
Ellis, F. and Biggs, S., 2001.  ‘Evolving Themes in Rural Development 1950s-2000s’, Development  
Policy Review, Volume 19, Number 4, pp437-448
Farley, T., 2005.  ‘Mobile Telephone History’, Telektronikk, Number 3/4, pp22-34
Foster-Carter, A., 1978.  ‘The Modes of Production Controversy’, New Left Review, Number 107, 
pp47-77
Freund, B., 2001.  ‘Contrasts in Urban Segregation: A Tale of Two African Cities, Durban (South 
Africa)  and Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire)’,  Journal  of  Southern African Studies,  Volume 27,  
Number 3, pp527-546
Gani, A. and Clemes, M. D., 2006.  ‘Information and Communications Technology: A Non-Income 
Influence on Economic Well Being’, International Journal of Social Economics, Volume 33, 
Number 9, pp649-663
Goodenow, R., 1996.  ‘The Cyberspace Challenge: Modernity, Post-Modernity and Reflections on 
International Networking Policy’, Comparative Education, Volume 32, Number 2, Special 
Number 18, pp197-216
Habib, A. and Padayachee, V., 2000.  ‘Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa’s  
Transition to Democracy’, World Development, Volume 28, Number 2, pp245-263
Hedley, R. A., 1998.  ‘Technological Diffusion or Cultural Imperialism?  Measuring the Information 
Revolution’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Volume 39, pp198-212
Howe, C., 1988.  ‘Cyberspace is No Place for Tribalism’, Wicazo sa Review, Volume 13, Number 2, 
pp17-27
Jain,  P.,  2006.   ‘Empowering  Africa’s  Development  Using  ICT in a  Knowledge Management  
Approach’, The Electronic Library, Volume 24, Number 1, pp51-67
Job, S., 2001.  ‘Globalising Russia? The Neoliberal/Nationalist Two-Step and the Russification of 
the West Globalising Russia? The Neoliberal/Nationalist Two-Step and the Russification of 
the West’, Third World Quarterly, Volume 22, Number 6, pp931-949
116
Kalusopa, T., 2005.  ‘The Challenges of Utilizing Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
for the Small-Scale Farmers in Zambia’, Library Hi Tech, Volume 23, Number 3, pp414-424
Katz, J. E., 1998.  ‘The Social Side of Information Networking’,  Society, Volume 35, Number 2, 
pp9-12
Kenny, C., 2002. ‘Information and Communication Technologies for Direct Poverty Alleviation:  
Costs and Benefits, Development Policy Review, Number 20, pp141-157
Leftwich, A., 2005.  ‘Politics in Command: Development Studies and the Rediscovery of Social  
Science’, New Political Economy, Volume 10, Number 4, pp573-607
Lewis, W.A., 1954.  ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’,  Manchester  
School, Volume 22, Number 2, pp139-191
Lucking-Reiley, D. and Spulber, D. 2001.  ‘Business to Business Electronic Commerce’, Journal of 
Economic Perspective, Volume 15, Number 1, pp55-68
Madden, G. and Coble-Neal, G. 2002.  ‘Internet Economics and Policy: An Australian Perspective’, 
The Economic Record, Volume 78, Number 242, pp343-57
Main, L., 2001.  ‘The Global Information Infrastructure: Empowerment or Imperialism?’, Third  
World Quarterly, Volume 22, Number 1, pp83-97
Malenbaum, W.,  1988.   ‘Review: Amartya  Sen on Future  Development  Policy and Program’,  
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 36, Number 2, pp401-409
Mbarika, V. W., 2002. ‘Re-thinking Information and Communications Technology Policy Focus on 
Internet Versus Teledensity Diffusion for Africa’s Least Developed Countries’, Electronic  
Journal on Information Systems in Developing Countries, Volume 9, Number 1, pp1-13
Miklitsch, R., 1996.  ‘The Commodity-Body-Sign: Toward a General Economy of ‘Commodity  
Fetishism’’, Cultural Critique, Number 33, pp5-40
Miller, D., 2008.  ‘Sterilizing Cyberspace’, New Left Review, Number 51, May-June, pp154-160, 
Molony,  T.,  2006.   ‘I  Don’t  Trust  the  Phone;  It  Always  Lies:  Trust  and  Information  and  
Communication  Technologies  in  Tanzanian  Micro-  and  Small  Enterprises,  Information  
Technologies and International Development, Volume 3, Number 4, pp67-83
Moore., D., 1988.  ‘The Zimbabwean ‘Organic Intellectuals’ in Transition’, Journal of Southern  
African Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, pp96-105
–––––––  2001.   ‘Neoliberal  Globalisation and the Triple  Crisis  of  ‘Modernisation’ in  Africa:  
Zimbabwe,  the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  and  South  Africa’,  Third  World  
Quarterly, Volume 22, Number 6, pp909-929
–––––––  2004.  ‘The Second Age of the Third World:  From Primitive Accumulation to Global  
Public Goods?’, Third World Quarterly, Volume 25, Number 1, February, pp87-109
117
Moyo,  S.,  2001.   ‘The  Land  Occupation  Movement  and  Democratisation  in  Zimbabwe:  
Contradictions of Neoliberalism’, Journal of International Studies, Volume 30, Number 2, 
pp311-330
Mutula, S. M., 2005.  ‘Peculiarities of the Digital Divide in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Emerald Group, 
Volume 39, Number 2, pp122-138
Ochieng, R. and Radloff, J., 1998.  ‘Relevant and Accessible Electronic Information Networking in 
Africa’, Agenda, Number 38, pp63-69
Odendaal,  N.   2003.   ‘Information  and  Communication  Technology  and  Local  Governance:  
Understanding the Difference Between Cities in  Developed and Emerging Economies’,  
Environment and Urban Systems, Volume 27, Number 6, pp585-607
Ottolini, C., 2001.  ‘Residents’ Associations and Information and Communication Technologies: A 
Suggested Approach to International Action-Research’,  Development in Practice, Volume 
11, Numbers 2 and 3, pp344-349
Powell,  M.,  2001.  ‘Knowledge,  Culture  and  the  Internet  in  Africa:  A Challenge  for  Political  
Economists’, Review of African Political Economy, Volume 28, Number 88, pp241-260
Paukert,  F.,  1973.  ‘Income Distribution of Different Levels of Development: A Survey of the  
Evidence, International Labour Review, August-September, pp97-125
Qizilbash, M. and Clark, D. A., 2005.  ‘The Capability Approach and Fuzzy Measures of Poverty: 
An Application to  the South African Context’,  Social  Indicators Research,  Volume 74,  
Number 1, pp103-139
Rafael,  V.,  2003.   ‘The  Cell  Phone  and  the  Crowd:  Messianic  Politics  in  the  Contemporary  
Philippines’, Popular Culture, Volume 15, Number 3, pp399-425
Rust,  V.,  1991.   ‘Postmodernism  and  its  Comparative  Education  Implications’,  Comparative  
Education Review, Volume 35, pp601-626
Sagar, A. D. and Najam, A., 1999.  ‘Shaping Human Development: Which Way Next?’, Third  
World Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 4, pp743-751
Schech, S., 2002.  ‘Wired for Change: The Links Between ICTs and Development Discourses’,  
Journal of International Development, Volume 14, Number 1, pp13-23
Schreiner, H., 1999.  ‘Rural Women, Development, and Telecommunications: A Pilot Programme in 
South Africa, Gender and Development, Volume 2, Number 2, pp64-70
Sen, A. K., 1985b.  ‘Well-being, Agency and Freedom: the Dewey Lectures’, Journal of Philosophy, 
Volume 82, Number 4, pp169-221
–––––––  2005.  ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’, Journal of Human Development, Volume 6,  
Number 2, pp151-66
118
Soriano,  C. R. R.,  2007.  ‘Exploring the ICT and Rural Poverty Reduction Link: Community  
Telecentres and Rural Livelihoods in Wu’an,  China’,  Electronic Journal of  Information  
Systems in Developing Countries, Volume 32, Number 1, pp1-15
Standing,  G.,  2000.   ‘Brave  New  Worlds?   A Critique  of  Stiglitz’s  World  Bank  Rethink’,  
Development and Change, Volume 31, Number 4, pp737-763
Swift, J., 1989.  ‘Why Are Rural Poor Vulnerable to Famine’, IDS Bulletin, Volume 20, Number 2, 
pp8-15
Tall,  S.  M.,  1999.   ‘Senegalese  Émigrés:  New Information  & Communication  Technologies’,  
Review of African Political Economy, Volume 31, Number 99, pp31-48
Thérien, Jean-Philippe, 2002.  ‘Debating Foreign Aid: Right Versus Left’, Third World Quarterly, 
Volume 23, Number 3, pp449-466
Thompson, M., 2004.  ‘Discourse, ‘Development’ and the ‘Digital Divide’: ICT and the World  
Bank’, Review of African Political Economy, Volume 31, Number 99, pp103-123
Tihanyi, L. and Roath, A.S., 2002.  ‘Technology Transfer and International Development in Central 
and Eastern Europe’, Journal of World Business, Volume 37, Volume 3, pp188-198
Townsend, A. M., 2000.  ‘Life in the Real-Time City: Mobile Telephones and Urban Metabolism’, 
Journal of Urban Technology, Volume 7, Number 2, pp85-104
Townsend, P., 1985.  ‘A Sociological Approach to the Measurement of Poverty – A Rejoinder to 
Professor Amartya Sen’,  Oxford Economic Papers,  New Series,  Volume 37, Number 4,  
December, pp659-668
Trentmann,  F.,  2004.   ‘Beyond  Consumerism:  New Historical  Perspectives  on  Consumption’,  
Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 39, Number 3, pp373-401
Tsie, B., 1996.  ‘States and Markets in the Southern African Development Community (SADC):  
Beyond  the  Neo-Liberal  Paradigm’,  Journal  of  Southern  African  Studies,  Volume  22,  
Volume 1, pp75-98 
van Leijden, F. and Monasso, T., 2006.  ‘Beware Dongas! An Assessment of the Road Ahead for 
Under-Serviced Area Telecommunications Operators in South Africa’, The South African  
Journal of Information and Communication, Issue 6, pp22-47
van Thanh, D. and Jørstad, I., 2005.  ‘The Mobile Phone: Its Evolution from a Communication  
Device to a Universal Companion’, Telektronikk, Number 3/4, p1-21
Warren, B., 1973.  ‘Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation’, New Left Review, Number 81
Williams, G., 1980.  ‘The Brandt Report:  A Critical  Introduction’,  Review of African Political  
Economy, Number 19, pp77-86
Y’au, Y. Z., 2004. ‘The New Imperialism and Africa in the Global Electronic Village’, Review of 
119
African Political Economy, Volume 31, Number 99, pp11-29
J) Unpublished Papers
Clark, D. A., 2003.  ‘From the Web to Wireless’, Paper Presented at the Conference on China and 
the Internet: Technology, Economy, and Society in Transition, Los Angeles, May 30-31
Esselaar. S., Stork, C., Ndiwalana, A., and Deen-Swarra, M., 2006.  ‘ICT Usage and its Impact on 
Profitability  of  SMEs  in  13  African  Countries’,  Paper  Presented  at  the  International  
Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development, Berkeley, 
25-26 May
Robinson, S. S., 2003.  ‘The Potential of IT in International Remittance Transfers’, Social Sciences 
Research  Council,  Working  Paper,  available  at  http://mediaresearchhub.ssrc.org/the-
potential-role-of-it-in-international-remittance-transfers/resource_view (accessed on 3 June 
2007)
Stiglitz,  J. E,  1998a.   ‘Towards  a  New  Paradigm  for  Development  Strategies,  Policies,  and  
Processes’, Paper Presented as the Prebisch Lecture, UNCTAD, Geneva, 19 October
Cross,  C., 2003.   ‘Migrant  Workers  Remittances  and  Micro-Finance  in  South  Africa,  Human  
Sciences Research  Council, Working Paper, pp1-23
Scoones,  I.,  1998.   ‘Sustainable  Rural  Livelihoods:  A Framework  for  Analysis’,  Institute  of  
Development Studies Working Paper, Number 72, pp1-22
Dorothy., 2000.  ‘The Role of Information Technology and the P.E.A.C.E. Model of Development 
in  the  Implementation  of  Poverty  Alleviation  Programmes’,  Paper  Presented  at  the  
University of Durban-Westville, October
K) Unpublished Theses
Benjamin, P., 2001.  ‘Telecentres and Universal Capability: A Study of the Telecentre Programme of 
the  Universal  Service  Agency  in  South  Africa,  1996-2000’,  Doctoral  Thesis,  Aalborg  
University




Battersby, J., 1990.  ‘ANC Tempers Hard-line Rhetoric on Economic Policy’, The Christian Science 
Monitor, 10 May, pg 3
Business Day., 1993.  ‘Compromise Deal on Cellphones’, Business Day, 20 September, pg1
Economist, The., 2007.  ‘Mobile Phones in Africa: Buy, Cell, Hold’, The Economist, Middle East 
and Africa, 27 January, pg38
Fowler, G. A., 2005.  ‘In Asia, it’s Nearly Impossible to Tell a Song from an Ad’,  Wall Street  
Journal, 31 May, ppA1, A10
Knott-Craig, A., 2007.  ‘No Limits on the Road Ahead’, Chief Executive Officer of the Vodacom 
Group in October, A. (ed.), Vodaworld, Interactive Africa: Roggebaai, Spring, pg6
Vodaworld.,  2007a.   ‘Dare  to  Discover  Something  New’,  in  October,  A.  (ed.),  Vodaworld,  
Interactive Africa: Roggebaai, Spring, pp12-13
–––––––  2007b.  ‘MakingWaves’, in October, A. (ed.), Vodaworld, Interactive Africa: Roggebaai, 
Summer, pp42-43
–––––––  2007c.  ‘Fireflycellphone: Easy Mobile Communication – Without the Usual Complexity 
of Cellphone Technology’, in October, A. (ed.), Vodaworld, Interactive Africa: Roggebaai, 
Summer, pp16-17
Wilson III, E. J., Best, M. L. and Kleine, D., 2005.  ‘Moving Beyond the ‘Real Digital Divide’’, The 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Information  Technologies  and  International  Development,  
Volume 2, Number 3, ppiii-v
M)  Unclassified Websites
AfricanLoft., 2007a.  ‘TradeNet Portal: A West African Agric Trade Network Debuts’, AfricanLoft, 
31  October,  available  at  http://www.africanloft.com/tradenet-portal-a-west-african-agric-
trade-network-debuts/ (accessed on 15 March 2008)
–––––––  2007b.  ‘Analysis of the TradeNet Service’, AfricanLoft, 17 December, available at http://
www.africanloft.com/analysis-of-the-tradenet-service/ (accessed on 15 March 2008)
Batchelor,  S.  and  Scott,  N.,  2001.   ‘The  Role  of  ICTs  in  the  Development  of  Sustainable  
Livelihoods’,  Sustainable ICTs,  available at http://www.sustainableicts.org/livelihoods.htm 
(accessed on 24 July 2007)
bridges.org., 2003.  ‘World Economic Forum-NEPAD E-Africa  Commission E-Readiness Policy  
Programme:  Building  Capacity  to  Narrow  the  Digital  Divide  in  Africa  from Within’,  
bridges.org,  available  at  http://www.bridges.org/publications/49 (accessed  on  21  March  
2007) 
121
–––––––,  SchoolNet  Africa,  International  Development  Research  Centre  and  Open  Society  
Institute., 2005.  ‘Comparison Study of Free/Open Source and Proprietary Software in an 
African Context, Implementation and Policy-Making to Optimise Public- Access to ICT’,  
bridges.org, available at www.bridges.org/publications/21 (accessed on 21 March 2007)
Celtel International., 2007.  ‘One Network Now Allows Celtel Customers in East Africa Fast and 
Easy  Internet  Access,  Africa  Setting  Standards  for  Global  Mobile  Industry’,  Celtel  
International,  8  August,  available  at  http://www.celtel.com/en/news/press-
release54/index.html (accessed on 19 March 2008)
Chen,  W.  and  Wellman,  B.,  2003.  ‘Charting  and  Bridging  Digital  Divides:  Comparing  Socio-
economic,  Gender,  Life  Stage,  and  Rural-Urban  Internet  Access  and  Use  in  Eight  
Countries’,  NetLab  Centre  for  Urban  and  Community  Studies,  University  of  Toronto,  
available at www.amd.com/usen/assets/content_type/DownloadableAssets/  (accessed on 18 
May 2007)
–––––––  2006.  ‘The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances’,  
Global Poverty Research Group, pp1-18, available at http://www.gprg.org/ (accessed on 3 
August 2007)
Clark, D. A. and Qizilbash M., 2002, ‘Core Poverty and Extreme Vulnerability in South Africa’,  
Discussion Paper No. 2002-3, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, available at 
http://www.geocities.com/poverty_in_southafrica   (accessed on 2 July 2007)
–––––––  2005, ‘Core Poverty, Basic Capabilities and Vagueness: An Application to the South  
African Context’, GPRG Working Paper 26, Universities of Manchester and Oxford, avail
able at http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-026.pdf   (accessed on 2 July 
2007)
Cohen, K. and Wakeford, N., 2003.  ‘The Making of Mobility, the Making of the Self’, available at 
www.soc.surrey.ac.uk/incite/AESOP%20Phase3.htm (accessed on 17 March 2007)
Hannan, A., 2001.  ‘Changing Higher Education: Teaching, Learning and Institutional Cultures’,  
EducatiON-LINE,  available  at http:www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/  00001855.htm   
(accessed on 12 February 2007)
Market Information Systems and Traders’ Organizations of West Africa (MISTOWA)., 2008.  ‘MIS
TOWA in Brief’, available at http://www.mistowa.org/en/pages/mission.htm   (accessed on 16 
March 2008)
Rheingold, H., 1995.  ‘Are Virtual Communities Harmful to Civil Society?’, 4 September, available 
at http://www.well.com/user/hlr/tomorrow/vccivil.html  (accessed on 10 August 2005)
Romanos,  E.,  2007.   ‘Analysis  of  the  TradeNet  Service’,  17  December,  available  at  
122
http://www.africanloft.com/analysis-of-the-tradenet-service/ accessed on 16 March 2008)
Samuel, J., Shah, N. amd Hadingham, W., 2005.  ‘Mobile Communications in South Africa, Tan
zania, and Egypt: Results from Community and Business Surveys, Africa: The Impact of  
Mobile  Phones,  Vodafone,  available  at  
http://www.vodafone.com/etc/medialib/attachments/cr_downloads.Par.78351.File.tmp/GPP  _  
(accessed on 4 January 2007)
Vecchiatto,  P.,  2007a.  ‘To  Patent  or  License  Software?’,  ITWeb,  31  January,  available  at  
www.enews.co.za/sections/software/previous.asp?C=Legal%20View (accessed  on  31  
January 2007
–––––––   2007b.   ‘Mbeki  Misses  the  ICT  Point’,  ITWeb,  9  February,  available  at  
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/telecoms/2007/0702091111.aspA=BSR&S=BestRead&
O=FPIN (accessed on 9 February 2007)
Vodafone.,  2005.   ‘Africa:  The  Impact  of  Mobile  Phones’,  Vodafone,  available  at  
http://www.vodafone.com/etc/medialib/attachments/cr_downloads.Par.78351.File.tmp/GPP  _  
SIM_paper_3.pdf (accessed on 25 June 2007)
Worldmapper.,  2008.   ‘A  to  Z  Index  of  Maps’,  Worldmapper,  available  at  
http://www.worldmapper.org/atozin    dex.html   (accessed on 26 August 2008)
N) Miscellaneous
Assessments of Impacts and Adaptation to Climate Change (AIACC)., 2003.  ‘The Way We Live: 
Livelihood Systems in the Sahel’ (Slideshow), Presented at the Africa Regional Workshop, 
South  Africa,  10-13  March,  available  at  
www.aiaccproject.org/meetings/Johannesburg_03/Sessions    %20A%20thru  
%20E/C3_ANyong_AF92.ppt (accessed on 10 July 2008)
Desai, A.,  2004.  ‘Karl Marx’s the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon: The Coming of Power 
of Napoleon: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Nelson-Mbeki’ (videorecording), E. G. Malherbe 
Library, Howard College, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Esselaar,  S.  Gillwald,  A.  and  Stork  C.,  2006.   South  African  Telecommunications  Sector  
Performance  Review  2006,  Link  Centre  Public  Policy,  Research  Paper  Number  8,  
Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand
Coyle, D., 2005.  ‘Overview’, Africa: The Impact of Mobile Phones, Vodafone Policy Paper Series, 
Number 2, pp3-9
123
Krishna Kumar, K., 1979.  ‘The Social and Cultural Impacts of Transnational Enterprises’, Working 
Paper Number 6, Sydney: Transnational Corporation Research Project
Stiglitz, J. E., 1998b.  ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-
Washington  Consensus’,  in  WIDER  Annual  Lecture  Series,  Helsinki:  United  Nations  
University
Turner, M., 2002.  80:20 Development in an Unequal World, (cartoon), in Regan, C., (ed.), Belfast: 
80:20 Educating and Acting for a Better World, pg32
Van Audenhove, L., 2003.  Towards an Integrated Information Society Policy in South Africa: An 
Overview of Political Rhetoric and Policy Initiatives 1994-2000, Occasional Paper 1, Cape 
Town: HRSC
Wang, H. M., 2003.  ‘Analysis of Project Operational Mechanism and Impacts: Poverty Alleviation 
Project Through Access to Information, Communications and Technology in the Rural Area 
of China’, Presented During the International Workshop on the Model of Poverty Alleviation 
through ICTs’, Volume 32, Number 1, pp1-15
Waverman, L., Meschi, M. and Fuss, M, 2005.  ‘The Impact of Telecoms on Economic Growth in 




Data Survey in Ndumu
Age  group 
categories
Age frequency per age group Age frequency by gender
M F
16-29 9 8 1
30-39 3 2 1
40-49 6 3 3
50-59 1 1 0
60-above 1 0 1
Income groups (per month) Income by frequency Income  frequency  by 
gender
M       F
< R100 9 4 5
0-R199 8 7 1
R200-R499 0 0 0
R500-R999 0 0 0
R1000-above 1 1 0
*2 participants chose not to provide income-related information.
Education groups Education level 
frequency
Education level frequency by 
gender
M     F
None 7 5 2
Grades 1-3 3 1 2
Grades 4-7 4 3 1
Grades 8-10 2 2 0
Grades 11-12 4 3 1
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Data Survey in Sicabazini
Age group categories Age frequency per age group Age frequency by gender
M    F
16-29 8 3 5
30-39 7 5 2
40-49 1 0 1
Education 
groups
Education  level 
frequency
Education level frequency by gender
M     F
None 8 4 4
Grades 1-3 5 3 2
Grades 4-7 0 0 0
Income (per month) Income by frequency Income frequency by gender
M     F
< R100 7 3 4
0-R199 6 3 3
R200-R499 6 4 2
R500-R999 0 0 0
R1000-above 0 0 0
*1 participant chose not to provide income-related information.                                      
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Annexure 2
Questions on Perceptions Towards Cellphones in Ndumu and Sicabazini
Before answering the following questions, participants were asked to state how many cellphones 
they own.
1. It improves communication with my family and friends.
2. It helps me in emergencies.
3. I don’t need to walk to a Telkom callbox.
4.  It helps me find work.
5. It saves me money because I don’t have to travel as much.
6. It saves me money because it is cheaper than using a fixed line.
7. It improves my life because it is a status symbol.
8. I allow family and friends to make calls and I charge them for it.
9.  I am able to constantly afford its expenses with a constant form of income.
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Annexure 3
Data Survey on Cellphones
“Which cellphone can realistically help you most to improve and sustain your living standards and  
quality of life from what they currently are, and reduce poverty if you are affected by it”
Cellphone 1
Cellphone 2
Model Type Ericsson GSM628
Model Year 1996














Model Type Samsung D900
Model Year 2006




Phonebook 1000 entries and photo call





Messaging SMS, EMS, MMS, Email
Camera Yes (3.15 mega pixels, autofocus, video, flash
FM Radio Yes
Price R1 889
